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anonymous respondents that contributed to this book by sharing with
me their valuable insights. All errors remain my responsibility.
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search, and mention other spelling methods if relevant.
Some of you, especially those familiar with ethnic Chinese business
in Indonesia, may think this book is about corruption. It is not – and I
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1 Introduction
1.1 Ethnic Chinese Family Business Groups in Southeast Asia
Despite the fact that ethnic Chinese make up only a very small minor-
ity of the populations of most Southeast Asian countries, they tend to
contribute a disproportionally large share to economic activity in the
region. This phenomenon can be observed in countries such as the
Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and most prominently in Indonesia.
Many of the large businesses in Southeast Asia are started and mana-
ged by families of Chinese descent. The majority of these family em-
pires are organised in a cluster of separate companies, hence the term
business group.
What is the difference between a family firm and a family business
group? A commonly used definition for a family firm is: ‘a business
governed and/or managed on a sustainable, potentially cross-genera-
tional, basis to shape and perhaps pursue the formal or implicit vision
of the business held by members of the same family or a small num-
ber of families’.1 Family control of businesses occurs around the world,
but family businesses are extremely important in emerging markets,
including Asia, where the largest of those family businesses are often
organised in corporate groups.2 Examples of family controlled groups
are Samsung from Korea, the Tata Group from India, and the Salim
Group from Indonesia. Many ethnic Chinese groups fit into this pat-
tern and they can be characterised as a collection of economic interests
rather than a single legal entity. Family business groups are therefore
collections of firms bound together in formal and/or informal ways, con-
trolled and shaped on a long-term basis by a family or coalition of families.
Given the importance of ethnic Chinese family business groups in
Southeast Asia, the literature on this phenomenon has seen a rapid de-
velopment.3 Researchers have asked themselves whether and how eth-
nic Chinese family business groups are different from other firms in
the region.4 What business strategies do they employ and why, and are
those strategies more successful than those employed by indigenous or
Western firms? This study contributes to this literature as it provides a
rich account of the development of one of the largest family business
groups in Southeast Asia. Before turning to the case study of the Salim
Group, I first provide the theoretical foundations for the study and de-
scribe the methodology applied. The research material on the Salim
Group is presented in subsequent chapters. Non-academic readers may
choose to skip this introductory chapter and proceed to chapter two.
The knowledge that has been developed on ethnic Chinese family
business strategy is voluminous but remains highly fragmented. Many,
often contradictory, explanations have been proposed for the behaviour
of ethnic Chinese family business groups. Three different academic ap-
proaches are reviewed below: 1. Chinese family business; 2. migrant
approaches; 3. the study of business groups in emerging markets.
1.2 The Chinese Family Business
The first set of theories assumes that there is a distinct and more or
less stable form of management within ethnic Chinese family firms.
This specific type of firm is termed the Chinese Family Business
(CFB).
Family firm research explicitly recognises the special role of the con-
trolling family, which often participates in the management of the
firm.5 If the ownership, control and leadership are combined, it en-
ables a very powerful leadership role for one or more family members.
Contrary to managerial firms, where the manager is not the owner, fa-
mily firms do not have to align the interests between managers and
shareholders (agency problem) since these roles are combined in one
family.6 The family leader, with his or her unique position of power,
may profoundly influence the corporate strategy of the firm. In many
Asian family firms, with a tradition of hierarchy and respect, family
firm leaders are often patriarchs with strong control over all operations.
This family leadership role gives continuity to the firm since the leader-
ship changes perhaps only with the passing of the generations.
As is the case in all family businesses, ethnic Chinese family firms
are strongly influenced by the internal dynamics within the family.
Many ethnic Chinese firms are known to have fallen apart as a result
of internal family conflicts, particularly with the arrival of a new gen-
eration.7 Those that have successfully managed the generational transi-
tion have done so by adopting new strategic ideas and new challenges.8
Given the strong role of the family in the firm, their values are argued
to be essential for corporate strategy.9 There are numerous studies on
the particular characteristics of ethnic Chinese family firms.10 This mod-
el is sometimes called the Chinese Family Business, or CFB11 or more
broadly ‘Chinese Capitalism’.12 The fact that it was called a Chinese
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model already indicates that researchers tended to look for intrinsic
qualities in Chinese businessmen.
What are these Chinese values that influence a firm’s strategy? Ex-
tant research emphasises the influence of Confucian values, in particu-
lar the social norms for different types of relationships. Hofstede and
Bond describe four key principles in Confucian societies: 1. the stability
of society is based on unequal relationships between people; 2. the fa-
mily is the prototype of all social organisations; 3. virtuous behaviour is
treating others as you would like to be treated; 4. virtue with regard to
one’s task in life consists of trying to acquire skills and education,
working hard, not spending more than necessary, being patient and
persevering.13 It is argued that Confucian values play a central role for
entrepreneurs of Chinese descent and guide them when doing busi-
ness. Hence, it is believed that the Chinese have a preference for patri-
archal family businesses with a frugal mentality. Businessmen of Chi-
nese descent are argued to value trust in relationships with others. A
typical list of ‘Chinese’ family business characteristics is available in ta-
ble 1.1. Other authors have given similar accounts of what constitutes
the Chinese Family Business.14
The ‘Chinese culture’ argument has been very important in studies of
ethnic Chinese business. As Ruth McVey15 puts it: ‘The arguments ex-
plaining the Chinese’ continued centrality to the region’s economy,
while they may take note of historical and economic factors, tend
to find the principal reason in culture: roughly, that Southeast Asia’s
Chinese have a value system which elevates business success and
promotes business-like behaviour, while the indigenous populations do
not’. There is now increasing criticism of this ‘cultural’ model of
Table 1.1 Characteristics of Chinese Family Business
Characteristics
1 Small scale; relatively simple organisational structuring.
2 Normally focused on one product or market.
3 Centralised decision-making, with heavy reliance on one dominant CEO.
4 Family ownership and control.
5 A paternalistic organisational climate.
6 Linked via strong personal networks to other key organisations such as suppliers,
customers, sources of finance, etc.
7 Normally very cost conscious and financially efficient.
8 Relatively weak in terms of creating large-scale market recognition for own brands,
especially internationally.
9 Subject to limitations of growth and organisational complexity due to a discouraging
context for the employment of professional managers. (There are now some exceptions
to this).
10 A high degree of strategic adaptability, due to a dominant decision maker.
Source: Redding (1995, p. 64)
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Chinese family businesses. It would set the Chinese apart from the in-
digenous populations as these explanations quietly assume that the
Chinese have superior business values. Moreover, by linking the Chi-
nese family business to a more or less stable set of cultural characteris-
tics, many authors tended to pay less attention to the rapid changes
that have occurred within ethnic Chinese firms, especially within those
family businesses that were successful and grew substantially.
Critics of the cultural perspective argue that it ignored important
changes within ethnic Chinese firms, such as growth and diversifica-
tion over a number of decades, thus increasing the complexities of run-
ning the family business and calling for new and more sophisticated
management strategies.16 With increased size, these businesses moved
away from the simple structures, hired professional non-family mem-
bers as managers, implemented pyramid structures,17 and used the
stock exchange to satisfy increasing capital requirements for expan-
sion.18 Although some businesses sold majority stakes of their compa-
nies to the investing public, many ethnic Chinese families keep control
over their groups through pyramid ownership structures that ensure
majority control rights, although not always substantial rights to the
economic fruits of the business.19 With expansion, which forced new
management approaches and organisational structures, usually came
internationalisation, which added another layer of complexity to the fa-
mily business.20 Furthermore, events such as the Asian Crisis, and
trends such as the world-wide globalisation processes21 and the rise of
the Chinese economy22 also exercise a strong influence on the strategy
of ethnic Chinese family business.
Given these changes, is the cultural view on the traditional ‘CFB’
which characterises it as based on paternalism, family ownership, con-
trol, personal networks, adaptability and simple organisational struc-
tures, still valid? One of the questions this study seeks to answer is
how many typically ‘Chinese strategies’ today’s large ethnic Chinese fa-
mily business groups have.
1.3 The Migrant Entrepreneur: Diaspora Advantages
A related body of literature starts from the specific situation of minor-
ity groups and argues that their success stems from developing excel-
lent social capital. This concept is used to denote advantages from per-
sonal or business connections.23 Some researchers emphasise closely-
knit personal relations and networks among diaspora Chinese in
Asia24 and argue that these links may be the key ingredient of a suc-
cessful business strategy. Close-knit groups may offer business advan-
tages because deviant business behaviour carries penalties, thus ensur-
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ing a higher level of trust and lower transaction costs among group
members doing business with each other. In addition, migration is a
selection process in which only the most risk-taking people engage –
which then increases the prevalence of entrepreneurship among such
groups.
The role of the Chinese in the economic development of Southeast
Asia is seen by some as essentially similar to that of other well-off
minorities such as Indians in the British Empire, Jews in Europe or
Protestants in Catholic Europe.25 Migrants often face difficult and hos-
tile host contexts, and often deal with official or unofficial discrimina-
tion. In theories related to migration, ‘being Chinese’ is the equivalent
of not being Indonesian, Filipino, Malaysian, etc.26 Chinese migrants
in Indonesia have since colonial times occupied important economic
positions, for example, as intermediaries, and have continued to do so
after the independence of Indonesia and throughout subsequent re-
gime changes. The favourable economic position of the Chinese mi-
grants (compared to the indigenous population) created tension among
Indonesians, and it does until today, and is known as ‘the Chinese pro-
blem’.27 Several seminal works, by historians, economists and sociolo-
gists, have described the peculiar position of the Chinese minority in
Indonesian business and raised questions on why this situation has
arisen.28
How has the Chinese minority in Indonesia been able to create and
maintain its economic dominance? If one were to see the development
of capitalism in Asia as a struggle for power over politico-economic re-
sources, an approach that political economists often take, ethnic Chi-
nese capitalists are a minority group that has been successful in this
struggle for economic control, particularly in Indonesia.29 Several
authors ascribe this to Chinese alliances with local political power
which enabled preferential access to scarce resources such as raw mate-
rials, technology and capital – an approach that is often termed rent-
seeking or crony capitalism.30 In Indonesia, the term cukong is used
for a Chinese businessman linked to an official. It may not be clear at
the outset in crony-type relations how and when the favour will be reci-
procated.
Local political or military figures in Indonesia were keen to establish
crony links with Chinese businessmen because they could derive eco-
nomic benefits from this alliance without the other partner forming a
threat to political power and because they could more easily be kept at
bay.31 The fact that a leader like Suharto linked up with various ethnic
Chinese businessmen can be understood in this manner.32 Elson, in
his biography of Suharto, noted his unusual ‘fundraising abilities’,33
and in his autobiography Suharto himself describes how he made use
of the Chinese businessmen to achieve his objectives for the Indone-
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sian nation.34 This situation meant that companies were generally
faced with an environment where relationships with those in power
were an important factor to business success. This specific context of
crony relations was particularly developed in Indonesia and less so in
other Asian countries, although cronyism has also been noted in coun-
tries like the Philippines. Cronyism between officials and vulnerable
minorities is by no means just an Asian phenomenon, but has also oc-
curred in Europe.35
Political economists also go a step further and claim that the ethnic
Chinese businesses in Indonesia, through their crony relations, have
managed to actively mobilise their resources to influence their busi-
ness environment successfully. By creating and subsequently actively
maintaining politico-business alliances they ensured alignment be-
tween political and economic elite to the benefit of both.36 Again, this
situation is not unique to Indonesia. In South Korea, some business
groups, known as chaebols, have become dominant factors in the econo-
my. Chibber argues that rather than the state controlling business, a
more subtle mutual process between state and business interests led to
South Korea’s successful economic development.37 Others argue more
strongly that South Korea was troubled by an entrenched system of
government-business relationships38 or use the concept ‘mutual hos-
tages’ to describe co-ordination between business and state.39 In Indo-
nesia the mutual dependence of business and state was perhaps even
more pronounced. Schwarz claims that
Indonesia’s policy-makers are hostage to the ethnic Chinese,
whose firms produce a sizeable share of output. ... Thus the
group [of ethnic Chinese] has usually been able to fend off mea-
sures that would hinder business operations.40
Others focus less on crony relations with officials, but instead empha-
sise the embedding in personal networks between diaspora Chinese in
Asia, based on common surnames, clans or dialect groups.41 Although
a topic of debate, some researchers argue that networks based on dia-
lect groups of ethnic Chinese continue to be an important factor influ-
encing their business networks. Chinese migrants have set up volun-
tary organisations, often based on dialect groups, to fulfil functions
such as preserving culture, providing mutual assistance and creating
regional trade networks, and these organisations continue to flourish.42
Some authors argue that the intra-ethnic Chinese networks offer a
competitive advantage as they cross borders and facilitate internationa-
lisation.43 Anecdotal evidence of business connections between large
ethnic Chinese tycoons are given in many semi-popular books, for ex-
ample in Weidenbaum and Hughes’ book The Bamboo Network, the
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title of which refers to the flexible networks of ethnic Chinese in
Asia.44
Cross-border minority group networking would also explain why so
many ethnic Chinese tycoons have invested in China, usually also in
their places of birth. Provinces with many migrants in southeastern
China, such as Fujian and Guangdong have received an enormous
amount of foreign direct investment in recent decades. The ties with
one’s place of birth are termed qiaoxiang ties, referring to a sojourner’s
village or hometown and have been the subject of analysis in a number
of books and research projects.45 Researchers emphasising the intra-
ethnic networking skills often see ethnic Chinese family businesses as
a transnational form of management, which is not necessarily linked
to or rooted in a nation.46 The basis of such intra-ethnic ties is often
linked to Chinese culture. Chinese networks are commonly termed
guanxi which refers to personal, particularistic relationships between
two individuals.47 The basis for guanxi can be a shared experience, for
example, the same birthplace, the same school, the same clan, the
same surname, the same family, and so on. As such, it is easier for
Chinese people amongst themselves to develop guanxi than for Chi-
nese with people of other nationalities. Guanxi has to be maintained
by giving favours and for this reason it is often associated with bribes,
especially in Indonesia.48
Placing the literature on crony connections and intra-ethnic network
of minority Chinese in a broader perspective, it appears that social
capital, or the ability to use networks as a business resource, is an es-
sential aspect of ethnic Chinese business. There is now substantial
agreement that social capital facilitates individual, organisational, and
collective action and thereby creates value.49 Although social capital is
useful in every context as a basis for competitive advantage, entrepre-
neurs operating in hostile environments, such as minorities in a cor-
rupt host country, or in an emerging market with poor investor protec-
tion, could specifically benefit from long-lasting connections.50 It is
useful to distinguish between bonding and bridging forms of social ca-
pital, where bonding is building connections within the own social
group and bridging means networking across social categories.51 Crony
capitalism theories have argued that bridging capital is the basis for
business success of (some) ethnic Chinese firms whereas diaspora the-
ories focus on bonding capital between ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs.
There is also increased criticism of the migrant point of view. Simi-
lar to the criticism of the cultural perspective, migrant theories may
stigmatise the ethnic Chinese, even if some migrant families have lived
in Indonesia for generations and assumed an Indonesian name and
nationality. Also, migrant theories do not always look at the dynamics
of migrant entrepreneurship. Networks of entrepreneurs are known to
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influence business decisions, but the composition and influence of the
business network may evolve over time.52 Some authors have criticised
the attribution of omnipotent powers to networking, and have argued
that, as the business grows and its environment develops, guanxi and
networking with political figures is not as important as in early
stages.53
1.4 Institutional Theory
The ‘Chinese family business’ and the ‘migrant’ approaches are some-
times combined. But a third kind of approach takes a radically different
stand and focuses not on the businessmen themselves, but on their
business environment. The institutional perspective argues that large
diversified conglomerates, often held by families or coalitions of fa-
milies, are perfectly normal types of economic organisation, particu-
larly in emerging economies with weak economic institutions.54 The
types of strategies and organisations ethnic Chinese businessmen cre-
ate – family business groups – exist in Chile, Mexico, Turkey and many
more countries. There is, in the perspective of institutional economists
or strategic management researchers, nothing ‘Chinese’ about this.
Institutional theory states that institutions are an important factor in
shaping the strategy of organisations,55 and lead to a particular set of
business strategies in developing countries.56 The fact that business
groups are more prevalent in emerging markets than elsewhere has
spurred a body of literature linking the existence of business groups to
attributes of the institutional environment where (lack of) formal insti-
tutions, relationships, or norms, values and networks create advantages
for developing diversified business groups.57 It is argued that in ‘weak’
institutional environments it is hard for firms to acquire inputs such
as capital, human resources or raw materials because financial, labour
and product markets are not well developed. In such cases where inter-
mediary functions are underdeveloped, a diversified business group
may offer advantages because production factors can be internally
sourced at lower cost.58 Others attribute a role to the state or state poli-
cies in stimulating the development of business groups, such as in
Japan59 or South Korea60 while others point to a more abstract ‘institu-
tional environment’ as a conditioning factor for business.61 The institu-
tional environment is a composite concept and refers to formal and in-
formal constraints on organisational behaviour, where formal con-
straints refer to rules and regulations and informal constraints to
norms, values, and networks.62
Another concept used to explain why diversified firms are more
prevalent in weak institutional settings is the transaction economics
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approach,63 which focuses on the contractual dimension of the firm. If
the environment displays large levels of uncertainty and the costs and
risks associated with a transaction with another party are high, it is bet-
ter to do everything yourself. So it may be advantageous to create your
own bank, your own export/import firm, insurance company, etc. An-
other way to overcome this problem of high transaction costs is to rely
on family and trusted parties – or, in other terms, to form social net-
works which are reflected in the corporate strategy.64 In emerging
countries, market failures (i.e., very high transaction costs) and strong
influence of the state on business may offer an incentive for companies
to diversify. Diversification has been an issue of considerable theoreti-
cal significance.65 The transaction cost approach offers one theory of
why companies diversify, namely depending on whether transactions
on the market or within the organisation are more efficient. Besides
the transaction cost approach, another complementary theory is useful
in explaining why business groups arise; the economies of scope. This
theory is generally linked to sharable production inputs.66 Examples of
such ‘sharable production inputs’ are production capacity, human re-
sources, capital, materials, or technology. Thus, if there are advantages
in combining different products, and transaction costs to acquire re-
sources outside the firm are high, building a diversified group or con-
glomerate could be beneficial.
If conglomeration and use of networks of trusted partners are re-
sponses to imperfect institutional environments, then as institutions
modernise one would expect a move towards market-based strategies,67
and eventually perhaps a convergence with Western management mod-
els. Extending this line of work, Peng and Zhou68 argue further that
the move of Asian firms from network strategies towards market-based
strategies is not a sudden transition. In the face of institutional
changes, the business strategy in emerging markets moves from a net-
work-based strategy through an intermediate phase of weakening net-
work ties before eventually evolving into a market-based strategy.
Critics of institutional theory argue that it assumes that organisa-
tions adapt passively to their context and as such it does not account
for choices of managers. Managers can wilfully steer their organisa-
tions in certain directions and are not passive adapters to whatever in-
stitutional context, they can and indeed make a difference. Therefore,
institutional theory cannot explain why organisations do not adapt to
new environments, nor can it account for the success of different types
of firms in the same environment.
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1.5 Dynamic Model of Ethnic Chinese Family Business
It is clear that the three approaches described above have distinct as-
sumptions and offer partial explanations (table 1.2). While the institu-
tional approach attempts to explain ethnic Chinese business group
strategy by looking at contextual factors (termed the institutional envir-
onment), the cultural approach finds explanations from within the
businessmen themselves. The minority approach combines internal
and external factors, arguing that minority groups create competitive
advantages by developing different types of social capital. How they do
this is informed by their values and dependent on the context. Recently
the cultural and minority perspectives have been criticised and re-
searchers increasingly feel that larger ethnic Chinese companies are
undergoing fundamental changes that have hitherto received very little
attention by scholars.
The aforementioned approaches, and the criticism of them, all offer
a partial understanding of the strategy of ethnic Chinese family busi-
ness groups, but taken together, may offer a more complete picture. I
argue that an essential first step in combining the approaches above is
to introduce a time element and look at the evolution of such business
groups over time. Doing this enables one to distinguish between large
and small firms and to address changes within ethnic Chinese busi-
nesses over time. A one-person trading business may be quite different
from a multinational business operating in different countries and in-
dustries. If one considers subsequent phases of business development,
from the first small one-person firm to the medium-sized family enter-
prise, to a large multinational conglomerate run by the next genera-












What are the characteristics and strategies of a Chinese family
business?
What is the influence of culture on management and strategy?
Is there a specific type of capitalism among ethnic Chinese?








What is the reason behind the business success of some
immigrant groups?
Why do some immigrants form crony alliances?
Why do immigrants form intra-ethnic networks?






Why are business groups formed?
What is the role of the institutional context?
Why do business groups diversify?
What competitive advantages do business groups develop?
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tions of family leaders, one is able to see that some theories offer expla-
nations for corporate strategy in one phase of their development, but
not necessarily in another. Cultural values, for example, may play an
important role for the first-generation migrant Chinese entrepreneur,
while the second generation may have lost affinity with China since he
or she grew up in Southeast Asia and perhaps received an MBA from
an American university. When the family firm is large and increasingly
global and professional, the owners’ values may be of decreasing im-
portance, but institutions may matter all the more for the strategy of
the group.69
The literature review clearly points at the importance of exogenous
and endogenous factors that influence corporate strategy over time.
While institutional theories place more emphasis on external changes
in the business context as a factor in explaining strategy, cultural and
family business approaches look primarily at factors within the firm,
such as the value systems of the founding family or the generational
changes in leadership. Diaspora approaches combine external factors,
such as the economic position of a minority, with entrepreneurial re-
sponses. How do these internal and external factors influencing corpo-
rate strategy work out over time? Which factors are important in which
stage of development? Once the above-mentioned theoretical ap-
proaches are placed in a conceptual model distinguishing between the
different phases in corporate development, they substantially increase
our understanding of how corporate strategy evolves in an ethnic Chi-
nese family business (table 1.3).
It is not very surprising that, as a company grows, founding entre-
preneur values become relatively less important and the corporate strat-
egy could also be interpreted in terms of current global opportunities
and strategic choices. Yet this basic insight has gained very little accep-
tance when it comes to ethnic Chinese firms. Even if we are talking
about multinational companies, whose turnover is in billions of dollars,
Table 1.3 Conceptual Model of Ethnic Chinese Family Firm Development
Corporate Size Strategy Relevant Frameworks
Small Small Scale Trading Chinese Family Business, Ethnic Networks
Medium Diversification and
Growth





Institutional Theory, Strategic Management, Crony
and Ethnic Networks, Family Business
Very Large Multi-national strategy,
domestic market power
Institutional & Strategic Management
Approaches, Business Groups in Emerging
Markets
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many researchers continue to look at the cultural values and network
strategies of the founder which occurred fifty years ago. New manage-
ment patterns, the decline of old networks and the rise of new net-
works are often ignored as a result of this bias. In this study the strat-
egy of an ethnic Chinese business over time is seen as a response to
both internal factors, such as family values, culture, corporate growth
and generational changes; and to external changes affecting the busi-
ness from outside, for example state policies, corrupt host culture, eco-
nomic modernisation or regime change.
Researchers taking a strategic management approach see the cultur-
al and migrant approaches as a way of dealing with weak institutional
contexts and sometimes refer to it as a relationship-based strategy. Fol-
lowing Peng70 it is possible to make a distinction between (1) the rela-
tionship-based business model (where business opportunities arise as a
result of personal ties with other Chinese business families and politi-
cal powers) and (2) the market-based model (where economic logic in-
dependent of personalities prevails). The relationship-based versus the
market-based model can be understood as a dilemma of two opposing
choices. The relationship-based model is associated with highly perso-
nal, value-based networks, special favours for both parties, opaque
transactions within and between companies, groups of individuals, and
institutions. The market-based model is associated with competition
based on choosing superior business strategies, on rational allocation
of resources, and on adherence to certain internationally accepted
rules. Overall, based on this literature review, one would hypothesise
that ethnic Chinese family firms, as they develop over time, show a
movement from a relationship-based to a market-based model as emer-
ging markets develop and adopt more liberal market economies.
It is likely that a relationship-based and market-based strategy does
not appear in a pure form among Asian conglomerates because cultur-
al values and networked strategies continue to be important. A com-
pany may maintain close business relations with clan-members while
also having joint ventures with Western multinationals and a close con-
nection with a politician. These businesses may operate on different
principles. In fact, depending on the situation and the strategic choices
available, companies may alternate between these models. If one con-
ceptualises strategy in ethnic Chinese family groups as a dilemma be-
tween a relationship model and a market model, one would expect a
pattern of oscillation, due to irregular external influence on the firm
and internal changes of leadership or directions. If Peng is right in his
hypothesis, strategy in such firms would probably show an oscillatory
pattern.71 I expect that evolution from a networked model to a modern
market-based strategy is not linear, and that oscillatory patterns display-
ing some sort of rhythm are likely. Figure 1.1 presents the hypothesised
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development of the strategy of an ethnic Chinese family firm over
time.
1.6 A Coevolutionary Approach to Strategy
I have briefly touched upon a topic that is essential in corporate strat-
egy: the degree of freedom a manager has to shape strategy. Is a com-
pany victim to environmental factors as is the focus of institutional the-
ory? Or can it exercise strategic choice and adapt to or even influence
its environment? The literature takes diverging directions attributing
various degrees of freedom for management to influence their own
strategy and their environment over time.72 Researchers of ethnic Chi-
nese firms have also voiced divergent views on strategic choice. On the
one end of the debate, it is argued that ethnic Chinese businesses are
specifically good at adapting to their environment and are known for
their resilience and strategic ‘fit’ within the business context of their
time.73 Even in a hostile context they have found ways to succeed in
business. This adaptability is considered a central feature of ethnic Chi-
nese business and is reflected in the organisational culture. Scholars
described ethnic Chinese family businesses as having a flat organisa-
tional structure with a strong leader, an agile organisational form. The









   
   
   
   












Figure 1.1 Oscillation of Corporate Strategy over Time
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mation flows, alliances and facilitate cross-border trade.74 Other re-
searchers have argued that, on the contrary, ethnic Chinese businesses
were unable to adapt successfully to new circumstances because of lim-
itations inherent in their initial physical and cultural set-up – some-
times called administrative heritage.75 Others refer to the fact that his-
tory matters for present-day strategy choices as ‘path-dependence’.76 In-
itial conditions present in the business from its founding period limit
the ability to change the business, although studies suggest that there
is always an element of choice.77 Some authors refer to the two per-
spectives described above (company strategy being either flexible or un-
able to adapt to the environment) as attributing a reactive and/or pas-
sive role to human agency.78
The passive and reactive roles described apply to the development of
ethnic Chinese business groups. Many ethnic Chinese business groups
in East Asia that started in the post-colonial period show a very similar
pattern. They initially began with trade, then moved into basic indus-
tries (food, cement), coinciding with the policies of import substitution
industrialisation, then moved into more capital-intensive industrialisa-
tion such as chemicals in a policy environment of export promotion;
internationalisation, and – to a limited extent – a recent move into
more high-tech industries and services such as telecommunications.79
The sequence of strategies clearly shows that the context strongly influ-
enced corporate strategy. In the case of the very large conglomerates,
the behaviour of the conglomerate also exercises a significant influence
on the evolution of the domestic institutional environment. This can
be referred to as a proactive role.80 Rather than simply being influ-
enced by their internal and external environment, this research points
to the idea that transitions in large business group strategy and their
internal and institutional environments are interdependent processes.
Instead of a unidirectional causal relation between institutional envir-
onment and corporate strategy, there is a process of co-evolution of cor-
porate strategy and the institutional context.
The co-evolution theory emerged in ecology to describe situations
where two or more species influence each other’s evolution.81 The fun-
damental insight of co-evolution is that context shapes the evolution of
a species by recognising that species sharing a habitat are part of each
other’s environment, and therefore they may exercise an influence on
each others’ evolution. Since the way each species evolves influences
the evolution of the other, this gives rise to complex longitudinal
patterns of intertwined relationships and unravelling the mutual adap-
tation mechanisms is the object of research by co-evolutionary theoreti-
cians. Most co-evolutionary phenomena are location-specific, and co-
evolutionary theorists speak of the ‘geographic mosaic of co-evolu-
tion’.82 This approach has little chance of resulting in generalisations
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that apply to the species as a whole, because co-evolution will work dif-
ferently in different habitats, but it is possible to unearth some patterns
that may apply to other cases.
The metaphor of co-evolution has recently been applied to the orga-
nisational sciences field.83 Coevolution theory has been instrumental
in reconciling various theoretical debates in organisational science, in
particular the above mentioned debate on the role of the institutional
environment versus the role of human agency. Institutional theory has
mostly focused on contextual variables that influence business beha-
viour.84 As a result of organisations adapting to the environment reac-
tively, organisations are remnants of past institutional contexts, i.e.,
they lag behind. Path dependency claims that as organisations develop,
their options to exercise strategic choice are more limited because they
are stuck in old routines. Institutional theory and path dependency
tend to focus on what we have earlier called the passive or reactive
roles for firms. The strategic choice theory however, assumes that orga-
nisations can meaningfully exercise purpose and that strategy is not
solely the outcome of contextual variables.85 Some firms are not only
influenced by the context, they also modify and influence it. It is usual-
ly much easier to document the influence of institutions on the strat-
egy of a company than the other way around. Most companies are too
insignificant to exercise any influence over national institutions. Some
very large companies, however, are in a position to modify their envir-
onment. Companies influencing their environment in a pro-active
manner are often termed ‘institutional entrepreneurs’.86 The advantage
of co-evolution theory is that it allows one to study the importance of
these theoretical notions in a longitudinal case, and in addition investi-
gate their interdependency. Academics using co-evolution approaches
are not only interested in factors increasing or decreasing managerial
purpose, but also in the question how this process takes place over
time.
Most empirical cases using the co-evolution framework have con-
firmed that firms may exercise strategic choice, but that this is at the
same time limited because of internal and external factors. The
amount of empirical co-evolution studies is still relatively modest. The
reason for this may be the considerable effort required to engage in
longitudinal, context-specific studies. The majority of existing empirical
studies have taken a class of companies in a certain national or regio-
nal industry context as their focus of study.87 Only a few of these stu-
dies are specific to Asian family business groups. I am aware of only
one co-evolutionary study of the development of ethnic Chinese family
businesses in Southeast Asia, which examines the development of such
organisations as a cluster in the institutional context in a longitudinal
perspective.88 There are virtually no co-evolution studies of single firms
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in an emerging market that had an influence on institutions.89 As far
as I know, this is the first study of company in an emerging market
that was large and powerful enough to directly influence its institu-
tional context as well as being influenced by it. Bringing corporate
strategy and the factors influencing it together in a co-evolutionary fra-
mework helps one understand strategic development of a company
over time. It is especially when such studies are set in an emerging
market context, that hitherto unexplored patterns of passive, active and
pro-active strategy formulation can be analysed.
1.7 Case Study Selection
There is an abundance of research on small and medium-sized ethnic
Chinese family business and a paucity of research with a longitudinal
perspective. Studies with a strategic management perspective have
mainly focused on smaller companies at a particular point in time.90
Although several management researchers have reported on larger eth-
nic Chinese firms, these accounts were often based on anecdotal evi-
dence rather than in-depth empirical research.91 Although various
studies have addressed ethnic Chinese business groups in a compara-
tive manner using quantitative analysis of publicly available financial
data92 there are few in-depth longitudinal studies of specific ethnic
Chinese business groups. Few researchers have been able to study
companies over longer periods of time, partly because of the challenges
such a study poses. Large ethnic Chinese business groups are often ela-
borate, complex, dynamic and often secretive in nature, all of which
makes rigorous study difficult and time-consuming. Thus, in order to
advance and integrate the various theories on ethnic Chinese business
groups, a longitudinal, in-depth study of a company that developed
from a migrant entrepreneur into a large multinational offers a pro-
mising research direction. The purpose of this study is to clarify how
the strategy of an ethnic Chinese business group changes over time,
and what factors may influence this process. This single case study
helps to fill a part of that gap.
How does one select the most suitable firm for a single case study?
In multiple case studies one may use statistical sampling, which is try-
ing to select those cases from a population which may be representa-
tive. Within single case research, however, theoretical sampling is used,
which refers to the idea that one selects a case that can most appropri-
ately and clearly show the phenomenon of interest. Case study re-
searchers often recommend selecting an ‘extreme’ case, firstly because
the phenomenon of interest may be better observable, and secondly,
because rigorous investigation of such cases may lead to theoretical
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advancement.93 Given the size, prominence and accessibility, I decided
to focus this study on the corporate strategy of the Salim Group.
The Salim Group embodies the typical ethnic Chinese business for
many Indonesians, and it is routinely mentioned in most academic
works on ethnic Chinese business. Even if many Indonesians tend to
think of the Salim Group as a ‘typical’ ethnic Chinese group, in many
ways the Salim Group was not typical but ‘extreme’: extremely large,
visible, professional, well-connected, powerful, international, etc. Its ex-
traordinary size contributed to the Salim family being perceived as a
symbol of ethnic Chinese businesses, thus making it a politically sensi-
tive topic during the Suharto regime. Moreover, the long term alliance
with Suharto made the Salim Group a well-known and despised ‘crony
capitalist’. Some popular and academic works even go as far to consid-
er the Salim Group as part of the Suharto family business empire.94
Whereas the Salim Group case cannot be considered representative of
a larger population, its prominence and size may contribute to empiri-
cal results that facilitate the development of new theories.
1.8 Introduction to the Salim Group
The Salim Group consists of a large number of private as well as pub-
lic companies – estimates are somewhere between 300 to 500 – placed
under the common umbrella of the Salim family and a few trusted
people. The portfolio of companies ranged from industries like bank-
ing, insurance, food, cement, to automotive and chemicals. In 1996,
the group had a turnover of over US$20 billion and around 200,000
employees, which made it by far the largest privately owned group in
Indonesia. Although the Salim Group operates in a number of mainly
Asian countries, most of the business is currently in Indonesia.
The founder of the group was Liem Sioe Liong, a Chinese from the
Fujian province in South China who immigrated to Java before World
War II. He initially started a small trading business with family and
clan members, which gradually expanded and diversified while supply-
ing goods to the local army after the war. During this period, Liem met
Suharto, who was later to become president. His contacts with the
army enabled him to grow and start small-scale manufacturing activ-
ities. Rapid growth occurred under the presidency of Suharto (1966-
1998), who was able to achieve unprecedented economic growth in In-
donesia for several decades (an average of 7% annually). Suharto of-
fered friendly capitalists favourable business conditions, which he con-
sidered a strategy to build a modern, industrialised economy. The
Salim Group benefited from this policy environment enormously and
in the 1970s it started or expanded activities in cement, flour milling,
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car manufacturing, banking, and textiles. A decade later, it had by-
passed all its peers and had become the largest domestic group with
close relations to Suharto.
As of the 1970s, Anthony Salim, who would become the second-gen-
eration leader, entered the business after having studied in the UK.
His vision was to modernise the family business and make it less de-
pendent on the government. In the 1990s, he started to take over con-
trol of the group from his father, as the business reorganised into divi-
sions, increasingly under the control of professional managers. Several
companies were now listed on stock exchanges in Indonesia or other
countries. Numerous new ventures were started, and the group also in-
vested substantially in Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Philippines,
and had businesses in the Netherlands and the US.
Before the Asian Crisis, the future looked bright for the Salim
Group. It consisted of hundreds of separate companies, in a variety of
countries. The group had experienced strong growth, diversification
and internationalisation. Around May 1998 however, the outlook for
the group changed completely. Having been a close friend of the Su-
harto family, the Salim Group lost its favourable political connections
when Suharto stepped down during the Asian Crisis. All Indonesian
business was severely hit by the crisis, but the Salim Group faced both
an economic and a political crisis. Having been the richest business fa-
mily in Indonesia; being ethnically Chinese; and being close to Suhar-
to, they came to symbolise the old corrupt regime in the eyes of the In-
donesian people. When violence against the Chinese minority raged in
Jakarta, mobs set fire to the Salim family house, people demonstrated
in the streets carrying Liem’s portrait and their Bank Central Asia
(BCA), the biggest privately owned bank in Indonesia with two of Su-
harto’s children on the supervisory board, fell victim to a bank run.
Along with many other Indonesian banks, it had to be rescued and re-
capitalised by the new Indonesian government. Many believed this was
the end of the Salim Group, but the group proved to be resilient to re-
gime changes.
The founder, Liem Sioe Liong, withdrew completely from the busi-
ness, and Anthony Salim was put in charge of facing the crisis. The
new Indonesian government required a payment for recapitalising
BCA, augmented with a fine for irregularities discovered in the bank’s
lending policy. In this way, the Salim Group suddenly faced a US$5 bil-
lion debt to the new government in addition to rising corporate debt le-
vels as a result of the depreciated rupiah. The new government pres-
sured the group to cooperate and, to the surprise of many, the Salim
family handed over 107 (shares in) companies to the new Indonesian
government to pay off their debts, being the first at that time to ser-
iously try to repay the company’s debts to the authorities of Indonesia.
32 THE RHYTHM OF STRATEGY
In fact, the Salim Group was to a large extent nationalised by the gov-
ernment as a result of these events. A few of their most precious com-
panies, notably Indofood, were ‘rescued’ by smart financial manoeuvr-
ing.
In the period after the Asian Crisis, it took years to bring corporate
debt back to acceptable levels. It was not until 2001 that the Salim
Group first started to invest again, in property in China and in agribu-
siness in Australia. It tried to regain its former strength and focused
on the business opportunities available in the East Asian region, while
divesting its US and European businesses. Some of the former busi-
nesses in Indonesia were bought back, and new investments were
made in Australia, China and other Asian countries.
In a nutshell, this paragraph described a few aspects of the fascinat-
ing corporate history of the Salim Group, which will be elaborated
upon and analysed further in this study.
1.9 Research Methodology
Case research is usually grounded in multiple sources. Within Indone-
sia, reliable written sources are scarce, so interviews were deemed im-
portant. Semi-structured interviews were held with Salim Group top
managers (including the CEO, Anthony Salim) as well as a range of
stakeholders, which was unique given the political sensitivity of this
group. As most respondents did not wish to become known they will
remain anonymous. Although companies like the Salim Group are re-
luctant to make corporate information public, there are laws requiring
the disclosure of information on public and – to a lesser extent – pri-
vately held companies. These corporate sources were also used. To
complement this, structured searches in specialised and general media
were also used as information sources on the Salim Group strategy
and the Indonesian business environment. Lastly, a broad survey of po-
litical and economic development of Indonesia was carried out mainly
using academic books and articles. Thus, the data gathered for this
thesis can be grouped in three types of sources, namely corporate docu-
ments; media sources and interviews. In addition to the three empiri-
cal sources secondary data (books, academic articles) have also been
used. While all those sources have disadvantages, these can partly be
overcome by combining them. In case research it is common to make
sure that arguments are supported by multiple sources. This procedure
is usually termed triangulation95 (see also annex 1 for a more elaborate
description of sources).
The data-gathering phase resulted in an enormous amount of data,
usually consisting of fragmented pieces of information. The first step
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in the analysis was to restructure and internalise the material in order
to pinpoint emerging themes. Thematic analysis focuses on emerging
patterns in the data, and on procedures for addressing these.96 Three
themes were formed over time while reflecting on theories and data.
The first theme identified was business networks. It was clear from
the beginning that the Salim Group worked with a large number of
partners. From the outset this made the concept ‘Salim Group’ proble-
matic. How can one define the borders of a conglomerate? Theory also
placed emphasis on networks, but was not clear regarding whether eth-
nic, professional or crony networks may have been the basis for the
success of the Salim Group. It was evident that the Salim Group en-
gaged in various partnerships of many kinds, but it was not immedi-
ately clear what types, how important which partners were, and how
the network changed over time. Thus, it was decided that the networks
of the Salim Group needed to be researched in detail in order to under-
stand how they evolved.
The second theme was an apparent discrepancy between this ‘net-
worked’ model and a more independent professional business model.
During the study it became evident that there was a strong dichotomy
in views on the Salim Group. On the one hand, there was the view that
the Salim Group was an unethical, corrupt and opaque conglomerate
known for its unhealthy crony relationships with former president Su-
harto, which forms the basis of their success. On the other hand, there
is a more positive appreciation of the professional competencies of the
Salim Group and the view that the Salim Group is the best corporate
group within Indonesia, employing the best corporate practices and
capable of operating in different environments.97 The dichotomy was
initially puzzling because the two pictures did not seem to match. Be-
cause it was such an evident aspect of the initial data review, it was
clear that this diversity showed different ‘voices’ that needed to be pre-
served in the analysis. The dichotomy supported the idea of the exis-
tence of both a relationship-based strategy (expressed in the first
theme) and a market-based strategy as articulated by scholars such as
Peng98 and discussed earlier in this introduction. Once the data was
placed in this context, the dichotomy was visible clearly in my inter-
views, but also in newspaper articles and documents/studies on the
Salim Group. In interviews Anthony Salim literally said that he wanted
to move away from connections and become more market-based. This
was very similar to the theoretical notion that the Salim Group strategy
could be understood as moving from a relationship-based model to a
market-based model.99 To further analyse and understand this dichoto-
my however, a more careful analysis was necessary.
The third theme was the flexibility and adaptability of the Salim
Group. On the one hand, interviews with the Salim Group indicated
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that the strategy was highly opportunistic, and it ‘grabbed’ business op-
portunities as they came. This is consistent with the culturalist ap-
proach which states that one of the characteristics of Chinese family
business is its flexibility. On the other hand, Anthony Salim claims that
he steered and designed the Salim Group – his leadership mattered,
and he implemented a market-based strategy. To what extent can the
strategy of the Salim Group be explained as a reaction to the institu-
tional environment? How much did the group adapt to circumstances,
and how much ‘choice’ did they have to influence their own strategy,
and perhaps their own environment?
The three themes that emerged from the first analysis provided clear
questions and a focus for subsequent data analysis and interpretation.
Several procedures were followed to structure and analyse the data, of
which only the most important ones are mentioned here. An analysis
was made of all partners of the Salim Group over a period of twenty
years. The leadership of the group was reviewed by making a database
of board positions in Salim companies over 10 years, which showed
the involvement of the family in the businesses, the effectuation of
generational changes, and the involvement of professional managers.
All annual reports were re-worked into spreadsheets in order to enable
visualising strategic and financial trends as well as the development of
the organisation structure. Interviews were summarised and grouped
into clusters to enable comparison. All quarterly economic updates in
the Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies were collected and stu-
died over almost 40 years, and combined with World Bank reports and
other economic reports these gave an indication of trends in the busi-
ness context in Indonesia.
In order to ‘map’ the strategy of the Salim Group and subsequently
investigate the influence of different factors on the strategic pattern
over time, it is reasonable to assume that the corporate strategy of the
Salim Group is reflected by the combination of all its strategic deci-
sions, and is composed of a set of separate individual business
events.100 Each of these business events can be studied separately and
their characteristics can be assessed. Combining those characteristics
over time would then reveal a development in corporate strategy. In or-
der to be able to ‘see’ strategy development chronologically, the raw
data were completely reorganised into a list of new business events. In
line with the triangulation principle, all sources were reviewed and
combined to create a chronological list of 277 important business
events for the Salim Group. The procedure is available in annex two
and the results are described in chapter six.
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1.10 Findings
The results of this study are, first of all, a contribution to understand-
ing the Salim Group and secondly, a contribution to extending existing
academic theories. Creating a more in-depth understanding of the
Salim Group is particularly interesting for a number of reasons. First,
the group has been a dominant player in various parts of the Indone-
sian economy for years, yet little is known about it from a strategic
management perspective. There is no study available on how this
group was structured and managed from 1994-2003, a particularly tur-
bulent period for the Salim Group. Second, the Salim Group is known
to be closed, and it is therefore a unique opportunity to have been able
to interview the top-management of the group for this study. The infor-
mation available to date was mostly based on secondary sources.
The research makes at least three contributions to existing academic
knowledge. First, it provides deep and multifaceted information about
one of the most influential business groups in Southeast Asia. Second,
through rigorous analysis it shows that existing theoretical frameworks
are only partially applicable to this case and argues that some are too
limited to account for the complexity of an individual case. The cultural
perspective is argued to be unable to explain the strategy of the Salim
Group. Although perhaps in its early phases the Group met some of
the characteristics of the typical ‘Chinese family business’ it does not
match these criteria today. The diaspora and social capital perspective
is valid, but this study also shows how business networks change over
time, incorporating less ethnic and political ties and more Western and
Japanese business connections. Emerging market theories offer a pro-
mising research strategy to explain the evolution of the Salim Group
over time. Institutional factors play an important role in defining the
business model of the group, which is deeply rooted in the Indonesian
post-Sukarno business context. Internal factors, such as generation
change also play a role in strategic changes. As such, the study vali-
dates some and invalidates other theories. It shows, from one example,
that some scientific theories need modification. Third, the study devel-
ops a method for studying complex and intertwined patterns of corpo-
rate strategy. It shows the co-evolutionary patterns of strategy with in-
ternal and institutional factors over time and visualises these in a new
type of oscillogram that enables the combination of quantitative and
qualitative data. The results of this exercise show that corporate strat-
egy is not a linear but rather an irregular and oscillatory process. The
strategy of the Salim Group can be understood as oscillating between
two opposite poles: a ’relationship-based’ strategy and a ‘market-based’
strategy. It also shows how a single business group interacts with Indo-
nesian institutions, influencing them as well as being influenced by
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them. The close proximity of the group to the Suharto regime results
in an interaction between company and environment, a phenomenon
that can rarely be observed because most companies are too small to
influence the national environment.
The chapters that follow describe the strategy of the Salim Group
chronologically. Chapter two describes the history of the Group from
its genesis until 1993. Chapter three describes the Salim Group strat-
egy before the Asian Crisis, while chapter four describes how the Salim
Group fared under conditions of regime change and economic crisis.
Chapter five analyses the new strategy developed after the recovery of
the Indonesian economy. Chapters six and seven respectively analyse
the Salim Group strategy in the light of the theoretical approaches de-
veloped in the introduction, and describe the conclusions of this study.
INTRODUCTION 37

2 The Birth of a Conglomerate
Today, our companies are intimately involved
in the day-to-day lives of millions of Indonesian families
Soedono Salim, Founder of the Salim Group
Source: Group brochure 1996
2.1 Introduction
Companies are started and built by people, and the company that is
the focus of this study was founded by a Chinese immigrant in Indo-
nesia. The first section of this chapter takes us back to southern China,
just after the start of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. From there we fol-
low the young founder of the group – Liem Sioe Liong – to the Dutch
East Indies where he started his first small-scale trading activities.
The struggle against colonialism and the establishment of the new
nation state of Indonesia profoundly changed Liem’s chances. The
young Liem took advantage of these developments, and engineered a
spectacular growth of his Salim Group over more than half a century,
while riding the waves of a favourable political and economic climate
during the rule of President Suharto. We find that the history of the
group was closely intertwined with the political and economic develop-
ment of Indonesia.
This chapter deals with the history of the group from its start until
1994 and serves as an introduction to the Salim Group. It also intro-
duces some of the topics that will be elaborated upon in later chapters.
Subsequent chapters will focus on the development of the Salim Group
from 1994 to July 1997; from July 1997 to 2000 and from 2001 to
2003.
2.2 Liems on the Move
The Salim Group was founded by a man named Liem Sioe Liong, who
was born on July 16, 1916 in Fuqing, Fujian province in southeastern
China.1 He was the second son of a rice-farmer and left China for the
Dutch East Indies in 1938.2 According to some sources, he had to leave
junior high school at the age of 15 due to poverty, which forced him to
run a stall selling noodles.3
The timing of his migration was intertwined with his family situa-
tion as well as the general the situation in Fujian at that time. His
father apparently had died when Liem was young. His elder brother
left to Java and Liem became head of the family at the age of 13. The Ja-
panese occupying forces created anxiety among Chinese people. Within
this context, Liem Sioe Liong left his native country, reportedly with lit-
tle more than the clothes on his back. The family land, which he sold,
was reported to raise just enough money for the trip. He arrived in Java
and joined his brother and uncles in the small town of Kudus on Cen-
tral Java.4
Liem’s migration was part of a long migrant tradition. Since the
VOC, (Verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie or Dutch East India Com-
pany) set up its headquarters in Batavia on the island of Java in 1619,
there has been a more substantial and organised Chinese community.5
The Chinese migrant community was and still is divided into the
peranakans (local-born Chinese) and the totoks (newly arrived Chi-
nese).6 From 1740 onward, the Dutch tended to separate ethnic
groups, and the Chinese were assigned their own residential quarters
in the cities.7 Within the Chinese community, people were further di-
vided into dialect groups (bangs) and subdivided in clans.8 Dialect
groups were historically specialised in certain professions.9 To date as-
sociations based on dialect groups play an important role in ethnic Chi-
nese business, especially among the totok Chinese.
Liem Sioe Liong, being from Fuqing, is a Chinese from the hokchia
dialect group.10 The hokchia were latecomers in migration, and were
traditionally located in the rural areas, often active in money-lending.
They were considered a relatively poor group among the ethnic Chi-
nese in Indonesia before the war. The hokchia are known to be a close-
knit group with a strong tendency for mutual assistance.11
From the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century the
number of Chinese immigrants to Indonesia rose substantially.12 Due
to the wave of new immigrations, mainly between 1860 and 1930, the
totok community expanded, both in size as well as in economic power
in the period up to the Japanese occupation.13
Throughout history, as a group, the Chinese have generally been bet-
ter off than the Javanese peasants and masses, often acting as traders
and middlemen. In 1930, according to one study, 58% of the Chinese
in Java were engaged in trading activities.14 The Dutch colonial rulers
gave the Chinese the legal status of ‘foreign Orientals’ which was eco-
nomically higher than the indigenous population.15 But they were also
regarded with some suspicion by the Dutch rulers. This suspicion con-
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tinued when Indonesia declared itself an independent nation state in
1945 and remains until the present day.16
When Liem Sioe Liong migrated to Central Java by the end of the
1930s, he certainly did not end up in a complete vacuum. As a newly
arrived Chinese, a totok, he arrived in an existing and organised Chi-
nese society, with family members that could accommodate him. His
elder brother Liem Sioe Hie had already been there for several years, as
well as two uncles. They gave him the opportunity to join them in
business (peanut oil trade) and gradually save money to start trading
on his own account. Some sources indicate that he was a shop assis-
tant selling local produce before the Japanese occupation.17 His young-
er brother Liem Sioe Kong followed him after several years and the
three brothers jointly formed a small company trading food products.18
Liem also offered credits to his customers, thus engaging not only in
trading but also in money lending.
Since the three Liems ended up in Kudus, a place for the typical In-
donesian kretek (clove cigarette) manufacturing, Liem Sioe Liong (here-
after: Liem) quickly became involved in clove trading as well.19 Liem
later changed his name to the Indonesian-sounding Soedono Salim,
following the example of many Chinese Indonesians.20 The Javanese
meaning of this is the following: soe = good; dono = capital; sa = three
(referring to three brothers) and lim refers to Liem.21 Yet Liem is re-
ferred to by both his Chinese and Indonesian name to date, and the In-
donesian media often call him Om (uncle) Liem.
2.3 A Daring Danbangke
In March 1942, the Japanese forces occupied the Netherlands Indies,
and trade became nationalised and strictly regulated. Shortages in tex-
tiles and food occurred as international trade was hampered during the
war. The Japanese tried to promote self-sufficiency for Indonesia, albeit
not very effectively. A result was that a black market thrived, which of-
fered business opportunities in the field of trading.
During the occupation the Japanese banned money lending in rural
areas, the traditional activity of the hokchia. An opportunity for over-
land trade (usually seen as smuggling) started to arise. The hokchia
were among the most daring and risk-taking groups, and many of
them started to be small traders or danbangke, personally transporting/
smuggling goods with bicycles. Liem was one of those danbangke tra-
ders operating between Kudus and Semarang.22 Liem later said that he
was arrested by the Japanese, accused of illegal possession of arms and
interrogated for a week.23
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Liem started a family during the Japanese occupation and subse-
quently got several children of which two, Andree Halim and Anthony
Salim were to play an important role in the family business later on.
The literature is not very clear on what happened to Liem in the late
1940s, but Liem’s family business seems to have originated in this per-
iod. There are different accounts of how and when this happened. A
Salim brochure from 1996 claims that the group started in the late
1940s. Another source adds that Liem’s business suffered during the
occupation and went bankrupt, forcing Liem to start all over again.24
Liem himself said later:
I had gunny bags filled with Japanese money, but the new gov-
ernment introduced new money, and the Japanese money be-
came worthless. ... You should not do business based on money,
but based on goods (Liem Sioe Liong).25
Yet another source indicates that Liem had a small local produce shop
in Kudus with a clan member during the Japanese occupation. Later,
when the partnership ended in the last month of the Japanese occupa-
tion, he established a partnership with his brother.26 This happened in
a context in which the hokchia were gaining economic power, especially
during and directly after the Japanese occupation. In certain areas in-
cluding the Kudus-Semerang area where Liem was located, the hokchia
basically controlled the textile and kretek (clove cigarette) industry, the
bicycle and spare parts trade, food distribution and started actively in
manufacturing such as soap.27
Although many peranakan Chinese left with the colonisers for the
Netherlands, many totok stayed. So did Liem, who sided with the Indo-
nesian nationalist movement. Some Chinese associations actively sup-
ported the soldiers of the Indonesian nationalists. At the time, the
Dutch army was fighting against the nationalists, and some of their
leaders went into hiding. His biography describes that Liem was part
of the Futsing Hwee organisation, which was in turn part of the Chi-
nese Siang Bu organisation. Leaders of that organisation chose Liem to
house one of the fugitives of the uprising against the Dutch. Liem was
chosen as he was known for his modesty, trustworthiness and quiet
character. Liem took care of his guest for a year, reportedly without
knowing who he was. This guest eventually turned out to be Hasan
Din, leader of the organisation named Muhammediyah, and also the
father-in-law of Sukarno.28
The Indonesian nationalists declared independence on August 17,
1945, although they were granted sovereignty only in 1949. Liem re-
sumed his trading businesses, mainly in basic commodities like peanut
oil, cloves and coffee. Through his connection with Hasan Din, he was
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introduced as a trustworthy supplier to the military. He supplied goods
(medicine, food, and clothing) to the Diponegoro division of the Indo-
nesian army during and after the struggle for independence from
Dutch colonial rule.29
Liem’s trade with the Diponegoro division continued to be facilitated
by his excellent connections, including Hasan Din.30 Hasan Din was
later reported to be one of the co-founders of the Salim Group31 and he
acted as director of several of Liem’s companies.32 But Liem was report-
edly also very apt in trading under difficult circumstances. At that time,
Lt. Col. Suharto, who was to later become president and a key connec-
tion for Liem, played an important role in the Diponegoro division. De-
spite Liem’s role as a supplier for the army division, it is not clear if
they had already been introduced to each other at that time.
2.4 All Businesses Are Good
After the struggle for independence Indonesia tried to build up its own
economy, administration and private sector. Within this context, Sukar-
no emerged as the first strong national leader. From 1957 onward, Pre-
sident Sukarno implemented new policies that were radically different
from those under Dutch colonial rule. The old colonial social and eco-
nomic system was rejected by the new leadership. Foreign capital was
now seen as a continuation of colonial oppression and most foreign
businesses were nationalised.33 Chinese capital came under scrutiny as
well since some Chinese were seen as collaborators of the Dutch colo-
nial regime.34
After the initial period of independence, the government attempted
to create an indigenous capitalist class as part of its nationalist policies.
One of the measures taken to promote indigenous business was the
so-called Benteng program. This programme was initiated in 1950 and
ended in 1957. Under Benteng (which means fortress), import licenses
were awarded to indigenous businessmen (this excluded the Chinese,
who were categorised as aliens at the time) under favourable condi-
tions. This did not produce the desired economic power shift.35 In-
stead, ‘the economic vacuum created by the elimination of Dutch eco-
nomic interests and the inefficiency of state enterprise was to a large
extent filled by Chinese business’.36 The Benteng program – and other
similar programs that were implemented later – failed to diminish the
economic dominance of the Chinese minority.
Under Sukarno’s leadership, Indonesia moved from a colonial capi-
talist system towards a policy of nationalism with a strong role for the
state, which had detrimental effects on the economy. This period was
called Guided Democracy. During this period, the business environ-
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ment became very difficult: private business was tolerated at best and
the economic situation offered a problematic environment for doing
business with high inflation, low growth and limited international
trade.
In the period following the independence of Indonesia, little is
known about the founder of the group and his economic activities.
Around 1956, Suharto was briefly posted at Semarang and Elson,
author of a biography of Suharto, presumes that Suharto and Liem
were probably introduced to each other around that year, but he found
no evidence of a close relationship between the two men.37 The Liem
family moved to Jakarta in 1957 where the new government was begin-
ning to gain influence. Jakarta also emerged as the new economic
centre.38 Liem seems to have mainly been active in textiles, trading
activities and as supplier to the army, which gained in power during
those times. It is important to place the economic alliance with army
officers into the context of the position of the Indonesian army at the
time. The army was building up its power in different areas of the so-
ciety, including business (state enterprises as well as private business).
The Indonesian army had acquired a political orientation and
political interests at the time of the revolution against the Dutch.
Later, after the introduction of martial law in 1957, the army and
other branches of the armed forces became deeply involved in
politics, civil administration, and economic management with
the result that the army became a key element in the govern-
ment coalition under Guided Democracy.39
Indonesia has a history of links with power-holders and Chinese
business, and Liem was one of the examples. All those division
commanders like Suharto did the same. The Indonesian army
was never self-sufficient in terms of budget. They got only 30%
or so of their budget from the state, the rest of the funding they
had to look for themselves. Even until now (former minister).
The foundation of Liem’s business group most probably dates back to
the late 1950s when Liem formed several business partnerships beyond
his family circle. His long term partner is Djuhar Sutanto, a fellow hok-
chia from the same district in China with the same surname in Chi-
nese. A study of the Liem Group in 1989 indicated that the business
was a family affair, complemented by a few other partners:
The group was established in the late 1950s by Mr Soedono Sal-
im alias Liem Sioe Liong, his elder brother (the late) Mr. Liem
Soehanda alias Liem Sioe Hie, Mr. Soedarmo Salim alias Liem
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Sioe Kong, Mr. Doni Pranoto alias Liem Sioe Djwan (both
younger brothers of Mr. Soedono Salim), Mr Djuhar Sutanto
alias Liem Oen Tjien and (the late) Mr. Hasan Din.40
According to Anthony Salim, Liem Sioe Liong’s son, despite difficult
circumstances in those early times, his father was successful and
started to diversify and also become active in processed goods around
1953, following his belief that ‘all businesses are good’.41 The Salim
business ventures adapted to the often unpredictable environment and
grew by taking the opportunities as they came, without a focused busi-
ness strategy.
Today we trade in this product and tomorrow there’s a new pol-
icy and the possibility exists that we trade in something else.
The world of entrepreneurship has its own path and characteris-
tics. Following this path is not easy, but mastering it is not im-
possible (Liem Sioe Liong).42
The group evolved not by design, but by necessity. Whatever op-
portunity was good, we just grabbed (Anthony Salim).
It is not completely clear whether the expansion of the business in the
period directly after the independence of Indonesia was funded by or-
ganic growth, by capital brought by new partners, or whether Liem was
able to tap into external sources of funds from, for example, the Chi-
nese community or banks.
Anthony Salim clarified in an interview that Liem already went into
manufacturing under Sukarno: ‘some textile factories started operating
as well as a soap factory’. Apart from diversifying into manufacturing,
Liem also started Bank Windu Kencana (in 1954) and bought Bank
Central Asia (BCA) in 1957. BCA was to become the largest privately
owned bank of Indonesia.43 One author argues that the rise of Liem
happened parallel to the rise of the hokchia group and can partly be ex-
plained by his alliances with fellow dialect members.44 He initially ex-
panded those lines of business that the hokchia had traditionally domi-
nated.
According to his son, the Liem businesses were already quite estab-
lished by the time Sukarno was forced out of office – among the top
20-30. This is supported by another source:
In addition to his trading activities in this period, Liem expanded
into manufacture (textile, soap, nails, bicycle parts) and success-
fully established himself as a supplier of the Indonesian army.
In the early 1950s, he established the Bank Windu Kencana and
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followed this in 1957 with the purchase of the Bank Central Asia.
When Suharto came to power in 1965, Liem already presided
over an established and varied business group and had an estab-
lished history of association with ... Suharto himself.45
The claim that Liem’s business group was already quite established be-
fore Suharto came to power has to be placed in the context of business
at that time. In the difficult economic environment virtually no large
private businesses existed, most commercial activities occurred on a
fairly small scale.46 Liem’s businesses were not particularly large or
very well known in this period.
Thus, after an initial period of small-scale local trading, Liem was
successful in a diverse set of business activities with an opportunistic
strategy in a difficult business context. His hokchia background initially
provided a good starting point, but was not advantageous only, since
Chinese capital was under pressure. Liem was able to build a success-
ful trading network outside the Chinese community, mainly with the
Indonesian army, who gradually gained political power as well as eco-
nomic influence. He eventually moved from trading into manufactur-
ing and banking.
2.5 Riding the Waves of Industrialisation
By the time president Suharto seized power in the mid-1960s,47 the
economy was in terrible condition with hyper-inflation (600% in the
mid-1960s) and a huge state debt burden.48 After President Suharto
came to power, the business context changed and a new economic pol-
icy emerged in which industries slowly opened up for private invest-
ment. In 1967, the Foreign Investment Board was established followed
by a five-year plan that aimed at industrialisation of the country. This
was the first policy of its kind in independent Indonesia. Following the
establishment of Suharto’s New Order, Indonesia experienced a period
of strong economic growth. Between 1967 and 1997, GDP grew an
average of 7% per annum. During the New Order, several new eco-
nomic policies were implemented that created a more favourable and
stable business environment.
According to Liem’s son: ‘my father started to see this new business
environment as an opportunity’. Liem made good use of his connec-
tions and two members of the Suharto staff were appointed at the
board of the Bank Windu Kencana.49 Liem began to appear among the
circle of trusted ethnic Chinese businessmen with whom Suharto es-
tablished close connections. Using a combination of business skills
and political contacts, he acquired several export licences and held
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import monopolies on cloves. His main companies were P.T. Warin-
gin50 (export of rubber and coffee) and P.T. Mega (import of cloves).
The latter was one of the two companies allowed to import cloves by
the government in 1968. Reports suggested that the licences and credit
facilities these companies received were directly related to the close
relationship with Suharto.51 These trading businesses in basic com-
modities gave Liem annual revenues of US$340,000 between 1968
and 1970.52
By the end of the 1960s, Liem had expanded his network of partner-
ships. Apart from Djuhar Sutanto, who also came from Fujian; Ibra-
him Risjad, from Aceh; and Sudwikatmono, a cousin of Suharto,53 also
joined him.54 These four, later complemented by Liem’s and Djuhar’s
sons, are often called the Liem Investors or the Gang of Four. The
Liem Investors had close ties with Suharto throughout the decades to
come.
The army, now the leading political force, became very active in busi-
ness-related activities, which provided the army with additional funds.55
Suharto and his close associates played a leading role in many of these
activities.
The general modus operandi was that the government provided
credit facilities or privileged access to a certain market, in the ex-
pectation that members of the government (often sleeping part-
ners in the arrangements) would be suitably paid for their coop-
eration. Amongst the key businessmen of the New Order was
Liem Siu Liong, long a broker for army business schemes but
now catapulted to new heights by the Army’s dominance.56
One of the army strategies was the use of special foundations (yayasan)
for business purposes. These foundations were and remained big busi-
ness until the end of Suharto’s regime. They included the Yayasan
Dharma Putra Kostrad, established by Suharto in 1964, which co-
founded the bank Windu Kencana with Liem and operated other com-
panies as well.57 Liem’s textile business, called PT Tarumatex, also re-
portedly received an order to supply military uniforms.58 Another ex-
ample is the Yayasan Harapan Kita, headed by Suharto’s wife, which
was associated with Liem in his company Bogasari (flour milling).59
Bogasari was owned by the Liem group and Sudwikatmono served
as the president director. In 1970, it received a monopoly on milling in
the western region of Indonesia from Bulog, the state logistics com-
pany. The articles of association of Bogasari stated that 26% of the
profits should be set aside for ‘charitable’ foundations like Harapan
Kita and Dharma Putra.60 The benefits of this milling arrangement for
the Salim Group must have been substantial and the arrangement
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lasted for decades. A 1987 World Bank report said that ‘the profit mar-
gin of the flour millers was 25 percent, which is described as “high by
international standards” and “difficult to justify”’.61 The milling activ-
ities of Bogasari were among many new initiatives in Indonesia which
were set up to replace expensive imports.
Suharto started to promote the industrialisation of Indonesia, and as
a result of these policies, the structure of the economy changed rapidly.
In 1965, only 15% of the economy stemmed from industrial activities,
whereas industrial activity contributed 41.7% to the economy in
1980.62 The policy of import substitution industrialisation was com-
mon not only in Indonesia, but in several other emerging economies
as well.
In Indonesia, the import substitution policy was carried out in var-
ious phases, of which the first was the ‘easy import substitution’ until
1975. This phase was concerned with industries that required relatively
little capital and technology. Liem used his revenues from trading com-
modities to diversify into various industrial activities in the first phase
of import substitution.63 However, in view of the relatively small reven-
ues in comparison with the cost of industrialisation, credit from state
banks and probably also capital from partners must have played an im-
portant role as well.
Liem was well-known for his instinct for selecting the right partners
and business opportunities. A person who knows him well explained:
An example of gut feeling is his move into automotive. The Ja-
panese motor vehicles were the best at the time; European vehi-
cles were not suitable for Indonesian conditions. Yamaha was al-
ready taken and Honda was part of Astra. Suzuki was part of a
local company. Then Liem talked to the Suzuki sole agency
holder in order to ask him to cooperate. He did not want to, but
wanted to sell the business for a very high price. In terms of re-
turn on investment etc you would say it was too high. But Liem
said no, I will buy it. It was very expensive, 50 million dollars or
so at the time. And what did he do with it? Suzuki became num-
ber two in the market in Indonesia. Intuition is important for
him (person close to the group).
Gut feeling, Liem was very good at that. For example selecting
Sudwikatmono as a partner was a brilliant choice; he is a pribu-
mi, a cousin of Suharto and really a man who knows his limits
(person familiar with the Salim Group).
According to Anthony Salim, the group strategy was opportunistic:
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Actually, it was not planned, not by design but by necessity.
And number two, it goes with the opportunity of the country
(Anthony Salim).
Apart from textiles and finance, the group set up activities in other sec-
tors where opportunities arose: in flour milling around 1971 or 1972,
cement in 1974 and the automotive industries in 1975.64 In all of these
industries, favourable conditions (such as access to credit and exclusive
licenses) were created by the government in order to promote the in-
dustrialisation of Indonesia and Liem’s direct relationships with Suhar-
to facilitated the process.65 Overseas partners, mainly Japanese, helped
the development of the Liem Group by providing technology and
knowledge.66
In 1972, Anthony Salim returned from his education in the UK and
joined the business. While the Salim Group grew quickly several do-
mestic Chinese partners and two of Suharto’s children also joined the
group in the early 1970s:67
In the early 1970s the group was joined by several new partners,
namely Mr. Mochtar Riady alias Lie Mo Tie, Mr. Sigit Haryoyu-
danto, Mrs. Siti Harjianti Hastuti Rukmana, Mr. Ciputra alias
Tjie Siem Hoan, and others.68
It is impossible to manage all the companies alone. For this rea-
son we need partners. For example, in banking we partnered
with Mochtar Riady. In real estate we have chosen for Ciputra.
If we are talking about the big group, it consists of different
partners (Anthony Salim).69
I met Mochtar [Riady] when I happened to be in the same aero-
plane. We went to Hong Kong. We then spoke about banks. He
had just retired from his position as managing director of the
Panin Bank, and was still considering what to do next. I pro-
posed to him: what do you think about managing my bank. He
agreed and asked for 25%. I wanted a bit less because I have
many family members. I knew he got 23% at the Panin Bank. I
offered him 15% and we finally agreed to 17.5% (Liem Sioe
Liong).70
The fact that Suharto’s partners (i.e., selected Chinese businessmen)
benefited unequally from the industrialisation process did not go unno-
ticed. Complaints from students about corruption and the privileged
position of Chinese businessmen erupted into violence on 15 January
1974, in an incident that became known as the Malari riots.71 This inci-
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dent forced Suharto to establish a commission to inquire into corrup-
tion. One of the four priority cases mentioned by the commission was
Waringin, Liem’s trading company, although the case was never pur-
sued.72
Thus, from the 1970s onward, the Salim Group became involved in
industrial activities on a much larger scale. The Group set up a large
number of companies in a variety of sectors, several benefiting from
close co-operation with Suharto and his regime. The development of the
group is intricately linked to the economic development of Indonesia,
and most of the Salim companies produced products for the Indonesian
masses. A pattern of diversification – where new companies were
started for every new line of business – was apparent from the very be-
ginning. In a favourable business environment with the right high-level
political contacts, the Salim Group – as it was known by then – rapidly
grows through diversification as well as normal business growth.
2.6 Building Substance
During the period 1974-1981 Indonesia experienced an oil boom,
which also helped businessmen like Liem succeed. The positive effects
of this boom on the private sector were tax and credit benefits in cer-
tain fields as well as increased private and government demand.73 After
the initial import substitution industrialisation period, there was a peri-
od of state-led industrialisation focusing on resource processing indus-
tries that required more capital. This phase came with more protection-
ist measures such as restricted foreign investment and trade barriers,
and it reversed some of the measures towards liberalisation.74
During that time, the Salim family also benefited from its regional
Chinese networks around Asia. The Bangkok Bank in Thailand, for ex-
ample, funded the construction of cement factories.75 The possibility to
tap international – ethnic Chinese – capital was one additional factor
that enabled the Salim Group to move from trading into more capital
intensive manufacturing.
In this second import substitution industrialisation phase, the Salim
Group became involved in steel and chemicals manufacturing during
the early 1980s. An example of chemicals was its company Unggul In-
dah Corporation, which was established in 1983 and began producing
alkyl benzene (ingredient used in the manufacturing of detergent) in
1985. Its entry into the steel industry was another example of close co-
operation with the Suharto regime. The idea of building a steel indus-
try came from the government and Liem was ‘encouraged’ to put up
40% of the costs of the steel plant.76 When asked about their entry
into the steel industry the Liem family said:
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We moved into Krakatau Steel to help the government (Liem
Sioe Liong).
If you want to invest up to US$800 million it is easier to invest
in other factories that make profit more quickly. But this is a
special task (Anthony Salim).77
To help the Salims finance their part of the deal, the government gave
them an import monopoly for steel in the years preceding the coming
on stream of domestic production, and allowed for significant increase
in prices. In 1985, the import of cold-rolled steel became the exclusive
right of Giwang Selogam, a Liem company formed in 1984.78 State
company Krakatau formed a joint venture with Liem and the Ciputra
group to produce cold-rolled steel. The cold-rolled steel business was
set-up with considerable overseas borrowing, but never made the ex-
pected profits. Therefore, the Salim Group withdrew from this busi-
ness in 1990 by selling its shareholdings to government company
Krakatau Steel.
Besides the above-mentioned new ventures, the Salim Group also
continuously expanded the capacity of its existing businesses such as
cement and flour. Activities in other industries such as real estate, con-
struction and plantations were started as well, usually with domestic or
foreign partners. Many of the Salim companies were market leaders or
held (semi-)monopolies and were considered closely associated with
the presidential family. The press therefore popularly referred to the
Salim Group as part of the ‘Cendana Trust’ after the name of the Jakar-
ta Street in which the Presidential Palace was located.
Anthony Salim argues that a change in strategy occurred as early as
1972, during the period of rapid diversification. In the words of An-
thony Salim: ‘rather than being driven completely by opportunity, the
group began selecting its business opportunities’. This idea is not
borne out by other sources, which indicate that the group started to be-
come active in virtually all sectors of the economy in the 1970s, but
also in the 1980s. One author even labels the period from 1981-1985
conglomerate diversification into unrelated business.79
In the early 1980s, the Liem Group consisted of 54 companies in six
fields: trading, automobile, manufacturing, property and construction,
finance and timber, logging and miscellaneous (table 2.1).
In the mid-1980s the number of companies started to rise quickly.
Having started with just one small company the business of Liem was
now a group of separate companies that had grown from 3 companies
in 1957 to 225 companies in 1986 (figure 2.1).80 A CISI report in 1989
recorded 350 separate Liem-affiliated companies. Although known as
THE BIRTH OF A CONGLOMERATE 51
the Salim Group, the companies are separate entities and have no com-
mon legal identity. The ownership of the companies is often shared be-
tween Liem and other partners.
Faced with a group of companies that was growing rapidly, Liem and
his sons started to introduce professional in addition to family manage-
ment and attempted to decrease the dependency on government con-
tracts.
Table 2.1 Salim Group Companies according to Robison
Automobile
P.T. National Motors
(Hino, Mazda sole agents)
P.T. Unicor Prima
(Hino & Mazda assemblers)
P.T. Indo Mobile Utama
(Suzuki sole agent & assemblers)
P.T. Central Sole Agency (Volvo)
P.T. Salim Jaya (Volvo assemblers)















P.T. Kabele Asia Nusantara
P.T. Central Sari Int. Builders
P.T. Nugraha Kencana Jaya
P.T. Cahaya Tugu Kencana
P.T. Central Salim Builders
P.T. Rimba Kencana
P.T. Budhi Agung
Logging, Timber & Miscellaneous
P.T. Kayu Lapis (plywood)
P.T. Dono Indah (logging)
P.T. Overseas Timber Products Corporation
Indaco Ltd. (tin mining)
Manufacture
P.T. Multiatex (textiles)
P.T. Indah Kencana (nails)
P.T. Indara Mas (bicycle tires)
Rubber Refineries
P.T. Tarumatex (textiles)
P.T. Pangan Sari Utama (food processing)
P.T. Bogasari (flour milling)
P.T. Indonesia Cement
P.T. Distinct Indonesia Cement Enterprise
P.T. Perkasa Cement
P.T. Perkasa Indah Cement Putih
P.T. Perkasa Into Abadi Cement
P.T. Tridaya Manunggal Perkasa







P.T. Asuransi Central Asia








Source: Robison (1986, p. 298-300)81
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From 1972 that’s when the crossover occurred. When we start to
become much more by design rather than opportunity driven.
Design in the selection of the business opportunity. The way we
set up things. And also managing professionally, establish the
concept of holding company, operating units (OPUs), account-
ability of management (Anthony Salim).
For a company as large as the Salim Group there is not enough
family to take up all the leadership roles. We already have the se-
paration between ownership and management here. The family
and partners indeed are still the owners, and slowly we can go
public. But our management is already professional. I think we
are one of the groups in Indonesia that already had the courage
to leave the management and operations to professionals (An-
thony Salim).82
According to Anthony Salim, the group began to be more market
based in its outlook and strategy and wanted to be less connected to
the government. Yet various sources indicate that the group was still
very much intertwined in government relations at least until the early
nineties. Some of its companies received government contracts, li-
censes beyond maximum quota or special credit facilities. Examples
are Indomobil, the automotive pillar of the group that received attrac-



































Source: Sato (1993, 1994)
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tive government orders,83 or the above-mentioned steel activities of the
group. However, the codes of reciprocity also required Liem to step in
when needed. For example, when Bank Duta, the majority of which
was owned by several Suharto-related foundations, experienced finan-
cial difficulties, Liem injected US$200 million in 1990.84
After the oil boom ended, in the early 1980s, the Indonesian econo-
my witnessed a setback, and new policies were introduced, mainly
aimed at liberalising the economy. In that difficult period, the rupiah
was devalued several times, and companies having borrowed abroad
suffered during this crisis. P.T. Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa (a Salim
company) was rescued by the government, which bought up 35% of
the shares for US$325 million in 1985.85 Despite this, by 1985, the Sal-
im Group emerged as the largest conglomerate in Indonesia, with an-
nual group sales estimated to be over US$900 million86 and 225 sepa-
rate companies affiliated with the group in 1986.87 Liem’s business
success was attributed to his proximity to the regime, but the Salim
Group was apparently also ‘good at what it did’.88
Thus, in the 1980s the Liem group still grew rapidly and now also
moved into new capital-intensive industries such as steel and chemi-
cals. In the difficult period after the oil boom the government stepped
in to help Salim Group companies in several industries (cement, steel)
by taking over (part of) their shareholdings. The Salim Group also
started in numerous other industries and the number of companies af-
filiated with the group started to rise rapidly. The group was composed
of an ever expanding number of legally separate entities that are under
ownership of Liem or the Liem Investors.
2.7 The Design of an International Portfolio
Having outgrown its rather small home markets, and probably wanting
to diversify their country risk, from 1975 onward, the Salim Group fa-
mily business had already started expanding internationally to Hong
Kong, and other Asian countries. This internationalisation process in-
tensified in the 1980s and 1990s. In the mid 1980s, the Group ser-
iously started its internationalisation efforts. The possibility of Suharto
retiring and the business opportunities in the region must have played
a role in this. Anthony Salim describes the new non-government and
more international strategy as follows:
From 1979 we started to sort of elevate ourselves from govern-
ment to market based enterprise. We do understand a lot of poli-
tical implications, because we try to choose that it is much more
on business directions rather than government related business
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– which is still good. Another characteristic is that of course we
start to balance our portfolio. We have no pretension to hide that
we have started to invest outside Indonesia since 1975, when we
created our Singapore and Hong Kong companies (Anthony
Salim).
The Liem family established an entity under which most of the inter-
national activities were grouped: First Pacific Company located in
Hong Kong, but with investments in various countries. First Pacific
started in 1982 as First Pacific Finance Limited, initially a financial ser-
vices company. One of the early directors was quoted saying ‘we would
be the Liem’s window to the world’.89 In that year, several other compa-
nies with similar names were set up and the First Pacific group (listed
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange) started to acquire other companies,
among which the Dutch trading firm Hagemeyer in 1983 and a US-
based bank. In 1983, the Liems also controlled KMP, a Singapore-based
holding company that in turn controlled a number of Singapore-based
companies.
During this period, Liem also started investing in Fuqing, his home
town, together with Djuhar Sutanto. With a group called Yuan Hong
they invested in flour milling, a nearby port, and an industrial park.
According to Djuhar Sutanto:
When we started this in 1987, Fuqing had no factories and no
industrial workers. There were no conditions for them – no ho-
tel and only a few antiquated telephones. We had to put in the
infrastructure – roads, telecommunications, hotels and a pier’,
he said. ‘Our aim was to do something for our home town, pro-
vide work for its people and raise living standards (Djuhar Su-
tanto).90
By the end of the 1980s, the Salim group got access to international
business networks, including the international capital market which
gave it the option to move into more capital-intensive industries and
also more degrees of freedom when it came to choosing its opportu-
nities both in the domestic Indonesian market as well as abroad.
After a period of international diversification, by the mid-1990s, the
result was that 25 to 30% of the assets were now outside Indonesia
and around 70 to 75% inside whereas prior to the mid-1980s most as-
sets were located in Indonesia (figure 2.2).
The main Salim businesses both in Indonesia and abroad produced
for the local markets. When the Indonesian government tried to pro-
mote exports rather than industrialisation for domestic consumption
only, the Salim Group set up some export businesses (such as shoes)
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but largely stuck to their domestic business model. Perhaps this is cap-
tured by Liem’s motto:
We plant a tree with the purpose of it growing big. What you
should not do is to move the tree, which has already grown, to
another place (Liem Sioe Liong).91
As a result of the deregulation packages of the period 1986-1988, Indo-
nesia’s capital market witnessed a structural change because of a rapid
growth in banking on the one hand (among those Liem’s BCA bank)
as well as the rapid development of the Jakarta Stock Exchange.92 The
emergence of the Jakarta Stock Exchange gave the Salim group more
access to capital, and they listed various companies on the stock ex-
change, starting with Indocement in 1989. The listing of Indocement
was controversial, since the company had made losses for the previous
years, which resulted in the government buying up a significant por-
tion of the shares a few years earlier. A condition for listing was that
the company made profits for the preceding two years prior to listing.
Indocement could only be listed on the stock exchange because of an
exceptional ministerial decree.93
The most publicised aspect of this transformation was the float-
ing in the mid-1989 of new share issues in subsidiaries of about
half a dozen of the biggest corporate conglomerates, including
... Liem Sioe Liong’s PT Indocement. All of these shares were of-
fered for sale at very substantial premiums ...94







Source: Salim Group Brochure, 1995-1996
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Other Indonesian Liem companies followed: Unggul Indah Cahaya
(1989), Indofood (1994), Darya-Varia (1994),95 and Indomobil
(1997).96 With the growth of the region, and the maturing of the capi-
tal markets, the Salim Group was now able to tap international capital
from banks and investors.
2.8 Summary and Conclusion
Chronologically speaking, we can distinguish a number of different
strategies for the Salim Group. It was started by a poor immigrant and
was first a small-scale trading business in Central Java. Soon Liem,
with his immediate family members, started in other lines of business,
but still on a rather small scale.
As soon as the Group had accumulated some capital, it started to be
active in a number of other non-trading businesses such as manufac-
turing and banking. Most of these were industries in which the hokchia
dialect group was strong. Apart from links to family and dialect group
members, Liem also formed partnerships outside the Chinese commu-
nity, mainly with the Indonesian army.
With the help of high-level contacts, the Salim Group diversified into
many industries catering to local consumers. The business of the
group became closely linked to the activities of Suharto. The group
started to be active in flour milling because of the policy of the govern-
ment to first and foremost produce (rather than import) its own food
to feed its people. This happened in a policy environment of import
substitution manufacturing. The main diversification strategy was hori-
zontal diversification into a number of unrelated industries. The group
has profited from favourable policies for domestic companies such as
licences and financing options from the government. This enabled it to
move into various industries such as cement, steel, food, textiles and
car manufacturing.
When favourable conditions in industries such as steel were abol-
ished, the group used its connections to move out of these industries
or to eliminate its debts. Later, when the group became larger, and
when the second generation family members entered the business, in-
ternational expansion into Asia and Europe became a logical next step.
It started in the Pacific region but the Salim Group also established a
foothold in Europe and the United States. With the development of ca-
pital markets, the Salim Group started to list its companies on various
stock exchanges and also got access to international capital sources
(table 2.2).
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Table 2.2 Summary
Period Institutional Environment Strategic Choices
1938-1945
Genesis
- Chinese enjoyed strong position
in trading
- business context for private
business strictly regulated
- opportunities in smuggling/
trading
- small scale trading of various
products




- difficult business environment
- demand for basic products
- important role of the army
- start of a national economy
- initial small-scale diversification
- manufacturing of basic products
and banking.
- supplying goods to the army
1957-1965
Diversification
- nationalistic political environment
- slow economic growth
- rising power of the army in
business
- trade and manufacturing of basic
products







- army most powerful political actor
& very active in business
- opening up for foreign investment
and international trade
- import substitution & protection
of local capitalists
- linking up with Suharto to develop
economy
- evolving conglomerate as new







- business opportunities exist,
especially when linked to Suharto
or army
- government connected business
- supplemented with international
businesses





- oil crisis and currency depreciation
- import substitution efforts halted
- export promotion policy
- reduced cronyism
- build international businesses
- expand local businesses
- work with government in order to
resolve losses in various
industries
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3 The Midas Touch
In the 1990s, it was as if every business
you touched turned into gold.
Anthony Salim,
CEO & President, Salim Group
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, the historical development of the Salim Group
from its start by a Chinese immigrant in Central Java until its inter-
national expansion in the mid-1990s was described. The Salim Group
developed from a small family business to the largest Indonesian
conglomerate with operations abroad.
In the following chapters, I will look more closely at the specific fea-
tures of the Salim Group in the last decade (1994-2003), the focus of
this study. The Asian Crisis, which started in mid-1997, had a major
impact on the Salim Group. It changed its size, composition, business
model and management. Therefore, I divide this period into three
phases: the period before the Asian Crisis from 1994-mid-1997 (the
Midas Touch); the Asian Crisis from mid-1997 to 2000 (Fire-Fighting)
and the post-crisis period of 2001-2003 (Axis of Opportunity). Each of
these phases will be discussed in a separate chapter.
In the following three chapters, I will present empirical data gath-
ered as part of this thesis, particularly interviews, annual reports and
analysis of relevant media sources. In each chapter, I focus on the busi-
ness context; organisation structure; strategy; co-ordination and control;
and leadership style of the Salim Group.
This chapter starts with a description of the business context in the
mid-1990s, a period of optimism and economic growth. It then pro-
vides a detailed overview of the Salim Group in 1994-1997, including
estimates of its size and structure. Various sources indicate that the
period 1994-1997 was a period of strong growth and expansion. Aside
from growth of the existing portfolio, the group also diversified with
several new investments. Many ventures were carried out in close co-
operation with a variety of partners, thus creating a network of busi-
ness relations. In addition to that, the internal dynamic of the Salim
Group in terms of internal restructuring and different types of synergy
is analysed. In the last section, I look at the managers and their man-
agement practices within the Salim Group.
3.2 Growing with Asia
In the period from 1994 until mid-1997 most Asian economies, in-
cluding Indonesia, experienced strong growth rates.1 Looking in more
detail at the Indonesian economy, the growth in the non-oil manufac-
turing, construction, finance, and business services exceeded 10% for
the years 1995 and 1996. In these sectors, many of the Salim compa-
nies (Indofood, Indocement, Indomobil, BCA, and Unggul Indah) are
active. The high growth offered business opportunities in Indonesia,
especially for the already well established Salim Group, which was in a
position to undertake large investments in a number of promising sec-
tors.
The Indonesian economic policy was aimed at further deregulation
and the promotion of exports, the latter having already started in the
mid-1980s. As a consequence, the exports indeed increased annually,
as in other Asian economies like Thailand and Malaysia. Trade deregu-
lations as well as the deregulation of foreign investment in 1994 and
1995 in Indonesia meant that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) started
to increase.2
FDI was US$2.6 billion in 1994/1995, but after the regulatory
changes the net realised foreign investment rose to US$5.4 billion in
1995/1996 and US$6.5 billion in 1996/1997.3 Sectors that received a
large share of foreign investment were chemicals, paper, metal goods,
food, infrastructure, textiles and plantations. Japan was the key foreign
investor with 19% of the approved non-oil foreign investment from
1994-1996.4 But a similar surge in investments occurred domestically,
with an increase in domestic investment that surpassed the FDI. Food,
paper, textiles, chemicals and non-metallic minerals were important
recipients of domestic investments. The new investments were mostly
financed with debt (56% in 1994; 103% in 1995; 70% in 1996). As a
result the corporate leverage in Indonesia increased from 58% in 1994
up to 92% in 1996.5
Because of the strong economic growth figures there was a strong
sense of progress and trust in the economies of the Asian region by
Western investors and local businessmen alike. The World Bank, in a
1993 report, termed this growth the East Asian Miracle.6 Confidence
was also reflected in the annual reports of the Salim Group companies.
In 1996, the annual report of First Pacific (Hong Kong-listed Salim
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company) was named ‘growing with Asia’ and Liem confidently re-
ported ‘improved profit on an increasingly solid foundation’.7
With the growing optimism about the future of Asia, many ethnic
Chinese also started to feel more confident about their position, and
some began to grant interviews. In 1996, the Salim Group published a
brochure with an overview of the group’s activities (see annex three).
As ethnic Chinese firms in the region began listing their companies
on stock exchanges, more information was available on the size of eth-
nic Chinese businesses. Interviews and articles about the overseas Chi-
nese were published in the popular press. Following this uncharacteris-
tic openness from the side of ethnic Chinese firms in the region, a
number of books and academic studies started to appear that paid at-
tention to the power of the ethnic Chinese in the Asian region and
their investments in China.8
Despite the high economic growth in Indonesia, experts were in-
creasingly worried about the rising corruption and preferential treat-
ment given to some businessmen. Although the deregulations were
generally effective in bringing down protection, some industries were
still enjoying protective government measures, such as the automotive
industry.9 Another example of protective measures was the sudden ban
of foreign investment in the palm oil sector in 1997 – a promising sec-
tor dominated by four conglomerates. The Salim Group ranked second
in this sector with 150,000 hectares under cultivation.10 The ban was
later changed and foreign investment was allowed in eastern Indonesia
(most plantations were located in western Indonesia). Other examples
included the controversial ‘national car’ project by one of Suharto’s chil-
dren, which received various tax exemptions.11
The combination of strong economic growth as well as their semi-
protected status further enhanced the rise of certain corporate groups
in Indonesia, most prominently those business groups closely asso-
ciated with Suharto. According to two observers: ‘favours to companies
associated with the first family continue to concern – even to shock –
long term observers’.12 The well-connected companies included the
businesses of Suharto’s children (primarily Hutomo Mandala Putra
(‘Tommy’); Bambang Trihatmodjo and Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana
(‘Tutut’) as well as the so-called cronies such as Liem Sioe Liong and
Bob Hasan. President Suharto denied any wrongdoing when it came to
his relation with Liem, in particular the quasi-monopolies of Indoce-
ment (cement) and Bogasari (flour milling). Instead, he presented the
Salim Group as his instrument to achieve economic progress.
The development of these two (Salim) companies is not a collu-
sion between me and Oom Liem, but the government’s effort to
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reach self-sufficiency by utilising a businessman who is willing
to work.13
In order to further diminish criticism, Suharto issued a decree in Janu-
ary 1996 forcing large businesses to ‘donate’ 2% of their annual reven-
ues to a special foundation. The foundation would attempt to reduce
the gap between the rich and the poor. The foundation’s board mem-
bers included two of Suharto’s children, Anthony Salim and Sudwikat-
mono, who was another member of the Liem investors.14 This unusual
fund-raising effort caused even more concern over the transparency of
Suharto’s policies.
Thus, we can summarise the business context as follows. The eco-
nomic growth in the region gave rise to substantial optimism. Large
foreign and domestic investments in Indonesia occurred. The excellent
economic position of some wealthy Chinese in the Asian region and
their business ties with China became well-publicised. The preferential
treatment of some ethnic Chinese businessmen like Liem was criti-
cised but Suharto made no attempts to change the situation. Economic
growth in combination with favouritism gave particularly good oppor-
tunities for well-connected groups. As we will see in the following sec-
tions, this business context offered a golden age for business groups
such as the Salim Group.
3.3 Qiaoxiang Ties: The China Connection
The favourable economic climate was not only limited to Southeast
Asia. China, which had gradually opened up for investments, started to
offer a wide range of business opportunities, particularly for ethnic
Chinese. Many of the now rich business tycoons, such as Liem, in-
vested in China, usually starting with their regions of origin, in this
case Fujian Province. Estimates of the share of FDI into mainland Chi-
na from ethnic Chinese in Asia run as high as 80%.15 Especially the
southeastern part of China profited from these investments, such as
Fujian where most migrants came from. The links between the ethnic
Chinese abroad and their home provinces were called qiaoxiang ties.
When Chinese migrants invested in China they were often criticised
in Indonesia, because it would reveal a lack of assimilation and loyalty
of the ethnic Chinese. Liem also came under attack and an interna-
tional newspaper reported the following about Liem:
Recently he came under strong criticism for multi-million dollar
investments in his home province in China. ‘Where can I go?’
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asked Mr. Liem. ‘If I invest abroad, they call it capital flight: if I
invest in Indonesia they say I want a monopoly’.16
As a consequence most people like Liem kept a low profile when it
came to their business ties with China.17 Despite this low profile, it is
clear that Liem has been an important investor in Fujian province. He
built several factories such as a shoe factory, a flour factory and he in-
vested in real estate. In 1993, he set up a joint venture with the Bank
of China and opened the Fujian Asia Bank.18 According to interviews
with various people close to the Salim family, these investments seem
to be at least partly stemming from non-commercial reasons. The in-
vestments in his native place of birth have had a large impact on the
small village of Fuqing. Several newspapers reported on Liem’s influ-
ence on his native village. According to the Australian Financial Review,
which dispatched a journalist to Fuqing in 1995:
About 90 per cent of the factories on the strip are controlled by
Liem, tipping money back into his ancestral home. Of the vil-
lage’s 50,000 workers, Liem’s operation – comprising food, plas-
tic flowers, shoes, clothes, packaging and Fuqing’s new port –
employs 20,000 of them.19
Liem was also an active member of the Fuqing Association. The Chi-
nese associations, often based on region or dialect, are known to be ef-
fective business networking platforms for ethnic Chinese. Liem was
also on the executive committee of the International Association of
Fuzhous (Fuzhou being the capital of Fujian Province), together with
Robert Kuok.20 The latter had entered into several partnerships with
Liem, such as a sugar plantation in Sumatra. Within the period under
review, 1994 until mid-1997, the Salim group made at least four new
investments in Southeast China in automotive, telecom, city develop-
ment, and ports, mostly in partnership with other firms.
Thus, with China opening up for investments, Liem also invested in
his native province Fujian – particularly in Fuqing village. In view of
criticism at home, Liem kept a low profile when it came to investing in
China. During the period 1994-1997, the Salim Group made several
new investments in southeastern China.
3.4 Supersize Salim
In the period prior to the Asian Crisis, the Salim Group was by far the
largest Indonesian business group. Since the group consisted of var-
ious separate entities, some listed on the stock exchange, others pri-
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vately held, it is not easy to estimate the size of the group, although
the Salim Group was the largest conglomerate in Indonesia, and ac-
cording to one source, in all of Southeast Asia.21
The large earnings of the Salim Group also translated into personal
wealth for the Salim family and its partners – who were the main
shareholders. In 1994, Liem was the largest taxpayer in Indonesia, and
Salim executives were reported to take the top five taxpayer positions.22
Having been Indonesia’s largest taxpayer for a long time, Liem also
consistently appeared on the list of wealthiest people in the world pub-
lished by Forbes. Liem was already ranked no. 48 in 1988 and no. 68
in 1997, with an estimated net worth of US$2 billion and US$4 billion
respectively.23 With wealth came status, not just in business circles, but
also in other fields. Liem, who had not received any university educa-
tion, received an honorary doctorate from the prestigious US-based
Wharton School where a special chair named after him was estab-
lished.24
After more than three decades of expansion and diversification, the
Salim Group had 280,000 employees and was organised into 12 ‘divi-
sions’ in 1995:25
1. Agribusiness;
2. Automotive and Shipping;
3. Banking and Financial Services;
4. Chemicals;
5. Computers & Communications;
6. Construction Materials;




11. Property Development & Leisure Industry;
12. Trading & Distribution.
Figure 3.1 gives an indication of the importance of the Salim Group ac-
tivities by division. According to the turnover figures in the 1996 Salim
brochure27 banking (mainly BCA), food (mainly Indofood) and con-
struction materials (mainly Indocement) stand out as relatively impor-
tant industries in the Indonesian context. Its international division was
substantial as well and contributed around 26% to total turnover in
1995. The international activities are mainly the listed company First
Pacific in Hong Kong; the much smaller QAF (listed on the stock ex-
change in Singapore) and KMP in Singapore (which owned the major-
ity of QAF, but also owned stakes in other companies as well); and
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some investments in privately held companies in Fujian, China and
some other regions.
Several authors and media have estimated the turnover of the group
in its golden age before the crisis. The most influential researcher on
the Salim Group is Sato who has reported on the turnover of the Salim
Group in various years: US$9.8 billion in 1992; US$8.6 billion in
1993; and US$22.8 billion in 1996.28 The latter figure represents
about 4% of Indonesia’s gross domestic product (GDP).29
According to various newspapers, notably the Financial Times and
the Australian,30 the turnover of the Salim Group ranged from US$9
to US$11 billion between 1993 and 1995. The Salim Group, in its bro-
chure, puts its 1995 turnover at over US$20 billion. If these estimates
are combined, a picture emerges of the approximate rate of growth. If
Sato’s estimates are accurate, the group experienced an overall growth
in turnover of 40-50% annually between 1993 and 1996.31 This would
mean that the growth rate is high and would certainly be a challenge
for existing financial and managerial resources within the Salim
Group. The high growth rates were a reality for Indofood and First Pa-
cific Company, both companies grew mainly through acquisitions. Ta-
ble 3.1 shows the turnover figures for the main listed Salim companies.
Thus, the Salim Group, which was already the largest group in Indo-
nesia, grew very rapidly in the period under review. This growth, of
which the turnover was just an indication, was the result of organic
growth as well as acquisitions and new partnerships. In the next sec-
Figure 3.1 Salim Portfolio as a Percentage of Total Turnover
Agribusiness (1%)
Automotive & Shipping (2%)
Banking and Financial Service (47%)
Chemicals (4%)
Construction Materials (5%)
Food & Consumer Products (9%)
International (26%)
Multi-Industry (3%)








Source: Salim Group Brochure, 1995-1996; excludes property, natural resources
and computers for which the figures are not known
THE MIDAS TOUCH 65
tions, we will look in more detail at the factors underlying the rapid
growth of the Salim Group.
3.5 The Salim Web
Like many Asian conglomerates, the Salim Group works with a variety
of partners. The core group of investors consists of Liem and two of
his sons (Anthony Salim and Andree Halim). The so-called Liem Inves-
tors (i.e., the Liem family, Djuhar Sutanto and his sons, Ibrahim Risjad
and Sudwikatmono) have also invested in several Salim Group compa-
nies. But there are other (minority) partners as well. A company may
be owned by the Liem family and the other Liem Investors plus a part-
ner, but could also be owned by the Salim family and a foreign partner.
Despite all the different ownership structures all companies in which
the Salim family has a major share are commonly considered part of
the Salim Group.
In every company with a partner, the Liem Group is always the
one with the largest shareholding (Liem Sioe Liong).32
You have to differentiate between the Salim Group, Salim family
owned, and the bigger group comprised of the Salim partners
and the Liem investors. Salim Group [the Salim family] may
have some activities in which the Liem investors have a stake.
But Salim Group [the Salim family] also has its own business.
For example the Liem investors invested in First Pacific and In-
docement. Salim family has Indomobil, plantations and so on
where Liem investors have no role (Salim Group manager).
What is part of the Salim Group and what is not often remains
unclear. It is therefore helpful to create in your mind a picture of the
Salim Group as a network rather than as a single unit (see figure 3.2).
The companies in the group are connected by ownership and leader-
ship. Whether or not a company belongs to the Salim Group is often a
matter of inside information, as the group only publishes results of its
Table 3.1 Turnover of Main Public Salim Group Companies (US$ Million)
Indofood Indocement First Pacific QAF Indomobil UIC
1994 622 1568 3804 206 1049 131
1995 930 1753 5249 231 1335 141
1996 1207 1824 7025 265 1361 157
Sources: various annual reports. N.B. not corrected for cross-ownership
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publicly listed companies, not of the privately operated units or private
holding companies. Interviews suggest that the Salim Group some-
times purposefully confuses the issue of who is the real owner of any
one unit. The Liem family and the Liem investors are considered the
core group of partners that have shaped the Salim Group.
Aside from the core group of shareholders many new businesses,
particularly in the industrial manufacturing area, started out as part-
nerships. In the early stages, the Salim Group often took a leadership
role in a domestic venture by acquiring a company that was not very
successful. Examples of this are Indomobil and parts of the cement in-
dustry.
To buy what already exists and then make it big, that’s the
strength of the Liem Group. This is the reason why I can keep
costs low (Liem Sioe Liong).33
In the period 1994-1997 a large number of new partnerships were an-
nounced. These partnerships support the notion that the Salim Group
is seeking to diversify even further, both in the nature of its activities
as in its geographical locations. The new partnerships show a great
variety of new activities for the Salim Group with a range of partners.
We can distinguish between three types of partners: foreign (non-
Indonesian and non-Chinese) partners; ethnic Chinese partnerships;
and political connections (figure 3.3). Generally speaking, Western and
Japanese partners are common in industries where outside technology
Figure 3.2 Salim Group Ownership and Structure
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family
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was required. Indocement, Indofood, Indomobil were all set up in this
manner.
In several cases, the original partners later withdrew or were bought
out and the companies came under control of the Salim Group. In
other cases, the partnership continued or was expanded into new
fields. Ethnic Chinese partners are common when it comes to large In-
donesian or Asian ventures or investments, often in the form of a con-
sortium. Indonesian partners often involve ventures with the second
generation Suharto family, but the scope and value of these seem
rather modest in this period compared to the overall size of the group.
According to a person interviewed for this study and familiar with the
group:
Before the crisis there was not really a strategy. If he (Anthony
Salim) diversified into small other things, it was probably to
help out partners, such as the Suharto family (IBRA employee).
The choice of partners appeared to be opportunistic, as the following
story reveals:
The partnership with Dunlop, which is basically run by Sumito-
mo, was completely by accident. At that time, the Dunlop man-
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ager visited and proposed a tire factory in Indonesia, but we con-
sidered the investment to be too high. Then there was the Kobe
earthquake in Japan, and all of the company’s top management
was in Indonesia. As their lives were saved, they wanted to move
their facilities to Indonesia, and, therefore, with a low invest-
ment we had a partnership with them (Salim Group manager).
Thus, in the period from 1994-1997, the Salim Group entered into a
number of partnerships with foreign (mostly Japanese and Western),
ethnic Chinese and crony partners. The partnerships with Japanese
and Western companies seem to be most important for the group
when building up manufacturing businesses in Indonesia. The Salim
Group also participated in regional ethnic Chinese networks, albeit
usually as a minority shareholder. Ventures with the Suharto family
also take place, although the scale of those activities seems rather mod-
est.
3.6 Further Expansion
Aside from the new partnerships the Salim Group announced in this
period, the existing companies also expanded further through organic
growth and acquisitions. The substantial organic growth of the Salim
Group in the period 1994 to mid-1997 can partly be illustrated by the
production capacity levels of the largest Salim companies in Indonesia.
Production capacity for noodles, cement, flour, and alkyl-benzene was
expanded before the crisis, although in some cases, like Indocement,
the new plants only came on stream during the crisis.34
Most of these companies sold their products on the domestic mar-
ket, and the organic growth was directly related to the growth of the In-
donesian economy.
Previously they were in every business. They usually target com-
panies with mass production, no high tech and also little
branded goods. Take Indosiar, for example, a TV channel that is
not investing in high tech, more on the creation of programs for
the masses that attract advertisers. They need cash for the short
term, working capital (IBRA Employee).
Despite the Indonesian policy of stimulating exports, none of the listed
Salim Group companies in Indonesia were exporting substantial por-
tions of their production.35 In 1995, the Salim Group reached market
shares of 90% for instant noodles and 89% for flour. In cement the
market share was 38% in Indonesia, but 71% in Java where about 60%
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of the Indonesian population lives. UIC, the partly Salim-owned alkyl-
benzene producer, held a monopoly. All these businesses achieved sub-
stantial production capacity growth (figure 3.4).
The expansion of Indofood’s noodle production, which already had a
90% market share, caused some controversy. In 1995, the Salim Group
applied for government permission to build three extra factories. The ap-
proval was initially withheld on the grounds that companies with a mar-
ket share of over 50% would not be allowed to expand further. This pol-
icy was later suddenly reversed and it was announced that Indofood met
the requirements necessary for expansion, which were that the company
had to be listed and its products exported.36 According to the 1996 In-
dofood’s annual report, however, only 1.5% of sales stemmed from
overseas sales in 1995 and 0.95% in 1996. Exports, which were never
substantial for Indofood since its listing, actually showed a decline.
Information on the expansion of Indonesian companies not listed
on the stock exchange was harder to obtain, but information from the
Salim brochure in 1996 also indicated the extremely ambitious expan-
sion plans of the Salim Group. Some examples were:
– Planned expansion of crude palm oil (CPO) production from
400,000 tons in 1995 to 2 million tons;
– Planned production of 700,000 tons refined sugar annually;
– Intention to cultivate 200,000 hectares of rice;
– Production increase from 96,000 tons of caustic soda in 1995 to
200,000 tons and from 90,000 tons of ethylene dichloride to
240,000 tons;

















Sources: Annual reports of Indofood, Indocement, UIC, various years
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– Galvanised iron sheets production projected to increase from
90,000 in 1995 to 190,000 tons.
The international activities of the Salim Group also expanded rapidly.
The listed company, First Pacific Company of Hong Kong, can itself
best be described as a conglomerate with telecom, property, marketing,
and distribution, as well as banking interests. It operated as an invest-
ment holding and several of the companies under its umbrella were
themselves listed on various stock exchanges.37 Contrary to the Indone-
sian companies, which were mainly active on the domestic markets,
First Pacific did business in over 50 countries, not only in Asia, but
also in Europe and the US. First Pacific was run by Manuel Pangilinan,
a professional manager of Filipino descent who earned the nickname
Pacman for his numerous acquisitions. These led to further diversifica-
tion of First Pacific. The rapid development of First Pacific also contrib-
uted to the further internationalisation of the Salim Group. QAF, one
of the smaller companies listed in Singapore showed a moderate
growth, and also started to expand beyond Singapore, for example, to
Malaysia, China and Thailand. The main business of QAF is bakery
products.
Thus, having emerged as the largest conglomerate, the 1990s were
used for additional expansion of existing businesses and for further in-
ternationalisation. The international activities, which now accounted
for over a quarter of turnover, effectively decreased the dependence on
Indonesia. The explosion of new ventures as well as the substantial ex-
pansion of existing businesses together made up the large growth of
the Salim Group.
3.7 Consolidation and Vertical Integration
In the previous sections, we looked at new partnerships and organic
growth; in this section, I describe the strategy of the Salim Group to
cope with such high growth. One of the noteworthy aspects of the
Salim Group is its complexity with large numbers of separate legal en-
tities. The Salim Group companies were themselves subdivided into
groups, such as the Indomobil group, the Oleochemicals group, the
Mosquito Coils group and so on.38 The Indomobil Group had 90 sub-
sidiaries in 1997 with activities in manufacturing parts, assembling,
distribution, sales, financing and vehicle rental services. Partly this
complexity comes with the large number of partners. Indomobil had
partnerships with Suzuki, Mazda, Hino, Ford (in financing), Nissan,
Volvo and some smaller automotive players. According to a Salim man-
ager interviewed for this study and involved in the automotive sector:
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‘Every partner with whom we have a JV needs a new holding company,
because you cannot mix up partners.’
From 1994 to mid-1997, the group made several efforts to integrate
its operations. The way in which this took place was by means of inter-
nal mergers and acquisitions. Internal acquisitions occur if one Salim
Group company takes over another or if the ownership of Salim com-
pany A is shifted from Salim-owned company B to Salim-owned firm
C. Although information on private companies is limited, the informa-
tion available on the listed companies provides a picture of the inter-
group consolidation efforts. If we look at the internal dynamic of the
group, we see a number of interesting patterns.
In the case of the food industry, the noodle activities were merged
and then listed on the stock exchange under the name Indofood
Sukses Makmur (Indofood) in 1994. Following the listing of Indofood
on the stock exchange, the Salim family started to sell several of their
private enterprises to the now listed Indofood. In 1995, the flour
milling activities (Bogasari), previously part of Indocement, were
brought under the Indofood umbrella. In 1996, there were no major
acquisitions, but in 1997, the majority shares of the privately owned
edible oil activities, plantations and distribution activities were all sold
to Indofood. These were all companies under the umbrella of the
Salim Group, so we can speak of internal acquisitions. Palm planta-
tions produce crude palm oil, which is processed into edible oil and
used in the manufacturing of instant noodles. Flour is another main
ingredient for noodles, and the distribution and retail activities are the
sales outlets for instant noodles. In a period of four years, the Salim
Group had consolidated its food activities in Indonesia by following a
strategy of vertical integration and internal reshuffling of assets. A per-
son familiar with the group:
Anthony Salim wants to be an integrated food player where he
controls everything from the wheat to the noodles and from the
pig to the frozen pork in the Chinese supermarkets. This food
business is between 50 to 60% of the profits and cash flow of
the empire. Therefore, food is a strong recurring theme for the
Salim Group (person close to the group).
If we look at the cement activities in this period, the strategy was also
one of vertical integration, complemented with related diversification.
In 1996, Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa (Indocement) was working on
the establishment of a coal mining facility, which would provide energy
(one of the major cost components in cement production). It distribu-
ted its cement in Java with 164 trucks and partly owned the distribu-
tors. Indocement had portfolio investments in property such as office
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buildings, hotels and industrial estates. Activities in construction man-
agement were also part of the portfolio as well as a minority interest in
a toll road operator (owned by Tutut, one of Suharto’s daughters).39
Another example of the strategy of merging existing companies was
Darya-Varia Laboratories, a pharmaceutical company in Indonesia. It
first acquired a distributor – formerly owned by Salim.40 It was subse-
quently listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange. It subsequently made a
series of acquisitions and it became the second-largest Indonesian
pharmaceutical company by market share with production and distri-
bution activities.41
Yet another example of an internal acquisition was UIC, the partly –
Salim-owned chemicals company, which bought Salim Oleochemicals
Singapore in May 1997.42 The chemicals division of Salim, which ac-
cording to an in-depth report shows a high degree of vertical integra-
tion and is comprised of chemicals producers in various phases of the
value chain for products like detergents, plastics, and packaging mate-
rials.43 A Salim manager explained:
They (the Salims) want to be vertically integrated, in all indus-
tries. The choice of industries is opportunity driven. E.g., Hage-
meyer was bought because the prices for Indonesian products
are set by large traders/distributors. If you buy Hagemeyer you
can control the price (Salim group manager).
Aside from the fact that these asset shuffles led to some degree of verti-
cal integration, they also provided the opportunity to influence the
flows of money within the group. Several interviews as well as newspa-
per articles indicate that the internal acquisitions are a way to make
money, for example, when listed companies pay too much for acquisi-
tions of private Salim companies. A banker close to the group said:
Take for example Indofood. The Salim Group has a private plan-
tation, assets are inflated, and the plantation is bought by Indo-
food. On the basis of those extra assets, they are able to get extra
borrowing capacity.
Thus, the number of separate entities was consolidated by means of
smartly grouping companies under the umbrella of larger listed com-
panies. The large listed companies in Indonesia followed a strategy of
vertical integration by means of internal restructuring. The strategy of
consolidation and vertical integration was carried out by internally
transferring companies from private ownership to listed Salim compa-
nies.
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3.8 Intra-group Synergy
Aside from vertical integration, there were also several indications of
co-ordination between the different Salim Group companies in order to
achieve synergy. Interviews with Salim Group managers clearly show
that major activities are co-ordinated amongst them. Anthony Salim
explained that synergy was about knowing how to create the right
products:
We see this with different angles. What is the synergy between
retail chain (Indomarco, 800 branches), Indofood and televi-
sion? We see that as a synergy. Why? If you are able to under-
stand the shelf, where people are buying things, the product, In-
dofood, then TV, then you can understand how the behaviour is
of the people that are going to buy. Synergy is that we under-
stand how people are creating new products. We can observe
trends by the TV station, for example in advertisements. That
helps us to understand what new products we should introduce.
Of course if we talk flour, packaging – vertical; another synergy.
Different ways of defining synergy (Anthony Salim).
For example the TV. The way we monitor is in 24 hours how
many seconds you are advertising. The free seconds which you
broadcast, if it is unused, we are trying to use as much as what
we call inside advertising (Anthony Salim).
In this period, for example, when the group’s companies needed cars,
they would go to Indomobil and Indorent, the automotive branches of
the group. When they needed construction industry services, they
would use Indocement and so on. Several managers called group com-
panies their customers and this is confirmed by the related party sales
and purchases (table 3.2). Indofood for example, sold 60% of its output
to related parties and Indocement 65% in 1994. UIC shows a particu-
larly high level of related party sales, which is in line with the interview
with one of the managers who indicates that the potential weakness of
Table 3.2 Related Party Sales as a Percentage of Total Sales
Related Party Sales 1994 1995 1996 1997
Indofood 60% 69% 31% 4%
Indocement 65% 63% 66% 78%
UIC n.a. 91% 90% 88%
Source: Annual reports
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his company is losing touch with the ‘real’ market because UIC sells
mostly to related parties.44
The group’s companies used BCA (Bank Central Asia) as their main
bank, making this financial institution perhaps the most important in-
tegrating factor (table 3.3). BCA was a key factor in providing loans to
group companies, particularly short term rupiah loans. As a result of
the relatively attractive rates on US$ loans, most companies increased
their indebtedness to foreign banks (and vulnerability for currency fluc-
tuations), but BCA remained important when it came to domestic
loans. In its annual reports BCA stated that it extended about 1.5-2.5%
of its total loans to related parties in the period 1994-1996. However,
in view of information that surfaced during the Asian crisis, it is more
likely that this figure was considerably higher; according to interviews
and reports, it may have been in the range of 50 to 80%.
BCA was but one example of its joint services; another is insurance.
Most companies use group companies like PT Asuransi Central Asia
and PT Asuransi Jiwa Central Asia Raya to insure their assets. There
are also connections between listed and non-listed Salim Group com-
panies. Take, for example, its food activities. Indofood focused on the
Indonesian market, but apart from Indofood, the Salim Group also has
similar but much smaller businesses in Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Chi-
na. Indofood provided management services for these foreign noodle
makers and received fees in return. Other examples included packa-
ging, for which group companies are used – although managers
stressed that they had the option to choose non-group companies as
well when it came to purchasing packaging materials. There were also
inter-company loans which were actively facilitated by the people close
to Anthony Salim.
They [people from the holding company] were familiar with the
cash-flow; I could approach them to obtain cash from other
[Salim] companies. For example if another company has excess
cash, I can borrow from another company, but I have to pay.
The holding company knows the situation of the companies, but
if I borrow, the payment is directly between the companies, not
Table 3.3 BCA Short Term Loans (% of Total Short Term Loans)
Short Term Loans with BCA 1994 1995 1996 1997
Indofood 75% 26% 26% 52%
Indocement 25% 16% 38% 14%
Indomobil n.a. n.a. 17% 39%
NB: UIC did not have banking relations with BCA; it obtained most of its loans in US$
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between the holding. It’s like a broker, but no fee. ... When I
want to borrow, I directly go to the other [Salim] companies for
cash or I get the capital outside, for example by issuing bonds
like we did. Every month we submit a financial report, so An-
thony Salim knows it if we borrow from other companies (Salim
Group executive, automotive sector).
Thus, looking at the internal dynamic of the group, we can say that
there seems to be a coherent group-level strategy of achieving synergy
between seemingly unrelated businesses. In the period 1994-1997 this
strategy not only included diversification, growth, and vertical integra-
tion (as demonstrated in the previous sections), but also one of achiev-
ing synergy and of intra-group co-ordination. The horizontal integra-
tion can be witnessed in the high levels of related-party transactions
(sales and purchases) and shared professional services such as finan-
cing, leasing, insurance and management consulting for group compa-
nies.
3.9 Co-ordination and Control of the Salim Group
In the previous sections, I demonstrated the existence of a coherent
group-level strategy of vertical integration and intra-group co-ordina-
tion. This overall strategy was carried out under leadership of Anthony
Salim by means of a number of control and co-ordination mechanisms.
These mechanisms are the focus of this section.
The pattern of ownership within the Salim Group was often a pyra-
mid structure. Companies were controlled sometimes directly, some-
times through a range of holding companies. Company A, at the top of
the pyramid, may own company B with 51% of the shares, B in turn
owns C by 51%, and so on. The ownership construction in the form of
a pyramid allowed the Liem investors to control the companies in the
pyramid while not having direct majority ownership of all of the com-
panies. In other words, their cash flow rights were lower than their
control rights. This ownership pattern was common for various compa-
nies.45 An essential part of such a pyramid structure was that all com-
panies are ultimately controlled by a holding company, which was not
listed. Anthony Salim comments that ‘a private holding is much more
flexible, but it does not mean that we have no checks and balances. We
operate with very stringent rules’. This pyramid ownership structure
ensures that the legitimate decision-making power was in the hands of
the Salim family.
A direct reporting line existed between the directors of the Salim
Group companies and the Salim family. In the beginning the top man-
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agers had to report to Liem Sioe Liong in Singapore. But in the 1990s,
Anthony Salim gradually assumed his leadership role. Managers had
to file weekly or monthly reports which gave fairly detailed income
statements as well as market-related data. Anthony Salim actually stu-
died and commented on all these reports in detail according to the var-
ious top-managers interviewed. Thus, the decision-making power
inherent in the ownership structure was used by the Salim family to
intervene in the management of the Salim companies until a fairly
high degree of detail.
The Salim family often used terms that are common on Western
management, without necessarily attaching the same meaning. One of
such terms was the word holding company, which normally would
mean a company that holds shares in other companies. The Salim
Group considered its headquarters the ‘holding company’, even if such
a thing did not exist as a legal entity nor did it hold shares in other
companies. What they called the Salim Group holding company, which
was presented as the headquarters in the Salim brochure of 1996, had
the following units: legal affairs and taxation; internal audit and finan-
cial analysis; treasury; and human resource management. This holding
company (or sometimes called a management holding company) was
not a holding in the sense that it holds shares in other companies, but
in the sense that it gave management services. One of the Salim man-
agers adds to the confusion:
The holding company is not a corporate identity as such. Legally
is there is not a board as such. But certainly there is an organisa-
tion in the holding companies (Salim Group executive).
What seemed to be the case was that the Salim family with its staff
made most of the decisions and plotted the long-term strategy of all en-
tities belonging to the Salim Group. The ‘holding’ was chaired by
Liem, whereas the day-to-day decisions were made by president and
CEO Anthony Salim, assisted by his top management including execu-
tive director Benny Santoso.
Before the Asian crisis, a legal entity called Inti Salim Corpora per-
formed the above mentioned tasks – although it is not unlikely that
more than one registered entity performed co-ordination tasks for the
group.46 According to interviews with top – managers, Inti Salim Cor-
pora recruited them and paid their salaries. It organised training ses-
sions and social events. Several managers saw Inti Salim Corpora as
the group of top managers of the Salim companies: ‘Anthony’s own
people’. There were regular co-ordination activities within this group,
which, according to one of the managers, comprised of over 20 people
and had meetings at least monthly. They co-ordinated activities such as
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joint projects or inter-company transactions such as sales or financial
transactions and perhaps acted as an informal board for the Salim
companies.
Inti Salim Corpora was set up as a management holding com-
pany. It is not truly a holding company as such, but only com-
prising of people who are providing the services to the Salim
Group as a whole as well as to the operating units within the
group. For example, in the past, they used to have the internal
audit division, HR division, tax and legal department (Salim
Group executive, various industries).
[Inti Salim Corpora] takes care of the management of the Salim
Group. It’s the key management people like Indofood, cement,
Bogasari, the chemicals, property (Salim Group executive, auto-
motive sector).
Inti Salim Corpora also had a large group of internal controllers and le-
gal or tax-advisors. Estimates of the number of auditors that worked for
the group as a whole and provided controls and directions to the differ-
ent Salim companies run into the hundreds. They too received the per-
iodic reports. Several managers experienced the internal auditors as
‘very tough’ and one top manager called them ‘consultants – but with
power’. The internal auditors also brokered financial transactions, but
according to one manager, if you borrowed from another company
from the group you had to pay. Therefore, although using the internal
capital market was possible, it was not always the most favourable op-
tion.
Thus, in order to be able to carry out a coherent group-level strategy,
the group made sure that the formal decision-making power was
firmly centralised in the hands of the ultimate owners: the Salim fa-
mily. The decision-making power is actively used to give detailed direc-
tions and was made possible because of a management information
system of weekly reports that are studied in detail by Anthony Salim.
Apart from this, a large number of internal auditors continuously scru-
tinised and checked the financials of the Salim companies. By means
of one (or possibly more) entities a set of co-ordination mechanisms
was implemented which ensured the group spirit and co-ordination of
Salim activities in terms of possible inter-company synergy. A coherent
recruiting strategy was also in place. An internal capital market was fa-
cilitated by the internal auditors.
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3.10 Salim Group Leadership
In 1993, Liem Sioe Liong, now aged 77, started to pass on the leader-
ship of the family business to one of his younger sons, Anthony Salim,
who gradually increased his position on the various corporate boards.
Liem himself also remained active on various boards within the group.
Anthony Salim, then aged 44, started his career in 1971 after graduat-
ing from a London technical college and was chosen leader of the
group despite the fact that he was younger than his brothers. One of
the top managers described going to Singapore to report to Liem regu-
larly, although in the period under review this role was slowly taken
over by Anthony Salim.
The board of executive directors of a large Salim Group company is
mostly composed of professional managers. These are usually trusted
people that have been linked to the group for a long time. Professional
managers generally stay with the group for decades and the group of-
fers good incentives to its managers. Some managers eventually leave
to strike out on their own and build their own group, such as Mochtar
Riady. This former CEO of the BCA Bank successfully built his own fi-
nancial group, the LIPPO group. The Salim family may also hold one
position on the executive board and several on the supervisory board
(as non-executive board members).47 If the group is a Liem Investors
company, the other Liem investors (Risjad, Sudwikatmono, and the
Djuhar family) tend to also have seats on the board (annex four gives
an overview of Salim Group executives). Table 3.4 shows the involve-
ment of the Salim family and Liem Investors in Indocement, Indofood,
and First Pacific, Indomobil (as of 1997), Bank Central Asia (BCA),
and Unggul Indah Cahaya (UIC).
Besides Liem and his two sons, the only other family member to oc-
cupy a strategically important position is Franciscus Welirang, Anthony
Salim’s brother-in-law. He held an important position in Indofood
(overseeing flour milling) and held board positions in other Salim com-
panies as well. However, other than these four, there is no evidence
that other family members are actively involved in managing the Salim
Group. One other person who stands out is Benny Santoso, who works
very closely with Anthony Salim. In the period 1994-1997, he held
board positions in Indocement, Indofood, Indomobil, and Bank Cen-
tral Asia.
The board memberships displayed above are in majority commis-
sioners. This implies a supervisory rather than an executive role. Com-
panies like Indofood, First Pacific, Indomobil and UIC are all run full-
time by professional long-time Salim managers with strong personal-
ities and thorough knowledge of the business. Unlike the owners, they
stick to their business and rarely hold board positions in other listed
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companies. These managers are sometimes in charge of other non-
listed companies in similar fields.
The common ‘Salim culture’ the managers describe is one of infor-
mal decision-making and very hard-working. There is very little inter-
nal bureaucracy and reporting lines are short. Once managers are
trusted they enjoy a considerable level of freedom. Outsiders generally
find the culture different from other Indonesian family conglomerates.
Table 3.4 Liem Investors and Board Memberships 1994-1997






















Soedono Salim x x x x Soedono Salim x x x x
Anthony Salim x x x Anthony Salim x x x x
Franciscus Welirang Franciscus Welirang x x x
Sudwikatmono x x x x Sudwikatmono x x x x
Ibrahim Risjad x x x Ibrahim Risjad x x x x
Sutanto Djuhar x x x Herman Djuhar x
Tedy Djuhar x x x Tedy Djuhar x x x x
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Johny Djuhar x x x x Johny Djuhar
























Soedono Salim x Soedono Salim x x x
Anthony Salim x Anthony Salim x x x
Andree Halim x Andree Halim x x x
Franciscus Welirang x Franciscus Welirang
Sudwikatmono x Sudwikatmono
Ibrahim Risjad Ibrahim Risjad
Sutanto Djuhar Sutanto Djuhar
Johny Djuhar Johny Djuhar
Tedy Djuhar Tedy Djuhar
* no annual report available * no annual report available  
Source: Salim Group Board Membership Database compiled by the author
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They describe it as very professional. But others comment on the see-
mingly unchecked empire building and the aggressive style of doing
business.
3.11 Summary and Conclusion
The period from 1994 to mid-1997 can be considered a golden age for
the Salim Group. The economic environment was favourable, and the
well-connected and large Salim Group was in an excellent position to
profit from this business context. The overall sales growth rates for the
group were approximately 40% annually during this period, which is
substantially higher than the economic growth in the region. Most of
the existing businesses, which were in high-growth areas of the Indo-
nesian economy, had ambitious expansion plans. Their sales increased
through organic growth as well as through acquisitions. The growth of
the international division of the Salim Group, First Pacific, was particu-
larly high, and as a result, the internationalisation process, which be-
gan in the mid-1980s, intensified and now contributed more than one
quarter of total sales. The Salim Group became less dependent on In-
donesia, where anti-Chinese sentiments and criticism of Liem person-
ally were always present just below the surface.
A large number of new partnerships were formed in a variety of
fields and countries, particularly Indonesia and China. Many of the
joint ventures were formed with Japanese or Western partners, in parti-
cular in those industries that required technological expertise or large
capital layouts. As part of consortia, the Salim Group also partnered
with other ethnic Chinese in the region, although these ventures did
not form a major share of their activities. Good relationships with Su-
harto and his children meant that the Salim Group could take advan-
tage of the high economic growth by lobbying for favourable regula-
tions, for example in instant noodles. Direct business ventures with
the Suharto family now seem less important than in its initial growth
phase.
The Salim Group cannot be categorised as a portfolio of different
companies. A coherent group strategy of internal restructuring and ver-
tical integration rationalised the main Salim Group companies. In ad-
dition to vertical integration, there was also a pattern of synergy be-
tween the group companies, which is for example evident in the sales,
purchases, and loans to related parties. This shows that the Salim
Group is not completely run as a portfolio, but that it takes advantage
of inter-group linkages.
The control over the group is firmly in the hands of the Salim fa-
mily, which established a system of reporting, control and active inter-
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vention. Further co-ordination took place by facilitating contacts
through a holding company named Inti Salim Corpora. The task of
this unit was to control as well as facilitate integration.
The intra-group links become even more apparent if one analyses
the board memberships of various Salim Group companies in the peri-
od 1994-1997. The Salim family and Liem Investors take up important
board positions, although professional managers usually do the day-to-
day management. The Salim Group culture is characterised as profes-
sional, hard-working and aggressive in its business pursuits (table 3.5).
Table 3.5 Summary
Period Institutional Environment Strategic Choices
1994-1997
rapid growth
- continuation of liberal economic
policies
- protection of selected businessmen
- activity in connection with Suharto
as his succession is discussed
- more crony capitalism
- FDI inflow
- continue internationalisation
- restructuring & vertical integration
- hiring professional managers
- small businesses with Suharto's
children
- fast growth of existing & new
businesses, increasingly with foreign
partners
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4 Fire-Fighting
Uncertainty is always in the equation
Anthony Salim,
CEO & President, Salim Group
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter described the growth of the Salim Group in the
period 1994 to mid-1997. It argued that the group developed rapidly
through new investments with partners, growth of existing business
and acquisitions. Some of its important businesses were structured
along the value chain by following a strategy of vertical integration. In
addition a conscious strategy of intra-group co-ordination was carried
out by the Salim family. The international division diversified and ex-
panded through acquisitions. All this happened in a business context
of high economic growth and government protection for well-con-
nected conglomerates like the Salim Group.
In the period covered in this chapter, the business context is sud-
denly reversed. The economy contracted, the rupiah was devalued and
many companies in Indonesia became insolvent.1 The Asian Crisis led
to an unprecedented decline and near-nationalisation of the Salim
Group. Since the Salim Group played such a prominent role in the In-
donesian economy, it also played a prominent role in the political and
economic crisis in Indonesia. The Salim Group faced the most devas-
tating years of its history.
This chapter covers the period from the start of the crisis in mid-
1997 until the end of 2000. It starts with a description of the events
leading up to the Asian Crisis, particularly in Indonesia. The dramatic
events in the crisis and its effects on the Salim Group are analysed as
well as the strategy followed by the Salim Group to cope with the crisis
– a strategy of fire-fighting. It discusses the impact on the group’s
structure, ownership and leadership.
4.2 Unprecedented Problems
In May 1997, the Thai currency started to devalue rapidly, causing a
panic among investors in the Asian region. In July 1997, the crisis be-
gan to spread to other countries, including Indonesia. The Indonesian
government initially assured local conglomerates that the Indonesian
currency would not be devalued. This proved unsustainable. After first
widening the band, in August, the monetary authorities of Indonesia
implemented a free-floating exchange system for the rupiah, which
subsequently fell further at a rapid pace. The rupiah, which was valued
at 2,450 to the dollar at the end of June 1997, rapidly lost value, reach-
ing a low of 15,000 in June 1998. The fall of the rupiah caused a
swelling of corporate debt since companies had most of their loans in
dollars, while their assets and income were measured in rupiah.
The results of the crisis were that in 1998 – the worst year of the cri-
sis – half of Indonesia’s companies were technically insolvent and the
economy contracted by over 13%.2 The stock exchange fell sharply to a
third of its previous level, particularly in the last quarter of 1997 and
Salim company stock prices fell as well (see figure 4.1).
The vulnerability of the corporate sector in the region was clearly de-
monstrated by Pomerleano,3 who analysed the health of the corporate
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sector in various countries prior the crisis, and concluded that Thai-
land, South Korea, and Indonesia were the most vulnerable (figure
4.2). During a time when capital was pouring into Southeast Asia,
many businesses, among them the Salim Group, had started borrow-
ing heavily from foreign banks, which offered substantially lower inter-
est rates than local banks. Moreover, most companies, including the
Salim Group, expanded rapidly – which required extra capital. The re-
sult was a general rise in the debt-to-equity ratio of many Asian compa-
nies, and an increase in dollar denominated loans, making the corpo-
rate sector vulnerable to currency fluctuations. According to an IMF re-
port the external corporate debt rose from US$34 billion in 1996 to US
$60 billion in early 1998.4
The Indonesian economist, Thee, mentioned comparable figures:
the total foreign debt of Indonesia was US$138 billion, of which US
$64.5 billion was private debt.5 Even worse, many of these foreign cur-
rency loans were short-term. Indofood, for example, saw its proportion
of US$ short term loans as a percentage of total short term borrowings
rise from 11% in 1994 to 49% in 1996, the year prior to the crisis.
Most Salim companies experienced more vulnerability to currency fluc-
tuations, as is demonstrated by their proportion of US$ loans as a per-
centage of their total loans (see table 4.1). Indofood admitted it had
hedged only 15% of its debt, and was forced to issue a profit warning
in October 1997.6
As it became clear that the corporate sector experienced widespread
problems paying foreign debts, the government appointed a special
commission of five people (the Private Foreign Debt Settlement Team)
that was to investigate the matter. Anthony Salim was one of the mem-
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bers. The committee, in January 1998, concluded that 228 Indonesian
companies had experienced problems paying their foreign debts.7 An-
thony Salim also sat on a committee called DPKEK (Council of the Sta-
bilisation of Monetary and Economic Resilience) which advised on the
macro-economic situation during the crisis.
Unfortunately, problems were not restricted to the private sector.
When the rupiah entered a free fall, Indonesians started withdrawing
money from ATMs and converting their money into dollars en masse,
amidst a panic among the population as well as within the banking
sector. Many Chinese businessmen had already started bringing their
capital abroad. Since the 1988 deregulation, the financial sector had
seen a quick rise in the importance and number of private banks.
However, financial institutions were generally not properly monitored,
and many banks were stuck with increasing amounts of non-perform-
ing loans8 and withdrawals. It was a phenomenal blow to an already
fragile banking system. The government sought the assistance of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and signed an agreement in Octo-
ber 1997. In November 1997, sixteen banks were closed as a result of
IMF demands. As a consequence of the crisis, most of the banks were
on the verge of collapse and were given life-saving injections from the
Bank of Indonesia (the liquidity assistance was called BLBI credits).9
Many conglomerates had also used their banks for intra-group lending,
something officially not sanctioned but a widespread practice in Indo-
nesia.10 When the conglomerate companies started to experience pro-
blems, their banks naturally also experienced problems in the form of
bad loans.11
Aside from the crisis in the private sector and the collapse of the
banking sector, the economic crisis in Indonesia also led to a political
crisis. By the end of 1997 it was clear that the crisis was more serious
than expected and a new agreement with the IMF was announced in
January 1998. The IMF package of policies agreed to included lowering
tariffs on various products, including those that had been beneficial to
Salim companies such as wheat and chemical import tariffs, the lower-
ing of the automotive sector protection rate, and the abolishing of the
restrictive distribution arrangements for cement. Suharto was appar-
Table 4.1 US$ Loans for Major Salim Companies (% of total)
USD Loans 1994 1995 1996 1997
Indofood 37% 54% 63% 77%
Indocement 29% 40% 54% 96%
Indomobil n.a. n.a. 51% 71%
UIC 88% 100% 98% 99%
Sources: annual reports of mentioned companies
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ently reluctant to commit himself to the IMF agreements, which meant
the abolition of privileges for all of the people around him.12 Relations
with IMF became strained. While the economy continued to worsen, a
third IMF agreement was announced in April 1998. Suharto’s health –
he was now 76 – also led to speculations with regard to his succession
and for the first time in decades, Suharto’s position came under in-
creasing pressure.
In early 1998, economists started to voice open criticism of how the
government had handled the crisis.13 Despite this, Suharto was re-
elected in March although his credibility was declining. His new cabi-
net, which also included allies like his daughter Tutut and Bob Hasan,
an ethnic Chinese businessman, was not well received. In January and
February 1998, there had already been some scattered riots against
small Chinese businesses, and the Chinese were afraid of being scape-
goated for Indonesia’s problems. A panic emerged and many people
started to hoard food. Daily demonstrations by students against the re-
gime became the norm. Liem and some other rich Chinese started dis-
tributing food parcels to the families most affected by the crisis.14
By May 1998, large-scale and devastating riots erupted. Public anger,
aggravated by mounting prices for food and other basic needs, was
mostly directed at the Suharto family and his so-called cronies. The lat-
ter were mostly Chinese businesses, among which the Salim Group
was considered the largest. In practice, all companies small or large
that were suspected of being Chinese owned were attacked by rioters
while physical violence against them also occurred. Indonesia wit-
nessed yet another period of violence against the Chinese minority
and, amidst widespread riots, the Salims’ family home in Jakarta was
set on fire as well as several branches of their BCA bank.15 This unrest
forced Suharto to resign on 21 May 1998 and hand over power to vice-
president Habibie. After Suharto stepped down, a movement arose to
fight corruption and cronyism. The common term in Indonesia is
‘KKN’ – corruption, collusion, and nepotism. The backlash against the
‘Suharto way of doing things’ was to have serious repercussions for all
contracts and businesses linked to the Suharto family – including the
Salim Group.
Habibie’s presidency was fairly short (from May 1998 until October
1999) – and fairly troubled because of the ongoing crisis. After the
elections in 1999, President Wahid, nicknamed Gus Dur, took office as
the economy was showing signs of turning around, but it did not grow
significantly either. Wahid apparently realised that Indonesia could not
recover without the capital and talent of businessmen. Some of the
conglomerates, including the Salim Group had simply grown too large
to fail. He negotiated a deal so that the Chinese-Indonesian business
tycoons would return the money that they had taken out of the country
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– estimated to be between US$10 and US$80 billion. One of Wahid’s
first actions was to visit Singapore in November 1999 and talk to Chi-
nese-Indonesian businessmen. Liem was reported to have been in the
audience with Anthony Salim and to have agreed to return to Jakarta
and resume his investment activities there.16
Some trials against former power brokers began, notably Suharto’s
son Tommy (who went into hiding but was later convicted and sent to
jail) and Bob Hasan (also convicted). Several scandals involving corrup-
tion and nepotism came to light.17 Another movement that threatened
the stability of Indonesia was that several regions were now demanding
greater autonomy. Wahid made national unity a priority and an-
nounced a process of decentralisation, which did not lessen the ‘cost of
doing business’ (i.e., corruption) but made it less centralised. Wahid’s
government was generally plagued with problems, prompting a com-
ment that ‘economic recovery remains hostage to politics, with the di-
verse coalition that makes up the cabinet unable to provide strong and
effective government’.18 Only in 2000 did the economy show signs of
some growth (4.8%) but the institutional context (government policies,
bureaucracy, legal system) did not undergo any substantial changes.
The recovery from the crisis in Indonesia was slower than elsewhere
in the region. According to one economist: ‘owing to its weak financial
and economic structures and institutions, Indonesia was unable to
withstand the severe shock of the currency crisis. A political crisis arose
that rendered a speedy economic recovery more difficult and intract-
able than in South Korea and Thailand’.19 The other regional econo-
mies also experienced a deepening economic crisis, which affected
most of the companies included under the umbrella of First Pacific in
Hong Kong and KMP in Singapore as well, although the effects of the
crisis were less devastating for this group than those in Indonesia,
which had the extra burden of a political crisis. The GDP growth in
various Asian countries reveals the depth of the economic crisis and
the length of the recovery (see figure 4.3).
To summarise, the Asian Crisis in Indonesia caused corporate debt
problems as well as a collapse of the banking sector. During the sub-
sequent political crisis the favourable regulatory environment for the
Salim Group was abolished, and formerly valuable political connec-
tions turned against the group. The political crisis and anti-Chinese
mob violence posted a direct physical threat to the Salim family and
their assets. The business context in this period can best be charac-
terised as extremely hostile.
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4.3 House on Fire
During the first months of the crisis, the group continued its strategy
of rapid growth and aggressive acquisitions. It was involved in several
large bids and take-over attempts. These included a hostile take-over at-
tempt of San Miguel (a listed Philippine brewer) and a bid for a large
stake in the second-largest Indonesian private bank, Bank Danamon,
in November 1997.20 Both deals eventually failed to materialise as a re-
sult of the unfolding crisis.
Besides its acquisition plans, however, the Salim Group also acted
quickly upon the emerging economic crisis. When asked whether he
had prepared for the crisis, Anthony Salim said:
Yes, uncertainty is always in the equation. Pak Suharto cannot
live forever. Number 2, we already started to institutionalise our
businesses. Market based put into our consideration. Whatever
the changes in politics, it’s going to have an impact on macro-
micro. Since we are in the market, we are somehow implicated.
There is a public perception that we are close to Suharto, which
is true, we don’t deny it. We did things the best way we knew
how at that time – three things: we distanced ourselves from
government contracts, which at that time was a fruitful business
– the last 20 years no government contracts; having market or-
ientation for our business direction; we always do business















based on the regulations, prevailing law. Our family is always
top ten 10 tax payer in Indonesia (Anthony Salim).
The first action taken by the group when the crisis broke out was an at-
tempt to bring Indofood, its largest Indonesian company, under the
umbrella of a foreign Salim company. Its first choice was the much
smaller Singapore-based QAF.21 In order to do this, a rather compli-
cated set of transactions was proposed by Indocement, Indofood and
QAF to the shareholders. Indocement owned a majority (50.1%) of the
Indofood shares, and it distributed those among its shareholders (i.e.,
the majority to the Salims themselves). The Liem investors subse-
quently sold their stake in Indofood to QAF in Singapore. Because the
government owned 26% of Indocement (and had also received Indo-
food shares) it had a large say in the deal. The attempt to move Indo-
food offshore received explicit approval from the government, as voiced
by various ministers.22 By virtue of its share in Indocement, the gov-
ernment now also owned 10% of Indofood as a result of this trans-
action. In order to maintain the majority ownership of Indofood, the
Salim family had partnered a close business friend, Putera Sampoerna,
owner of another Indonesian group, to also take a 6% stake in the
company. This was necessary to maintain full control over Indofood.
These moves were discussed in the Indonesian press as ‘capital
flight’, although this was denied by the Salim Group and the govern-
ment. The unusual step was taken to allow media interviews with
spokesman Benny Santoso, who had the difficult task of explaining
this move in terms of synergy and attracting more capital in the lower
risk environment of Singapore.23 Just how much synergy you can
achieve when you are a giant bought by a little dwarf remained up in
the air. This action sparked suspicion in Indonesia that a change in po-
litical power was in sight. One former minister, interviewed for this
study said ‘if a group like Salim engages in capital flight it indicates a
shift’. There were indications that the Salims also planned a similar
move to sell Indocement to a foreign company.24
However, the events that followed distracted attention away from this
deal and the Salim Group had to focus on more urgent issues as the
crisis worsened, which included a negotiated pay off or restructuring to
deal with the mounting dollar denominated debts. An example of this
was Indocement, which declared a moratorium on its debts because it
could not afford to pay them any more. The company had started a
large and expensive expansion at the wrong moment, financed it with
dollar loans which mounted as the rupiah depreciated, while the de-
mand for cement in Indonesia declined rapidly. Other companies also
accumulated huge debts and had not hedged their foreign currency
loans.
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In the past every business you touch becomes gold. You think
that the things never end. For example in cement, we started
with 1 million, then 3 million, become 6 million tons, and then
you’re dead (Anthony Salim).
I believe Anthony Salim missed a chance. His financial advisors
told him to hedge, but he calculated that it would cost him in
the area of US$80-100 million and he considered this too much.
Then the crisis came and it turned out he made a mistake. He
had taken a lot of credit at the BCA bank in order to save his
companies. This was of course against banking regulations (per-
son close to the Salim Group).
The debts (of the Salim Group) accumulated because they over-
valued their assets. There was no proper check on financial insti-
tutions – this was for political reasons. It was in nobody’s inter-
est to have a functioning system of checks and balances. In gen-
eral, the rules in Indonesia are not followed, because they can
be bent by political connections (international journalist).
But the Salims were not alone in their misery. Anthony Salim, who
was appointed by the government to negotiate with private sector cred-
itors, was quoted as saying ‘It’s as if you’re sitting on the Titanic. If In-
donesia sinks, all the corporations will sink’.25 While most Indonesian
Salim companies were indeed sinking quickly and approaching insol-
vency, an even more serious problem for the Salim Group arose: the
collapse of BCA, which had become the largest Indonesian privately
owned bank. Siti Hardijanti Rukmana (Tutut) and Sigit Haryoyudanto,
two of Suharto’s children, had a combined 30% stake in BCA, and with
Suharto’s position under pressure, all kinds of rumours spread in Indo-
nesia. On 14 May, newspapers reported the first mob attacks of BCA
branches. The next day, newspapers reported that angry mobs burnt
and looted the Salim family home, and many Chinese tried to rush to
the airport to flee to Singapore or elsewhere while Jakarta was ablaze.
The New York Times later reported:
Rioters had dragged out and slashed a portrait of his [Anthony
Salim’s] father and spray-painted the words ‘Suharto’s dog’ on
the gate. Reluctantly, Mr. Salim caught the next flight to Singa-
pore. ‘If your house is already burned, the next thing they would
try to do is get the people,’ he explained in a rare interview here.
‘You don’t want to get caught in the middle of something like
that’.26
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Part of the widespread violence and panic was a bank run on BCA by
worried customers. For weeks people were lining up to withdraw their
money from the bank.27 On 19 May, after some days of violence, the
bank announced that 122 branch offices and 150 ATMs had been de-
stroyed.28 After days of continued withdrawals, the newspapers re-
ported on 28 May 1998 that BCA was placed under state supervision.29
The Salim family had, according to the interview with Anthony Salim,
as well as news sources, tried hard to rescue and recapitalise the bank.
But they did not succeed and handed over BCA to the government for
recapitalisation.30 Other sources tell a different story and claim that
Salim had used the bank’s money to save other companies:
When there was a rush on their (BCA) bank, people did not end
up withdrawing 53 trillion rupiah. That is a lot of money. Con-
servatively estimating, maybe 25 trillion. They used the other
half to channel into their corporations (former minister).
Within the hostile environment of riots, political chaos, and panic, the
Salim Group’s management withdrew to Singapore for a few weeks to
see how things would transpire from a political perspective. The direct
attacks on the Salim family, with their family home torched, made Ja-
karta too dangerous a place. Although Anthony Salim returned, his
father remained in Singapore and never returned to Indonesia after
the crisis. As a result of the collapse and nationalisation of the BCA
Bank on 28 May 1998 the Salim Group became by far the biggest debt-
or to the government, owing some US$5 billion. This amount included
the pay-back of capital injections into the BCA bank (3 billion US$)
and a fine for violating the inter-group lending limits.31
As Suharto stepped down, suddenly open criticism of companies
previously close to Suharto became possible. As a result of this anti-
KKN movement, several recent Salim contracts came under pressure,
one of them being the recently signed Jakarta City drinking water pro-
ject that the Salim Group had embarked on together with France’s
Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux,– which had clearly benefited from its close
relationships with the former Suharto regime.32 The Salim group was
forced to withdraw from the venture. A Salim property project along Ja-
karta’s coast was also cancelled.
Most of the already technically bankrupt Salim companies experi-
enced further setbacks as the demand for products in general in Indo-
nesia dropped. This was particularly true for luxury items such as cars
and personal computers. Car sales dropped 83% in 1998 – which
meant that companies like Indomobil posted losses and their partner
threatened to pull out. Volvo, one of Salim’s partners, issued a state-
ment that they were revising their strategy for Indonesia.33 Other Salim
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companies in Indonesia were no better off; their main cash cows Indo-
food and Indocement also reported losses in 1997 (table 4.2).
First Pacific, the international division of the group, also suffered.
Its subsidiary Metro Pacific started to post losses (over a troubled prop-
erty project in the Philippines) and First Pacific announced a strategy
of selling off investments in a variety of companies. It first raised US
$2 billion by selling Hagemeyer, a Dutch trading company, and a few
other companies.
The sale of Hagemeyer, which was the foothold of the Salim Group
in Europe, meant that First Pacific again became a conglomerate com-
pletely focused on Asian markets.34 The money was subsequently used
to strengthen its existing businesses and invest in new acquisitions.
One of the acquisitions was a majority stake in Philippine Long Dis-
tance Telephone (PLDT) for US$749 million (Financial Times, 1998a,
1998b).35 When it became clear that QAF could not buy Indofood, First
Pacific came to its rescue and in December 1998, First Pacific acquired
a controlling interest in Indofood.36
4.4 Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency
The government had established the Indonesian Bank Restructuring
Agency (IBRA) on 27 January 1998 as a consequence of agreements
made to obtain IMF assistance.37 IBRA was to oversee the ailing (but
still viable) banks. As of May 1998 this included the formerly Salim-
controlled BCA bank, along with most of the Indonesian banking sec-
tor. IBRA was supposed to recover the banks’ debts, either in cash or
in assets. Assets that IBRA received were subsequently sold on to in-
vestors or the general public, with the proceeds flowing back to the
state.
Unlike the average scruffy Indonesian government institution, this
entity had the appearance of an investment bank, with young well-
trained staff members and a shiny building. Its employees were mostly
from investment banks, whereas its chairmen (it was a revolving door
of chairmen in the short period of IBRA’s existence) were political fig-
Table 4.2 Profits of Selected Salim Companies during the Asian Crisis





Sources: annual reports. N.B. not corrected for cross-ownership
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ures. IBRA quickly became one of the most powerful institutions in In-
donesia as they managed assets worth a third of Indonesia’s GDP and
most of the large conglomerates were its ‘patients’.38 Its mission as de-
scribed in the strategic plan for 1999-2004 stated:
to aid economic recovery through the restructuring of the bank-
ing sector and corporate debt, and to maximize the recovery of
state funds to reduce pressure on the government budget.39
IBRA requested the former owners of those banks under its supervi-
sion to inject new funds into their banks, which the Salim Group
agreed to do in August 1998.40 In that same month, the chairman of
IBRA revealed that besides having to pay back the liquidity assistance
provided by the central bank to keep BCA running, the Salim Group
also violated the legal lending limit, for which it also had to pay as well.
In total the amount to be paid was agreed to be over US$5 billion. Ac-
cording to Anthony Salim,
Our approach is: OK, we open up. We don’t believe that negotia-
tions should be hide and seek. This is our wealth; now let’s ne-
gotiate how this is going to solve the problem (Anthony Salim).
IBRA officials who frequently negotiated with him during that period
confirm that he laid his cards on the table – but he remained a tough
negotiator. Anthony Salim, as well as sources in IBRA, confirmed that
he offered a list of his companies, and IBRA was able to choose the
most liquid assets. Despite these statements, the majority of the Salim-
owned shares in its cashcows such as Indofood and First Pacific, were
not surrendered. According to Anthony Salim the reason for this was
that the shares were pledged as collateral for certain loans. This may
have been true – but in any case, it was very convenient, and it allowed
the Salim Group to hold on to a few of its most important companies.
According to some IBRA employees, this was ‘a political process’. One
of them stated:
Within IBRA Anthony Salim laid down his cards on the table,
but it was still a poker game. He is smart. Asks us for our condi-
tions first. We would like to have the liquid assets, like Indofood
shares, but it turns out that there is a condition, that if he has
less than 51% ownership, his bank loans become immediately
payable. Obstacles arise. Instead he offers Indomobil. Anthony
Salim is very tough to negotiate with (IBRA employee).
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In September, the Salim Group reached an agreement with the govern-
ment to pay its obligations of US$5 billion by transferring stakes in
over 100 companies.41 Anthony Salim and a few other tycoons ar-
ranged the transfer by signing a Master of Settlement and Acquisition
Agreement (MSAA) with the government. IBRA employees, who had
negotiated with various tycoons at the time, claim that the Salim
Group was co-operative and the most professional. The administration
of its companies was excellent, which was the reason that the transfer
took place in such a short period of time.
They have centralised financial control, a team of maybe 100
people work on the holding level. When we took over the assets
it was easy to get the data, they were easily available at Salim
because of their centralised financial system. ... They have
grown so big only because of this way of running things (IBRA
employee).
Salim is known to keep very good records, very detailed records.
This is the reason why IBRA was able to acquire and dispose of
the Salim assets in such a short period of time – it was because
of the thoroughness of their data. Besides the case of the sugar
plantation, the figures provided by Salim were basically quite ac-
curate (IBRA employee).
In 2000, it appeared that Salim family (and other conglomerate own-
ers) assets surrendered were worth much less than the promised value.
Meanwhile, Anthony Salim agreed to pledge more assets.42 Enemies of
the group described it as ‘theft’. A former minister interviewed for this
study, for example, noted that:
They transferred companies worth 53 trillion rupiah. But when
these assets were audited again, the value of them was only 20
trillion, so we are talking about theft here. But the Salim Group
was one of the most co-operative groups. Others were far worse.
Now these Salim assets are with the government, with IBRA.
What solution they took was also vague. The government’s
losses were huge. If we had a choice it would be better not to
have this type of conglomerates in the future.
In July 2002, it was agreed that the Salim Group had to pay IBRA an
extra US$107 million (or 960 billion rupiah) for misrepresenting asset
values.43 These reports as well as the interviews show that their
involvement with IBRA was a process of continuous negotiation – a
game of give and take played not only at IBRA level, but also at the
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highest political levels. The Salim Group wanted to have a document
stating that they fulfilled their obligations by paying off their debts, the
so-called Release & Discharge (R&D) document. According to an IBRA
employee:
While the asset disposal was progressing, the Salim Group had
in the meantime, on another level, been working towards the
R&D document. Surprisingly, the five names on the list to ob-
tain this release and discharge document included two small
debtors and Anthony Salim, Sudwikatmono, and Risjad – the
three Salim Group owners. There is political activity at another
level. Anthony Salim has connections with IBRA chairman and
with various ministers, etc. as well (IBRA employee).
Much of what has happened has not been transparent until now, but
the interview results show an interesting dual image of the Salim
Group. From the side of the former ministers interviewed, the Salim
Group is portrayed as immoral because of their attempts to gain as
much as they can and to leave their debts behind for the government
to pay; while IBRA picture was that of a group of very smart and re-
spected businessmen who were ‘squeezed’ by politicians because they
were the most co-operative.
Following the agreement with the Salim Group, a special company
named PT Holdiko Perkasa was established under IBRA to receive,
manage, and sell the shares and assets of 107 Salim companies on 14
December 1998. Among the transferred shares was a majority stake in
the publicly listed company Indomobil (72.63%) and smaller stakes in
Indocement (13.2%), Indofood (2.5%), Astra International (24.27%),
QAF (20%), and First Pacific (5%). Apart from the 13.2% stake of Indo-
cement held by Holdiko, IBRA owned a further 6.6% and the govern-
ment was also a shareholder, owning 26% of the company. Therefore,
Indocement was then fully controlled by the government. Meanwhile,
Salim family managed to maintain control of First Pacific.
The remaining 89% of the value came from private companies.
These included palm plantations; oils and fats; sugar; coal and granite;
plywood; television; textiles and garments; chlor-alkali; oleochemicals;
food and consumer products; trade; multi-industry; and property. The
industry composition of these companies in terms of value is shown in
figure 4.4.
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4.5 Salim Asset Disposals
BCA Bank was declared solvent by the government on 25 April 2000,
and IBRA listed the bank through an initial public offering of 22.5% of
IBRA’s total shares on the Jakarta Stock Exchange on 31 May 2000.45
The Salims’ stake in the bank had been taken over by the government
except for a 7% share while a new management had been installed
with the task of restructuring the bank. Surprisingly, a few of the new
bank executives came from Indomobil, another Salim company. The
result of the IPO – proceeds worth 109 million dollars – was consid-
ered disappointing.46 An IBRA employee remarked:
The Salim Group was unable to get back Bank Central Asia. An-
thony Salim was not allowed to participate in the bidding pro-
cess because it was too political. Too bad because otherwise the
government could have probably gotten a higher price for BCA
(IBRA employee).
Under the leadership of Scott Coffey Holdiko Perkasa swiftly started to
sell the assets under its management to investors. According to inter-
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FIRE-FIGHTING 97
views with IBRA employees, the process promised to be relatively quick
because of the professional management of the Salim Group, and its
adequate financial administration of the companies transferred. After
some discussion in the government, it was agreed that the former own-
ers could not buy back their assets for the next two years.
In 1999 and 2000, several disposals took place. In the first quarter
of 2001, the total proceeds amounted to approximately US$1 billion.
Shares in listed companies were sold and the private companies were
disposed of by means of tender processes. The stakes in those com-
panies that were joint ventures with foreign partners were mostly sold
to the partners. Several companies were acquired by foreign investors,
such as the palm plantations, which were bought by Guthrie from
Malaysia and a stake in Astra, the largest Indonesian automotive com-
pany, which went to a consortium led by a Singapore company (see
table 4.3).
4.6 Leftovers and Asset Shuffles
The strategy of the Salim Group during this period was to focus com-
pletely on fire-fighting and dealing with its debt problems with the
banks and the Indonesian government. As many companies started to
post losses, the growth strategy of 1994-1997 was reversed into one of
shrinking, restructuring, and selling.
However, the Salim family did not abandon its debts (as APP, a large
listed company belonging to Sinar Mas Group, the second largest Indo-
nesian conglomerate, did) and negotiated as smartly as they could to
fulfil the demands of both the government and the creditors. In the
process, they handed over large parts of the Salim empire, while they
managed to hold on to a few of their most profitable assets in Indone-
sia (i.e., Indofood) as well as some non-Indonesian companies.
Besides those companies transferred to the government, the Salim
Group also tried to sell off their non-core assets outside Indonesia.
Apart from Hagemeyer, which has already been mentioned, other as-
sets sold included property and supermarkets in Singapore.47 The
Salim Group had several investments in Singapore. They initially tried
to sell a 23% stake in United Industrial Corporation (UIC) to a com-
pany named HKR. After that deal fell through, they finally sold the
stake to the JG Summit Group from the Philippines for an estimated
US$194 million.48
Besides selling off their assets, there were also internal changes
within the group that were meant to raise money or shift control, for
example to bring one Salim company under the control of another, or
to merge one Salim company with another. A recurring theme was that
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these asset shuffles usually did not succeed because of objections from
creditors or minority shareholders. When the Salims tried to transfer
Indofood out of the country, it was finally bought by First Pacific, an-
other Salim Group company. The Salim Group sold most of its shares
in Indofood to First Pacific at a discount but maintained control (by vir-
tue of their majority shareholding in First Pacific). The sale of the
shares was done to transfer Indofood’s ownership abroad, but the
Group also converted its shares into much-needed cash. Similar trans-
actions of shifting company ownership were planned in Singapore with
QAF. In 2000, QAF announced that it would take over Yinfu Interna-
tional Ltd. edible oil refineries (based in Fuqing, China) and Shanghai
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Yinfu Oils and Fats Industries Co Ltd. Due to ‘certain legal and regula-
tory issues’ the agreement was later annulled.50
A number of transactions suggested that the Salim Group was pre-
paring for a comeback. The QAF shares sold by IBRA were bought
back and the company remained under Salim control. In May 1999,
Indomobil’s debts to Bank Central Asia were assumed by the Salim fa-
mily, by means of issuing bonds to the Salim family which could be ex-
changed for shares in Indomobil after three years.
Furthermore, Indocement was special because it was the only com-
pany in which Liem Sioe Liong maintained a position on the board,
which probably indicated that the Salim Group was eager to hold on to
this company. By 1998, when Indocement nearly collapsed under its
debts, Anthony Salim had already found a partner for the company.
Initially, Anthony Salim came to an agreement with the German multi-
national Heidelberg Cement Group to share ownership, but the gov-
ernment prevented this deal by forcing the Salims to hand over control
of their company Indocement. A manager of Heidelberg Cement
Group, who purchased shares of Indocement said:
The government finally told me, we are now in control, and
even though we know you have a deal with Anthony Salim, we
don’t want you to enter into a 50/50 partnership with him, be-
cause he is no longer very much liked in Indonesia. Make it a
minority share. I told them I needed a local partner with knowl-
edge. So, finally I ended up, against my wishes, buying 65% of
the company, with Anthony Salim owning 13% (Heidelberg Ce-
ment manager).
I will tell you a story about Indocement. Two days before IBRA
opened the bidding, the market was reporting that Heidelberger
Cement was interested. And that Heidelberger already had an
agreement with Salim in Hong Kong. A back-to-back arrange-
ment. So, we contacted Heidelberger’s management and told
them that if this was true, they would have to pay a fine. They
responded by telling us that they had a 50/50 agreement, where
Salim would manage it. I told Heidelberger that cement is not
high technology, and that they can manage it themselves. So
they cancelled the deal with Salim (former Indonesian minis-
ter).
The government also pressured Salim on other fronts as well, espe-
cially those businesses considered ‘crony’ businesses. A European part-
ner said:
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The pressure on the Salim Group became enormous, during
that period they feared for their lives. When they had some idea
that a Chinese hunt would become reality, they tried to moving
everything out of Indonesia. The government was not fond of
Salim, and forced them out of our joint venture. ... We did not
want to lose the Salim Group’s co-operation , and we were un-
happy with this development. When you do business in a coun-
try like Indonesia you need to find a local champion, who can
solve problems when they occur, someone with good ties to the
government (Western partner of the Salim Group).
The Asian Crisis forced structural change upon the Salim Group and it
ultimately became a smaller and different enterprise. The portfolio
ended up consisting of First Pacific, which, in turn, controlled Indo-
food and PLDT, a major Philippine telecom operator. Moreover, the fo-
cus was now completely on Asian markets, in particular Indonesia and
Philippines, after it sold off all of its European assets (Hagemeyer).
4.7 Leadership
In the previous chapter I demonstrated that Liem Sioe Liong was in
the process of handing over his central leadership role to Anthony
Salim. The Asian Crisis accelerated this process because Liem did not
return to Indonesia, remaining in Singapore after the May 1998 riots.
The very critical negotiations with the Indonesian government were
thus handled by Anthony Salim. As is shown in table 4.4, Liem with-
drew from all of Salim’s boards of executives (except Indocement).
Some managers, however, noted that he still played a role in the back-
ground, but the decisions – including those involving IBRA – were
Table 4.4 Board Memberships by Liem Investors and Benny Santoso
Name 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Andree Halim 3 3 3 3 2 3 3
Anthony Salim 4 5 5 5 5 5 5
Benny Santoso 3 3 3 3 3 2 3
Djuhar Sutanto 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
Franciscus Welirang 1 2 2 3 3 3 3
Ibrahim Risjad 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
Liem Sioe Liong 4 4 4 4 3 1 1
Sudwikatmono 2 3 3 4 3 2 1
Johny Djuhar 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tedy Djuhar 2 3 3 3 3 2 2
Source: Board membership database compiled by the author
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now made by Anthony Salim. When it became necessary to make state-
ments to the press, he would send Benny Santoso instead of appearing
himself.
The Salim Group had enjoyed close ties with Suharto prior to the cri-
sis, but these ties evaporate during the crisis. With public sentiment
running against any company associated with the previous regime, An-
thony Salim manoeuvred carefully in this environment. On the one
hand, he co-operated with the new government and met its demands
(albeit, after tough negotiations). On the other hand, he never betrayed
Suharto in public, despite the fact that everybody was rushing to dis-
tance themselves from the Suharto family in late 1998.
The policy of many Chinese in Indonesia to turn more to the outside
world, which had been the trend in the period prior to the crisis, was
reversed. The Salim family largely disappeared from the news, using
Benny Santoso only when it was absolutely necessary to explain sensi-
tive strategies such as the shift in ownership of Indofood to offshore.
By adapting to the new situation without abandoning their old friends,
the Salim Group chose to maintain a delicate balance – and at some
points in time it was uncertain whether Anthony Salim would be ar-
rested or not. The following story was told to me by a Salim manager:
During the crisis, we received some information that Anthony
Salim was going to be arrested and put in jail. So we went to
pray in his office. He saw us and asked ‘what are you doing?’
We said we are praying for you. ‘Why?’ Because we are afraid
that you are going to be arrested. To which he responded, ‘If I
have to go to jail, I will go, it is my responsibility’. We were sur-
prised, but this was his attitude (Salim Group manager).
At that time, the possibility that the government might completely dis-
mantle the Salim Group with its leaders facing imprisonment was a
very real scenario. Anthony Salim himself narrates the story as if the
crisis and the new government’s policies were a given. Within this fra-
mework, he looked for the best solution for his companies.
We talked to the new, emerging government and asked them
several questions: 1. Whether a company like Salim will be al-
lowed to exist in this new environment; 2. Is this going to be a
political or commercial and economic solution. If it is a political
solution, you can do anything you like, nationalise the compa-
nies and put anyone in jail. But we believe it needs to be a com-
mercial solution: the emerging nation will be heavily dependent
upon the IMF and the World Bank as well as bilateral support
for its economic policies. We believe that that has not changed.
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So, we believe a commercial solution is the one necessary for
the economy. Secondly, it is not just us. It’s a total financial,
monetary, corporate crisis. We are one of the problems, no doubt
a big one, but one among many. ... So, we talked to the govern-
ment, about whether this was going to be a commercial solu-
tion. Number 1, we have the capacity to pay you back. Now, if
you want cash, I don’t have it at this time. Number 2, let’s define
the rules. It’s not my rules regarding the total solution for the
banking, monetary, and corporate sectors. So, within the rules,
let’s talk about how the Salim problem and solution fits in. ...
When that was established, they have the product of MSAA,
BPPN. So that is the product of the IMF, government (Anthony
Salim).51
However, other interviews and media sources indicate that the group
was clearly in a position to influence at least some environmental fac-
tors, so this is only a portion of the story. There were probably plenty
of high-level political negotiations behind the scenes, as an earlier
agreement with Wahid already indicated. IBRA officials also hinted at
negotiations on a higher political level, while at the same time, they in-
dicated that Anthony Salim had focused on the problem and was very
pragmatic in his dealings with IBRA.
The new environment had a profound impact on the way the Salim
Group operated. Prior to the crisis, visitors would line up to meet An-
thony Salim with their business proposals, whereas the office now be-
came very silent. Some IBRA officials thought he had become lonely.
The image of a powerful group suddenly changed into that of a
troubled group. It must have been hard to swallow.
Indeed, the group’s management team (those who headed Indofood,
First Pacific, Indomobil, and Indocement) did not abandon the com-
pany during this crisis period, trying instead to find a solution to the
crisis together. Interviews reveal that some of the management of the
companies that were sold (e.g., Indomobil and the palm plantations)
joined other Salim companies. As we shall see in the next chapter,
however, some of the strategies implemented to save the Salim Group
were difficult to deal with for them.
4.8 Summary and Conclusions
Thus, during the crisis period of 1997-2000, the previously favourable
political and economic climate turned into an extremely hostile busi-
ness context for the Salim Group. It suffered from corporate debt, fall-
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ing stock prices, and an attack on their bank as well as mob violence
directed against the family itself.
Because they were surrounded by fires everywhere, the group
decided to adopt a strategy of fire-fighting. New investments ceased be-
cause within the context of the political and economic crisis the Salim
Group’s future remained highly uncertain. Anthony Salim’s multi-level
negotiations allowed the group to survive the crisis, but not without
having to hand over many of his assets to the government. Some other
assets outside of Indonesia, such as Hagemeyer, were sold to raise capi-
tal.
Nevertheless, the group managed to hold onto several important
companies, such as First Pacific and Indofood, to its share of UIC, as
well as to some smaller private companies. Its structure was altered
and First Pacific, now also in control of Indofood in Indonesia and
PLDT in the Philippines, became its key asset. The Salim Group tried
hard to hold onto its majority shares in all three of these companies.
As a result of the changes, the Salim Group was reduced from an inter-
national to merely an Asian conglomerate. Anthony Salim was now
clearly in charge and his father Liem Sioe Liong had withdrawn from
most of his management Salim Group positions (table 4.5).
Table 4.5 Summary
Period Institutional Environment Strategic Choices
1997-1999
regime change
- anti-Chinese riots and looting create
hostile atmosphere for Chinese
business
- Suharto's regime falls apart
- IMF stops protectionist policies
- anti-cronyism
- use connections to survive & help
Suharto family
- focus on solving the crisis
- comply with government demands,
sell businesses to pay debts
- retirement of Liem
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5 Axis of Opportunity
Whatever you learned in the last decades,
you’ll be able to save because you don’t make the same mistake.
And opportunities are now much bigger than the ASEAN tigers.
Anthony Salim,
CEO & President, Salim Group
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, the dark years of the Asian crisis were de-
scribed in which the Salim Group survived the Asian Crisis crisis, if
only barely. Leadership had been passed to Anthony Salim, who had to
forfeit large parts of Salim’s empire in the process of coping with the
political and economic crisis in Indonesia.
In 2001, the group took its first steps on the bumpy road to recovery
in the context of a modest Indonesian economic recovery and more im-
pressive growth in the surrounding Asian economies. Although the
economy showed positive growth figures, the Indonesian investment
climate did not improve substantially, with corruption costs remaining
high and the institutional context remaining weak.
Despite some internal conflicts within the Salim Group, by and
large, a process of buying and buying back commenced. The buy-back
preparations were highly controversial. Furthermore, the remaining
companies were re-structured and by the end of 2003, the Salim Group
was in better shape and looked to be in a position to re-gain some of
its lost glory. The Asian Crisis did not lead to a fundamentally different
business model for the Salim Group, although some minor elements
of the strategy were altered.
This chapter begins with a description of the business context during
this period. Within this context the moves of the Salim Group to re-
sume a strategy of growth are described as well as their post-crisis
structure and management style, which was increasingly centralised
around Anthony Salim, but less focused on Indonesia.
5.2 Business Context
Since 2000, the Indonesian economy has shown more stability and
has resumed its growth, albeit at a much lower rate than prior to the
crisis (around 3-4% in 2001-2003).1 These growth rates were not able
to absorb the new entrants into the labour market, and were consid-
ered too low to actually reduce poverty. Indonesia’s recovery from the
crisis was much slower than that of the surrounding economies.2
Factors that contributed to this slow recovery were the ever-fragile
banking sector, and the fact that the corporate sector was not in a posi-
tion to initiate new investments while foreign direct investment re-
mained low. In fact, Indonesia recorded net capital outflows; the bal-
ance only began to show positive returns in the second quarter of
2003. The bombings in Bali in October 2002 also did little to restore
the already low FDI levels.
The corporate sector had suffered tremendously during the crisis
and was still in the recovery process. The previously insolvent Salim
companies began posting modest profits again while they struggled to
lower their debt levels. Indonesian exports performed relatively well,
and contributed to the modest economic growth (although mainly due
to a few successful commodities), together with private consumption.
Generally speaking, export recovery, as with the overall economic recov-
ery, in Indonesia lagged behind that of South Korea, Malaysia and
Thailand.3
Indocement, UIC, Indofood and Indomobil had all made some at-
tempts after the crisis to increase their previously negligible exports.
This was a logical strategy in view of falling domestic demand, dollar
denominated debt and a depreciated rupiah. Despite these attempts,
none of these companies significantly increased its exports. Some non-
listed Salim companies, for example, the Bulan pig farms were estab-
lished specifically for exporting to the Singapore markets. Data from
Holdiko also show that some private Salim companies were actually
world leaders in their sectors and exported most of their products. The
larger Indonesian listed Salim companies, however, were never willing
or able to export to any significant degree.
Meanwhile, the political environment in Indonesia remained rela-
tively unstable. Wahid, who had won the presidential elections in
1999, came under pressure as a result of various scandals and a gener-
ally inconsistent record of policy implementation. On 23 July 2001,
Megawati, the vice-president under Wahid and a daughter of the for-
mer president Sukarno, was inaugurated president. Despite this
change of power, however, there were no major policy changes or im-
provements in the macro-economic situation. Most people interviewed
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agreed that, in this respect, very little had changed in the Indonesian
business context.
One of the main issues that surfaced during the crisis was that KKN
(corruption, collusion and nepotism) was not effectively addressed,
and, as a result, the institutional environment remained weak while
corruption costs remained high. Moreover, the decentralisation policy
also brought adverse effects, such as a higher cost for doing business
due to new local regulations and actual increases in corruption.4 One
expert interviewed for this study stated: ‘something worse than orga-
nised corruption is unorganised corruption’. While another interviewee
complained about increased cronyism and corruption: ‘Now under Su-
karno [President Megawati, daughter of former president] you only
have to show that you are loyal by paying up. It’s 100% cronyism’. The
Salim Group lost a patron in Suharto, but under the subsequent gov-
ernments they continued to try to influence policies by using their con-
tacts – and, if an interviewee was right – by paying bribes to people
close to former-president Wahid.
The effects of measures implemented by the IMF packages during
the crisis only became noticeable after the crisis had begun to fade.
The protection rate for domestic industries was greatly reduced as a re-
sult of these measures. This plus the abolishment of favourable mar-
keting and distribution schemes probably had adverse effects on some
Salim operations, such as their flour milling, cement and chemical
concerns. It is difficult to demonstrate a direct link between the
changes in the regulatory environment and Salim company perfor-
mance. This link is, however, suggested by interviews with some insi-
ders. The data available in the annual reports of Indofood, UIC and In-
docement show that the profit margins of most companies continued
to decline (figure 5.1).
During this period we can see declining margins for UIC, a mono-
poly in alkyl-benzene production protected by an import tariff of 15%
prior to the crisis, which was lowered to 5% in 2000. Indofood also
showed declining margins, but when the figures are consolidated and
include both the noodles and the flour milling businesses (since 1997),
it is not clear whether one or both products were the major cause of
this decline. Interviews suggest that noodle production faced increased
competition from a local group, whereas the Bogasari mills suffered in
this new regulatory environment.5 Meanwhile, in 2001, as noted ear-
lier, Indocement was taken over by Heidelberger Cement. Indocement
showed increased profit margins in the period 2002-2003 because of a
specific Heidelberger Cement strategy that focused on improving profit
margins instead of increasing volumes. This differed from the Salim
Group strategy which preferred to focus on market share.
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5.3 IBRA Asset Sales
Since the millennium, the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency
(IBRA) has increasingly become a source of controversy. Although the
sale of Salim assets proceeded rather quickly, the institution’s overall
asset sales proceeded slowly while at the same time there was a rapid
turnover of chairmen.6 One IBRA employee noted that: ‘IBRA became
preoccupied with power. The instinct of Asian bureaucracies is then to
slow things down’. As IBRA approached its agreed-to closure date (Feb-
ruary 2004), it became evident that the restructuring of the banking
sector was not very successful and that the asset recovery was lower
than expected.7 Some employees at IBRA seemed embarrassed by the
‘politics’:
Within IBRA, Anthony Salim is the businessman that won the
most respect. In fact I saw him many times. Every time we in-
troduce a new policy or a new minister, I had to have a meeting
with him and explain the details of the new policies, which was
a bit strange. He is an amicable person, very bright, some might
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say hyperactive. Work is his life; it is very much a one-man
show. He’s not a bad guy, not shadowy or anything like some of
the other owners. I think he would prefer to avoid politics alto-
gether if possible. He’s not much of a lobbyist (IBRA employee).
In the period 2001-2003 it became clear that the Salim Group intended
to get back some of its assets. The previous chapter described how
IBRA had started to sell off Salim’s stakes in joint ventures (which
were usually taken over by the joint venture partner) and shares in
listed companies. These were the easiest to sell. Moreover, some com-
panies were sold to foreign firms, like the plantations which went to
Guthrie in Malaysia. According to Scott Coffey, approximately half of
the assets pledged by Salim were sold to foreigners.8
But the assets put up for sale in the next wave of IBRA disposals
were companies that were more difficult to sell. In 2001, 76 companies
were readied for a sell off by IBRA, 28 of which were Salim companies.
IBRA required that buyers state in writing that they were not related to
the Salim Group, but this was difficult to prove. Indomobil and Indo-
siar stakes were sold at the end of 2001, almost immediately to be fol-
lowed by persistent rumours that the Salim Group was behind the
buyers.9
They got Indomobil back. The government bought the shares at
2700 [rupiahs] a piece, but re-sold it at a quarter of the price to
the highest bidder. This happened in 2000-2001. How do I
know this? Well, in the deal with Suzuki there was a clause that
stated that should the Salim Group pull out as a major share-
holder, all loans would immediately become payable. Thus, it
was obvious that Salim was behind the buy back of Indomobil
(financial analyst).
IBRA had a regulation that the original owners cannot re-pur-
chase their old companies for two years. Now it has been almost
one year, so they are preparing now. After two years they are al-
lowed to buy back their old companies. So far they use nomi-
nees: companies or other conglomerates. These are paid in the
form of shares or something. Salim is quietly re-purchasing
some of his old companies such as Indosiar, Indomobil, Indo-
milk, their shipyard (IBRA employee).
The sale of Indocement was controversial at first. The Salim Group
had an agreement with the eventual buyer, Heidelberg Cement Group
of Germany, to jointly run the company.10 However, under government
pressure, Heidelberg acquired a majority stake, and swiftly started to
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change Indocement’s strategy of diversification and began to sell off
bits and pieces that were the result of prior diversification, such as its
various properties.
The sugar plantations received a great deal of attention, because
there were rumours according to interviews with IBRA executives that
Anthony Salim was trying to block the sale and was favouring another
buyer closely associated with him. The eventual sale to a local conglom-
erate was an example of a power game for control over the company,
where the Salims used various legal manoeuvres to prevent the new
owner from successfully operating the sugar plantation. Court cases
followed, while another asset sale was also criticised because Anthony
Salim intervened.
There was the case of the Mosquito Coil company, where the
new owner had a no-competition clause. But Anthony Salim
built a factory next door and hired all their personnel. The new
owner can sue Salim, but in this country – well you know how
it works (IBRA employee).
Take, for example, the case of the sugar plantation, Indolam-
pung. There was a problem because the factory had been sold,
but not the land. IBRA initially did not know that there was any
land involved because there was nothing to indicate this. When
we entered into a due diligence case with the prospective buyer
we discovered that the land rights were owned by another com-
pany. It was not traceable to Anthony Salim, IBRA could not
prove that the land was his. All we knew was the name of the
company – Indo-something – and that the people working the
land had sold out to the factory, and that the plantation workers’
salaries were paid by that company. There was nothing illegal
about it, but it serves as an example of how ownership patterns
remain opaque. The companies acquired by IBRA were never di-
rectly owned by Anthony Salim (IBRA employee).
However, Salim is much better than the others in terms of qual-
ity of assets surrendered, speed of co-operation etc. Unlike the
others, they only play in the grey areas, like asset valuation, not
in written and clear agreements. Other conglomerates used bla-
tant manipulation (financial analyst).
However, these well-publicised cases seem not to be the norm as most
sales proceeded rather smoothly without much ado (table 5.1). But the
most sensitive case was the one involving Bank Central Asia. IBRA still
owned 70% of the bank in 2001. Politically it was a sensitive sale, and
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people spread rumours that the Salims wanted to buy back the bank.
High-level politicians were involved and the parliament delayed the
sale because of concerns involving future ownership. It was finally
decided to sell a majority share of the bank to the highest bidder, either
local or foreign. The minister for state enterprises had to reassure the
public that he had Anthony Salim’s word that he would not participate
in the bidding.12
Press reports and interviews contradict one another, and it is not en-
tirely clear what actually happened. According to some insiders inter-
viewed for this study, the Salim family maintained a separate company
that was responsible for the IT systems for the bank – thus they mana-
ged to keep a core function of the bank under its control. Some inter-
viewees thought that, although the Salims may have been involved in
the buy-back process, they did not re-gain control of the bank. The con-
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trolling consortium was composed of several groups, including a US-
based investment fund and the Djarum family from Indonesia.
When the last Salim assets were sold off by IBRA in 2003 the gov-
ernment acquired a total of approximately US$2 billion, a recovery rate
of between 30 to 40%.13 Many complained because they felt that the re-
maining balance would have to be supplied by the Indonesian public.
Moreover, the Salims were able to buy back some of their own debt for
a much lower price, and some figured that they actually profited from
the process.14
Nevertheless, the Salim Group is generally believed to have been the
most co-operative debtor. They repaid more of their debt than other In-
donesian conglomerates. As one IBRA employee put it: ‘it was such an
emotional period. Anthony Salim pulled us through it by just focusing
on the problem’. Salim admits that the group has learnt a very hard les-
son. Salim thought that one had to: ‘Simply face reality. Confront the
problems. Never give up’.
By the end of 2002, the government began considering sending a
letter to those who had paid off their debts stating that they had ful-
filled their obligations. This letter, stemming from the original MSAA
(Master Settlement and Acquisition Agreement), would also shield
them from future criminal prosecution involving their debts during
the Asian Crisis. The initial list of people eligible was composed of
three of the Liem investors (Anthony Salim, Sudwikatmono, and Ibra-
him Risjad) and two other smaller conglomerate owners, later comple-
mented by Suharto’s daughter Tutut. Because it was a very sensitive is-
sue, no government official wanted to risk signing the letter. The letter
in the end was approved (but not issued) by the Financial Sector Policy
Committee in January 2004.15 IBRA formally shut down in February
2004, although some people stayed on to deal with administrative is-
sues. The Release and Discharge letter to Anthony Salim was finally is-
sued by IBRA in March 2004.16
5.4 The Axis of Opportunity
After a few years of coping with the Asian Crisis, the Salim Group be-
gan taking its first steps towards renewed growth, albeit not at rates
common before the crisis. Interviews reveal that the group’s strategy re-
garding its portfolio changed in three respects: 1. its geographical com-
position; 2. its industry composition; and 3. its network orientation.
Geographically, Anthony Salim was aiming for a portfolio of compa-
nies that was composed of 50% inside Indonesia and 50% outside,
thus reducing its dependence on Indonesia, which, however, would re-
main its most important market. He saw an axis of opportunity in the
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Pacific region, between Australia, ASEAN and China. If there was an
opportunity to link, for example, Australian expertise in agribusiness
with Chinese and Indonesian markets, then a lucrative business can be
established. A few steps were taken to realise this strategy. For in-
stance, there was the acquisition of a minority share in the listed Aus-
tralian company Futuris. Futuris had a wheat division, and Indofood
was one of its largest wheat clients because of its noodles. As a conse-
quence of the acquisition of this minority stake, Anthony Salim was
also appointed to the Futuris board of directors in March 2003.17
In China, the group paid US$500 million for a 45% stake in the
COSCO property group.18 According to Anthony Salim, these acquisi-
tions fit in with the Salim Group’s strategy establishing an axis be-
tween Australia, ASEAN and China. This ‘axis of opportunity’, will
mean that the Salim Group will be less a product-based company, and,
instead they will use their expertise and capital to invest in any lucra-
tive businesses in the region, be it agri-business, cement, or other activ-
ities.
We have to transform ourselves to manage our resources. To
transform our assets. It does not mean money, you see, it is
whether we have the contacts. We believe we can operate in dif-
ferent markets (Anthony Salim).
With regard to industry composition, the Salim Group wanted to move
away from too many smaller companies, preferring instead to focus on
a few sectors they are more familiar with. This objective had already
been achieved as a result of the crisis, since most of their ‘bits and
pieces’ were handed over to IBRA, while the Salims maintained control
of a few of the larger businesses. Most of the new investments involve
the food, telecom, media, and property sectors, which are all industries
with products or services for the masses.
The Salim Group perceived its key competence as mediation with ex-
tensive knowledge of local markets. Anthony Salim said he wanted
Salim to remain a broadly oriented conglomerate:
Big and small companies they have their place. If you are big,
you become a component. If you are a system, components be-
come your friends. It is like a rubber belt. Even if you have a big
wheel it does not move without a rubber belt. So you have to
choose, and we want to be a rubber belt, it is easier (Anthony
Salim).
The third factor was its network orientation. The importance of its poli-
tical connections seemed to fade. After the crisis, the Salim Group did
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not resume its activities involving political connections, and apparently
no longer had the desire or ability to establish relationships with new
power brokers. One person close to the group said that Anthony Salim
did not get along with Suharto’s children, which had already led to
some alienation between Suharto and the Salim Group even prior to
the crisis.
Furthermore, the group was now less interested in the ethnic Chi-
nese networks, which Anthony Salim considered outdated.
Question: What is the role of Chinese networks in the region for the
Salim Group?
Only in the early days, when Anthony came back from school.
When we did not have the relationship with the international
bank. Since early 90s when the group developed, we have access
to more and international institutions. Then everything is basi-
cally open for us, in terms of capital. ... Of course we know the
business from the region. They are just businessman friends,
connections do not really help. We may do something with non-
Chinese in the Philippines. Business is Business. ... Anthony
Salim is not interested in that. The second generation usually
does not regard this as important (Salim Group manager).
Question: How about the Fujian investments?
Of course, for the first generation like Anthony’s father they
have a sense of attachment to their home country. Of course the
first investments, 50% based on non business motives – even if
it is not profitable you can do something good for the people.
We invested in a shoe factory for employment and so on. An-
thony does not care because he was born here. Of course we are
investing in China, but not because his father came from China.
We believe that China is a very good prospect and can offer us a
business opportunity that we can develop. It does not matter in
Fujian. From a purely commercial perspective in fact we believe
that Fujian is not the place to do business. It is Shanghai,
Beijing. A lot of new activities are done outside Fujian (Salim
Group manager).
Within the Chinese community there has been a paradigm shift,
a tendency to make connections through cross-holdings. How-
ever, the Salim Group still follows the old paradigm of autocratic
leadership. ... Their strategic alliances are more based on busi-
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ness, not on cross-holdings (second-generation leader of another
ethnic Chinese conglomerate).
Liem and Kuok are clan members and good friends. In Asia, the
big ones help the other big ones not so much that the big ones
help the small ones. I mean clan is more about the region than
the surname. Many have risen above the clan networks, Liem
being one of them. Because people started to study abroad and
also because of structural changes , the clans have lost their in-
fluence in Indonesia, but not in Singapore and Hong Kong (per-
son familiar with the Salim Group).
The relationships with their long-time partners the Djuhars also be-
came increasingly strained, and Anthony Salim seemed to prefer deal-
ing with Western companies. As a result, the network orientation of
the Salim Group changed and the ethnic as well as political connec-
tions, which had already decreased in importance prior to the crisis,
were now negligible compared to their contacts with foreign partners.
Anthony Salim believes his strategy was now less based on connec-
tions:
During Suharto’s time we thrived in that constellation. During
crisis time, when I worked with the IMF and the World Bank
here, we adapted ourselves, we became more market oriented.
Post-IBRA, we are thriving, we are also adapting to a new mar-
ket situation (Anthony Salim).
Despite a little more focus and less dependence on Indonesia, the
Salim Group apparently had no intention to change its basic business
model – that of a family controlled conglomerate, focused on produ-
cing mass products locally for various markets.
5.5 The Salim Group Structure and Control
After the crisis, First Pacific owned the two largest remaining compa-
nies: Indofood and PLDT. As was discussed in previous chapters, own-
ership was basically organised as a pyramid structure and continued
this way (see figure 5.2).
Other companies, such as QAF in Singapore and PLDT in the Phi-
lippines, showed similar pyramid-like structures which ensured full
control over the company with limited cash flow rights. The holding
company always remained private.
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I don’t believe in the short time that the family holding will be
changed to a listed holding in the future, because there is no ne-
cessity. And, number two, a non-listed holding is more flexible
to embark on what we want to do. (Anthony Salim)
There were now some exceptions to the majority ownership principle.
Majority ownership of Indocement, for instance, was sold to Heidelber-
ger Cement. Despite losing control over the company, Salim was able
to retain a minority stake of 13.5%, and both Benny Santoso and Ibra-
him Risjad remained board members. This could indicate the Salim
Group’s long-term interest in the company. A 7% stake in BCA was
also retained. The Salims sold part of their stake in Indomobil, a com-
pany in severe financial trouble at the time, to partner company Suzu-
ki, with the option to purchase it back in subsequent years. Despite the
fact that they now had minority stakes in the various Indomobil com-
panies, the company remained part of the Salim Group and its core
management remained unchanged. One manager who was interviewed
for this study admitted that Indomobil was still considered part of the
Salim Group:
After the crisis it’s complex. Anthony Salim has nothing and
has everything. He sold bits of everything. Officially, Indomobil
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is no longer part of the Salim Group, but informally it still is
(Salim Group manager).
In short, the Salim Group maintained its strategy of full control over
its remaining companies after the crisis by means of a pyramid struc-
ture, although there were some exceptions. The control mechanisms
which consisted of internal weekly reporting systems and majority con-
trol by the Salim family were complemented by external control by
minority shareholders. Indocement and Indomobil, both previously
controlled by IBRA, were now minority owned by the Salim Group,
however, Indomobil was still considered part of the Salim Group.
5.6 Leadership
From the period 2001-2003, a number of interesting leadership-related
issues arose. The first was related to the development of companies un-
der IBRA. IBRA installed a number of its executives on the boards of
various Salim Group companies, such as Indocement, Indomobil, and
Indosiar. As these companies were no longer majority-owned by the
Salim Group, the Salim family withdrew from these boards of direc-
tors. However, in those companies the Salim Group planned to buy
back, such as Indosiar and Indocement, management saw no major
changes, and in the two above-mentioned cases, Benny Santoso re-
tained his position in the board. In 2003, Santoso held more board po-
sitions (within companies in my database) than Anthony Salim (table
5.2). Interviews indicate that a similar thing happened in the private
companies: if management remained unchanged, it probably meant
that the Salims were still in control, or planning to regain control in
the near future.
Anthony Salim’s departure from various boards did not mean that
his central position was waning, on the contrary. In the previous chap-
ter we have seen that the Asian Crisis triggered the rapid departure of
Liem Sioe Liong from most company boards. Andree Halim also with-
drew from his Indonesian board positions. It became clear that An-
thony Salim was in full charge – he was personally negotiating on be-
half of the family with creditors and with IBRA as evidences by one of
IBRA reports (and supported by interviews):
On July 11, 2002, IBRA, represented by the Deputy Chairman of
AMI and the Division Head of PKPS-1, has met with Salim
Shareholders namely Soedono Salim, Anthoni Salim, and An-
dree Salim (SS), represented by Anthoni Salim (IBRA Monthly
Newsletter, July 2002).20
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In 2003, Andree Halim launched a take-over bid for QAF and joined
the board of directors of this small Singapore-based company. Inter-
views also indicate that he was in charge of some of the factories in
Fuqing. He also became board member of Peaktop International Hold-
ings Limited, a small company listed in Hong Kong, which, according
to one of the interviews, was run by his wife.21 After the crisis, Andree
Halim received his own corner of the family business group.
The major share of the empire, however, was run by Anthony Salim.
The structured co-ordination between the companies by means of com-
panies like Inti Salim Corpora changed. Inti Salim Corpora was no
longer being used and the number of financial experts working directly
for Anthony Salim declined. Several interviews indicate that any cross-
company co-ordination now went directly through Anthony Salim per-
sonally, making the group more and more dependent upon him. Man-
agers noted that after the crisis that pre-crisis ‘family’ feeling was re-
placed by a situation where each manager was just running his/her
own business.
Now the synergy is not any more there, people are more work-
ing for themselves rather than helping each other. Now they try
to build their own kingdoms. For example, a competing com-
pany [in my field] was set up. I told Anthony Salim I like to
compete, but they are so small, so it’s easy. After 2 years their
accumulated losses were quite high and I feel bad because I use
the group’s money to kill these competing companies that are
also group members (Salim Group manager).
During the crisis, none of the top managers departed, but after the cri-
sis, several internal conflicts or changes arose within top management.
Table 5.2 Board Memberships Liem Investors and Benny Santoso
Name 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Andree Halim 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 0 0 1
Anthony Salim 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 2 2
Benny Santoso 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 2 3
Djuhar Sutanto 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1
Franciscus Welirang 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 1 1
Ibrahim Risjad 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Liem Sioe Liong 4 4 4 4 3 1 1 0 0 0
Sudwikatmono 2 3 3 4 3 2 1 1 1 1
Johny Djuhar 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Tedy Djuhar 2 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2
Source: Board members database compiled by the author
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Angky Camaro resigned from Indomobil and took a top position in
Sampoerna. Eva Riyanti, who had already occasionally revealed some
disappointment in Indofood’s strategy to the press, ended up in a con-
flict with Anthony Salim and resigned in December 2003.22 She was
replaced by Anthony Salim himself. Manuel Pangilinan, responsible
for First Pacific, also had a clash with Anthony Salim. Apparently the
Salims wanted to sell PLDT, the Philippines telecom company, and
Pangilinan successfully blocked the deal.23 While Manuel Pangilinan
had been chairman of the board he had to relinquish this position to
Anthony Salim to stay on as CEO. Anthony Salim’s second man Benny
Santoso was also appointed to the board after the COO and finance di-
rector resigned during the conflict.
These facts and evidence from interviews shows that the Salim
Group was still very centrally managed by Anthony Salim, who appar-
ently actively intervened in many of its businesses.
Every week we report on sales to Anthony Salim, he likes to con-
centrate on market share. He is very detailed. One day he asked
for the profitability of each product. So we submitted a pile of
papers, and he actually read it all. He even pointed out that pro-
duct such and such was not profitable. He has very good and
creative ideas and made insightful remarks (Salim Group man-
ager).
It is very difficult to get along with him. His personality makes
him want to meddle in things. Anthony Salim is energetic, intel-
ligent and has a dazzling breadth of knowledge; the level of de-
tail is very high. He has the illusion that he knows enough to
run all businesses (person close to the Group).
Thus, as the empire had grown a lot smaller, Anthony Salim’s formal
and informal grip on the empire strengthened, making the group more
centralised in its decision-making structure. His style also led to some
conflicts internally, which caused some of the best CEOs to leave the
company.
5.7 Summary and Conclusions
Thus, after a period of fire-fighting, the Salim Group again embarked
on a growth strategy, this time confined to the Pacific region. The In-
donesian business context eventually changed from hostile to slow
growth and recovery, and most of the earlier problems, such as lower-
ing debt and dealing with IBRA, were winding down. The remaining
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Salim companies, particularly those under First Pacific, started to re-
cover, although margins remained under pressure.
Within Indonesia, most of IBRA sales had been completed and those
companies sold to foreigners were now beyond the Salim Group’s con-
trol. However, it also made preparations to buy back a few of the for-
mer assets, such as Indomobil and Indosiar. The Salim family retained
a minority stake in Indocement, now majority owned by a German ce-
ment maker, which was an unusual strategy since most of its compa-
nies were majority owned through a pyramid structure.
The post-crisis structure and strategies of the Salim Group were not
that different from the situation prior to the crisis, except for the fact
that there was less emphasis on Indonesia and a more selective ap-
proach to the choice of industries. The group remained active in a vari-
ety of industries that supplied products or services to the masses, on
the premise that contacts were more important than industry knowl-
edge. It attempted to integrate its operations across the region, most
notably the axis that ran between Australia, ASEAN, and China, where
it planned to serve as a mediator.
Anthony Salim seemed – consciously or unconsciously – to disrupt
many of the previously strong relationships with ethnic Chinese
groups and his own CEOs. The Salim Group’s leadership underwent
several changes, most notably Anthony Salim’s consolidation of power
as the group’s central leader. The old structured way of achieving
synergy was replaced with a more informal co-ordination mechanism
(table 5.3).
Table 5.3 Summary




- continuation of IMF liberal
economic regime
- tariff barriers and protectionist
policies now largely abolished
- new type of politico-business
alliances with new power-holders
- refocus business, more emphasis
outside Indonesia
- Asian multinational player
- compete for maintaining market
share
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6 Evolution of the Salim Group Strategy
6.1 Introduction
The previous four chapters described in detail the development of the
Salim Group, in particular its strategy before, during, and after the
Asian Crisis. Whereas, prior to the crisis, the Salim Group had shown
a strong growth pattern and attempted to achieve synergy between the
portfolio of diversified companies, during the crisis growth ceased and
the group declined while it had to cope with an extremely hostile envi-
ronment. It was only after the crisis that the Group began a policy of
new investments, while modifying some minor aspects of its strategy
and maintaining its domestically oriented, diversified strategy. In this
chapter, key elements of the case are brought together and placed in a
long-term perspective.
Without referring to theoretical concepts, the evolution of the Salim
Group strategy within its context and covering several decades is pre-
sented in the first section. It summarises some of the salient aspects of
the narrative from the previous chapters. I emphasise the two themes
identified in the introduction: business networks and flexibility. The
second section deals with the third theme, the dichotomy between a re-
lationship model and a market-based strategy. First, the Salim Group
strategy is visualised in these terms using an interpretative approach
and secondly, by using coding procedures. The last section deals with
the co-evolution of the Salim Group and Indonesian institutions, focus-
ing on mutual influences between the two.
6.2 Corporate Strategy of the Salim Group
After recounting the history of the Salim Group from its inception un-
til after the Asian Crisis, it is now possible to present an overview of
the institutional context of the Salim Group as well as describe what
strategic choices the Salim Group leadership has made over time (table
6.1).
The Salim Group started out small and then diversified to cope with
a chaotic business environment. It first had to adapt to a colonial
Table 6.1 Strategy of the Salim Group over time
Period Institutional Environment Strategic Choices
1938-1945
Genesis
- Chinese enjoyed strong position in
trading
- business context for private
business strictly regulated
- opportunities in smuggling/
trading
- small scale trading of various
products




- difficult business environment
- demand for basic products
- important role of the army
- start of a national economy
- initial small-scale diversification
- manufacturing of basic products
and banking.
- supplying goods to the army
1957-1965
Diversification
- nationalistic political environment
- slow economic growth
- rising power of the army in
business
- trade and manufacturing of basic
products






- army most powerful political actor
& very active in business
- opening up for foreign investment
and international trade
- import substitution & protection of
local capitalists
- linking up with Suharto to develop
economy
- evolving conglomerate as new







- business opportunities exist,
especially when linked to Suharto
or army
- government connected business
- supplemented with international
businesses





- oil crisis and currency depreciation
- import substitution efforts halted
- export promotion policy
- reduced cronyism
- build international businesses
- expand local businesses
- work with government in order to
resolve losses in various industries
1994-1997
Rapid growth
- continuation of liberal economic
policies
- protection of selected
businessmen
- activity in connection with Suharto
as his succession is discussed
- more crony capitalism
- FDI inflow
- continue internationalisation
- restructuring & vertical integration
- hiring professional managers
- small businesses with Suharto's
children





- anti-Chinese riots and looting
create hostile atmosphere for
Chinese business
- Suharto's regime falls apart
- IMF stops protectionist policies
- anti-cronyism
- use connections to survive & help
Suharto family
- focus on solving the crisis
- comply with government
demands, sell businesses to pay
debts




- continuation of IMF liberal
economic regime
- tariff barriers and protectionist
policies now largely abolished
- new type of politico-business
alliances with new power-holders
- refocus business, more emphasis
outside Indonesia
- Asian multinational player
- compete for maintaining market
share
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regime, then Japanese occupation, a colonial war, and finally an emer-
ging national state. In its initial stage, it focused on contacts within
ethnic Chinese circles and its activities were mainly imports and small-
scale manufacturing for the local market. Even if the group was active
in exports, its major companies were producing for the domestic mar-
ket.
The domestically oriented business model was completely different
from that of other large ethnic Chinese companies from the colonial
era. Back then, ethnic Chinese businesses developed a business model
based on producing commodities for export, such as rubber and sugar.
For example, the Oei Tiong Ham Concern, the largest ethnic Chinese
group in Southeast Asia during the late-colonial period, became suc-
cessful with this export strategy. Liem, on the other hand, was not
shaped by the colonial export economy – probably because his business
was still too small and too local when the colonial period ended – and
instead he focused on domestic buyers.
When Sukarno assumed power, Liem aligned himself with the army,
which at the time was a major player in the business world. Sukarno
was not interested in private business and he instituted poor economic
policies resulting in economic decline. Moreover, he implemented poli-
cies that discriminated against Chinese businesses. In this hostile con-
text, Liem achieved some stability as a supplier to the army. During
this time, Liem was already looking for suitable partners, and found
both ethnic Chinese and political connections in the form of a Sukarno
family member. During his period as a supplier for the Diponegoro
army division he was also introduced to Suharto, who was to succeed
Sukarno after a bloody regime change. Operating under the motto ‘all
business is good’ Liem began diversifying from the very beginning,
which has remained a characteristic of the Salim Group ever since.
Suharto needed legitimacy to remain in power, which he soon rea-
lised lay in improving the economy. Ethnic Chinese partners, on the
one hand, were perfectly positioned to help Suharto in this respect.
Several ethnic Chinese businessmen were competent, willing, and fa-
miliar with a crony system through their contacts with the army. On
the other hand, they formed a despised minority which stood no
chance of gaining political power. As they were easily made scapegoats
for Indonesia’s problems and discriminated against they did not form
a political threat. The continued hostility against the Chinese minority
made them vulnerable partners, and easier to control. Although several
ethnic Chinese crony capitalists emerged in the early days of Suharto’s
rule, the Salim Group evolved into the largest and most successful
group associated with Suharto. In this situation, competition also took
place, but competition for favours rather than competition for market
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share. In this crony competition process, Liem eventually emerged as
the most successful player.
The group managed to evolve into a major player only during the
Suharto period, and consistent with the opportunities of the time, it de-
veloped a range of businesses that produced goods for the domestic
market. As Suharto facilitated unprecedented economic growth, the
buying power of Indonesians increased, and there was a growing de-
mand for Salim products, which were protected from outside competi-
tion via high tariffs. It is this local-for-local business model that con-
tinues to characterise the Salim Group up to the present day, both in
Indonesia and abroad. Suharto’s goal was to modernise and industria-
lise the country, for which he needed capable businessmen. Both rela-
tional and business skills played a role in both the rapid growth of
Liem’s businesses and in the relationship between Liem and Suharto.
During the Sukarno period, Liem began seeking partners for his ex-
panding ventures, and carefully chose them to incorporate people from
his own ethnic Chinese circles, political circles, and indigenous busi-
nessmen. While during Sukarno’s leadership he had links to a Sukarno
relative, it was under Suharto’s leadership that Liem included one of
Suharto’s family members in his circle of investors.
The group received favours such as access to credit and special li-
censes in various sectors and the ability to set up various industries
producing commodities that used to be imported. The first phase of
import substitution in Indonesia was aimed at industries that were not
very capital intensive or high tech. The first of these included the
wheat, cement, automotive assembly and textile industries. Once the
group had surpassed its peers, it developed the resources and the mar-
ket strength to expand and professionalise its empire. Although it initi-
ally relied on ethnic Chinese networks, the Salim Group increasingly
found Western and Japanese partners for their industrial ventures sup-
plying technology or capital. In the second phase of import substitu-
tion, in which the Salim Group participated along with the government
and Western partners, more capital intensive industries such as steel
were targeted.
When Anthony Salim joined the business it was already large and
intricately involved with Suharto. He tried to balance the risks asso-
ciated with this political alliance and he attempted to professionalise
the business by involving more non-family members as managers.
Moreover, he saw the need for building businesses outside of Indone-
sia, many of which were also producing for local markets in Singapore
or China. The anti-Chinese riots of 1974 must have justified his fears
and his determination to become less dependent upon Indonesia.
While the founder of the business, Liem Sioe Liong, laid the founda-
tions for success with his ability to select the right partners, and his
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adaptation to environmental conditions at the time of founding the
group, his son tried to focus the Salim Group on modernisation by
making the business less dependent upon relationships with politi-
cians. Anthony Salim probably saw the risks in the Suharto alliance
and he tried to balance those risks by making the businesses less
dependent upon Suharto’s favours. He also mitigated the risks of the
Suharto alliance by investing in international businesses and he also
restructured the group into divisions, a popular concept at the time.
Even though he tried to move away from government contracts,
there were still many interconnected business ventures (figure 6.1 indi-
cates the number of political partnerships and a trend line). The gov-
ernment bailed out the Salim Group in the steel and cement indus-
tries, clearly showing the preferential position of the Salims in Indone-
sia. Many of their companies enjoyed a certain degree of protection via
special licenses or trade barriers. But the number of new crony busi-
nesses was indeed small compared to non-crony partners (figure 6.4).
Anthony Salim’s efforts in a way ran contrary to the Indonesian con-
text, however, which showed waves of increased cronyism, especially in
the years prior to the Asian Crisis. While foreign investors flocked to
the country, Suharto personally divided many licenses and special con-
ditions, which ultimately benefited his family and friends. One could
say that the strategy the young Salim was implementing worked
against the business climate, and that probably made their transition
slower, and fall backs to crony businesses more frequent. After all, the
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Salim Group was immensely successful and a preferred partner for
many domestic and foreign businesses. There was no immediate ne-
cessity to detach themselves from the Suharto government, which was
still firmly in power at the time. Even though the Salim Group may
have tried to move away from their crony connections, it did little to
change their image in the eyes of the public, which interpreted the
business of the group as an extension of the Suharto family.
Liem had already laid the foundations for a diversified business
group with his motto: ‘all business is good’. By the 1970s, the Salim
Group had already moved into large-scale manufacturing and became
active in many of the key industries in Indonesia. Anthony Salim in-
creasingly began turning away from the traditional Chinese small fa-
mily firm. He started to work with professional managers – which is
not surprising given the size of the group – and implemented a more
complex organisational structure. He professionalised the business to
such an extent that foreign partners, government officials, and bankers
in Indonesia all speak very highly of the corporate practices of the com-
panies under Salim’s leadership. He tends to select investments and
partnerships based on business criteria, and not on ethnicity. Although
his father had invested heavily in his birthplace in China, partly to help
the local population, Anthony Salim preferred to invest in Shanghai
which offered better business opportunities. The number of new busi-
ness activities, that were founded with ethnic Chinese partners was re-
latively modest and declined slightly over time (figures 6.2 and 6.4).
Although there were links between the Salim Group leadership and
other ethnic Chinese tycoons in the region, this study shows that new
business activities were more often started with foreign partners than
with ethnic Chinese or political partners (figure 6.3).
In fact, activities involving foreign partners occurred more often than
activities with ethnic Chinese and crony partners put together (figure
6.4). The results show that the Salim Group is more embedded in glo-
bal business than in ethnic Chinese businesses. Interviews confirm
that Anthony Salim is not really interested in the ethnic Chinese net-
work. Because the Salim Group was a preferred partner of the Suharto
regime it became an attractive partner for Western companies as well,
which used these connections to avoid bureaucratic obstacles in a cor-
rupt country.
It is often the case that second-generation family members often do
not continue the partnerships established by the first generation, even
though Anthony Salim had already spent twenty years in the business
before formally taking over the leadership. While Liem and Djuhar
were close business partners for decades, their sons faced increasing
conflicts involving various business issues. While Liem and Suharto
got along very well and developed a close relationship, Anthony Salim
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did some business with Suharto’s son Bambang, but further was not
very involved with Suharto’s other children.
Because of declining oil revenues in the mid-1980s, Indonesia was
forced to change its economic policies. It abandoned major public ex-
penditures, devaluated the rupiah and moved from an import substitu-
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tion to an export promotion strategy. Although the Salim Group did
manage to establish a few new export ventures, such as in the shoe in-
dustry, they largely stuck to the domestic model, which was also re-
peated in their businesses abroad.
Although in interviews Anthony Salim claims that from 1979 on-
ward the Salim Group was no longer involved in government contracts,
this is not entirely the case. Furthermore, respondents claim that the
Salims had a weekly meeting with Suharto, which indicates their inti-
mate relationship to the regime and their ability to influence affairs in
Indonesia. By the 1990s, the Salim Group was so large that it enjoyed
considerable economic power, including the power to influence domes-
tic institutions such as the legislature’s implementation of laws. How-
ever, Anthony Salim is right in the sense that the Salim Group had de-
veloped the power to stand on its own feet and was no longer depen-
dent upon special favours and credits from the government for its
survival.
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Although the Salim Group increasingly became a multinational en-
terprise, Anthony Salim also kept a number of key success factors that
many ethnic Chinese business groups have, such as a flexible, flat
structure under strong family leadership, and a portfolio strategy of
spreading risks across businesses and countries. This enabled quick de-
cision-making. All major business decisions required the consent of
Anthony Salim, making him the central person in the group. A man-
agement information system allowed him to monitor his companies in
great detail. Anthony Salim also maintained an opaque structure for
hundreds of different companies. This network of companies allowed
for opaque transactions, which were necessary to keep crony, ethnic
and foreign partners happy. Since the 1990s, a handful of large Salim
companies have been listed on stock exchanges, although the holding
companies remained private to retain the flexibility.
Many internal transactions occurred within the rapidly growing
Salim Group, some of which apparently benefited the family rather
than the minority shareholders. But many internal transactions seemed
to both offer private benefits and rationalise the business as well. An
example of the frequent internal transactions can be found at Indofood,
which, through internal acquisitions, achieved a large degree of vertical
integration. From solely producing noodles, it acquired almost the en-
tire noodle value chain from wheat and palm oil to supermarkets. Most
of the acquisitions necessary to accomplish this vertical integration
were internal acquisitions within the Salim Group which were inte-
grated into a listed Salim company.
Faced with such a large empire and scarce family management re-
sources, the Liem Investors focused their attention on the large Indo-
nesian businesses, (such as Indofood, BCA, and Indocement) which
also happened to be crony businesses in the eyes of the public. The
Liem investors and Salim family occupied many of the board seats in
these companies (table 6.2). The international businesses were mana-
ged by professional managers, such as Manuel Pangilinan in Hong
Kong and Tan Kong King in Singapore, while other Indonesian divi-
sions, such as chemicals were also under trusted professional man-
agers. Just how strong these professional managers were became clear
after the Asian Crisis. When the Salim family wanted to sell bits and
pieces of their foreign interests to save the Indonesian businesses, sev-
eral of the foreign managers successfully rebelled. The Salims had
hitherto concentrated their managerial efforts on their Indonesian
companies, which constituted the core of the group. As a consequence,
the foreign managers had over time managed to acquire more freedom
to follow their own courses. The fact that, even after three decades of
internationalisation, the ‘soul’ of the Salim Group was still in the Indo-
nesian businesses associated with Suharto clearly showed that the
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Salim Group was resistant to change and tended to stick to what had
worked in the past.
The real tragedy of the Salim Group is that, when the Asian Crisis
struck, the Liem Investors were focusing on those businesses that
were, in the eyes of the public, examples of cronyism and corruption.
Faced with a regime change, the Salim Group was viewed as a symbol
of the wrongdoings of the Suharto regime, and some of the businesses
were attacked. The group was unable to influence the new government,
which now took an anti-corruption and cronyism stand, and thus they
lost many of their key businesses, such as BCA and Indocement. Some
of the key government players were in favour of dissolving the Salim
Group altogether and exercised political pressure on their Western
partners to abandon the Salim Group.2 However, these Western part-
ners were satisfied with the group’s co-operation and only reluctantly
complied.
Anthony Salim has insisted that he changed the course of the Salim
empire so that it became a more professional and less crony-dependent
enterprise, but events during the crisis show that he was only very par-
tially successful. The general public still saw the group as an element
of the now-despised Suharto regime, and Salim’s businesses and the fa-
mily home were both attacked. The Salim Group strategy for indepen-
dence may have ultimately only been very partially implemented, but
in at least one aspect it clearly paid off. First Pacific, its Hong Kong
conglomerate, was able to save the Indofood cash cow in Indonesia.










































Anthony Salim 41 x x x x x x
Ibrahim Risjad 29 x x x
Benny Santoso* 28 x x x x x x
Tedy Djuhar 24 x x x
Andree Halim 21 x x x x x
Franciscus Welirang** 21 x x x
Liem Sioe Liong 21 x x x x x
Sudwikatmono 21 x x x x
Djuhar Sutanto 16 x x
Johny Djuhar 7 x
* Right hand of Anthony Salim
** Brother-in-law of Anthony Salim
Source: Author's board members database compiled from annual reports
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Even if at first it had to sell off most of its other businesses before it
could re-acquire Indofood, this white knight role would not have been
possible had the Salim Group not internationalised in the first place.
One of the lucky coincidences of the Asian Crisis for Anthony Salim
was that, due to the sudden retirement of his father, and the withdra-
wal of his brother, he was able to easily consolidate his power (table
6.3). He competently steered the group out of trouble, tackling its debt
problems and political issues one by one. Had succession issues arisen
during this particularly critical time, or had the family been divided,
this would have certainly had a negative influence on its chances for
survival. Other companies that had faced a profound regime change,
such as the Oei Tiong Ham group in the early Sukarno era, are known
to have been unable to act decisively because the heirs to the business
could not agree on a strategy.3
Another positive aspect of the crisis was that it suddenly established
the scene for a more liberal market environment. The IMF forced Indo-
nesia to abolish protectionist economic policies favouring cronies like
Salim. This new environment better fit in with the direction Anthony
Salim envisioned for the Salim Group, but also forced him to fight bat-
tles with new competitors and accept lower profit margins. Further-
more, investors, bankers, and the new government admired the group
for their co-operation, and for the fact that they quite willingly handed
over well-managed, professional companies during the crisis. Given
the enormous political pressure that was exercised on the Salim Group
during the crisis, in combination with their debt problems, it is a mira-
cle that Anthony Salim was able to survive the political and economic
attacks and actually turn it around to win the praise of even his oppo-
nents.
It is not surprising that it is exactly this dependence on Indonesia
that Anthony Salim is now in the process of changing. His goal is to
bring the relative importance of the Indonesian businesses back by in-
vesting in other countries. Anthony Salim has also strengthened his
grip on a couple of key companies, both officially within the board and
more informally. But he also realised that building relationships- is one
of the Salim Group’s strengths. Prior to the crisis, the group had made
Table 6.3 Generational Change: Family Board Positions 1994-2003
Family Member 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Andree Halim 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 0 0 1
Anthony Salim 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 2 2
Franciscus Welirang 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 2 1 1
Liem Sioe Liong 4 4 4 4 3 1 1 0 0 0
Source: Author's database
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forays into the US and European markets, but the crisis forced a radi-
cal departure from this policy. The Salim Group is now concentrating
primarily on the Asia-Pacific region, targeting countries such as China
and India for investments. Many of the countries in this region display
the characteristics of a market economy while also have relatively weak
economic institutions. It is here in these high-growth, government-led
economies that the Salim Group knows how to operate and knows
how to develop into a multinational emerging market player.
6.3 Strategy Oscillation
This study has shed light on the strategy of the Salim Group over time.
It has shown that institutional changes (such as regime changes) and
generational changes gave rise to a new strategic direction. Because the
external and internal factors influencing strategy are not aligned, and
may be sudden, irregular, and vary in intensity, it can be expected that
the strategy development of the Salim Group will actually not follow a
neat linear pattern. This is illustrated by first following an interpreta-
tive method, and secondly, via the coding procedure described in annex
two.
Table 6.1 was based on an interpretative analysis of the corporate his-
tory of the Salim Group and its context. Based on table 6.1, one can as-
sign scores to each strategic direction, on a -5 to +5 scale, where -5 is
highly market-based; 0 represents a mixed strategy, while +5 indicates
a highly relationship-based strategy. If one interprets the intensity of
the type of strategy and expresses it as a figure, one can plot the scores
on a time line (x-axis). Taking a market-based versus relationship-based
continuum as the y-axis, the pattern reveals how the Salim Group strat-
egy oscillates over time (figure 6.5).
An analysis of the business events utilising the coding procedure
gives a similar oscillating figure. In fact, the oscillations using this pro-
cedure are even more pronounced. The overall results show a less clear
trend, although the trend line in the figure indeed shows an overall
movement towards a market-based strategy (figure 6.6).
Both interpretative methods and data coding methods have their
drawbacks. In the interpretative method, one can get stuck in anec-
dotes and the bias of the researcher can influence the interpretation.
This is not the case for the more objective coding method, although
this technique also has serious drawbacks, most importantly that it is a
less encompassing method using proxies that only measure aspects of
relationship-based and market-based model. It does not, for example,
take into account the importance of the different business events. If
one weighs the importance of all of the business events to reflect their
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relative importance, the accuracy increases, while the reliability of the
method decreases because the more complicated the measurement
method, the more likely an independent coder will assess events in a
different way. However, the fact that both of these techniques show a
similar strategic pattern strengthens the overall conclusion that the
Salim Group strategy can be understood as shifting away from a rela-
tionship-based toward a market-based strategy as well as displaying an
oscillatory pattern.
The first pole, the relationship-based model, is a strategy built on
crony connections with politicians and (often ethnic Chinese) business
partners, and is characterised by the pursuit of unrelated opportunities,
seizing anything that comes along that provides either pecuniary bene-
fits or strengthens useful relationships. Meanwhile, the second pole,
the market-based model, adheres to the ‘best practices’ of international
Figure 6.5 Interpretative Analysis: Salim Group Strategy
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business, implementing a rational exploitation of markets and re-
sources, professionalising management and putting in place formal fi-
nancial and managerial control systems. It also strives for internationa-
lisation, both in the form of bringing powerful foreign business part-
ners to Indonesia and developing activities abroad.
Both poles offer opportunities for the Salim Group, but also have
their risks. The more a company moves to one or the other pole, the
larger the tendency becomes to return to one or the other extreme. If
one then considers the history of the Salim Group, especially since
early 1970s when the young Anthony Salim joined its management, it
clearly shows both a steady modernisation and a dynamic interplay be-
tween two opposed patterns of business strategy.
To summarise the previous line of argumentation, while the founder
of the business, Liem Sioe Liong, laid the foundations for a successful
relationship-based model, which fit into the environmental conditions
at the time the business was started, the son tried to move the Salim
Group towards a modern, market-based enterprise by making the busi-
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ness less dependent upon relationships. But the movement was not
linear. While Anthony Salim tried to move away from a dependency
upon Suharto, the opportunities and obligations attached to this rela-
tionship could not easily be broken off or dismissed. The more profes-
sional the Salim Group became, the more attractive it became as a part-
ner for Suharto, as he could then legitimately claim that he had simply
teamed up with the best business group in the country. The more the
group became associated with Suharto, the clearer the risks attached to
such an alignment became whenever discussions about the demise of
the dictator arose. For these reasons, the Salim Group shifted between
the opposing poles and built competencies associated with both the re-
lationship and the market model. The oscillation approach applies well
in the Salim Group case study. The strategy oscillations are clearly visi-
ble via various interpretative and quantitative techniques, while the in-
terpretative approach is able to explain why strategy displays an irregu-
lar pattern.
6.4 Coevolution of the Salim Group and Institutions
The study shows that the Salim Group not only adapted to external cir-
cumstances, but was also able to influence Indonesian institutions. Ta-
ble 6.4 gives an overview of mutual responses and adaptations between
Salim and Indonesian institutions.
The most important external factors are regime changes in Indone-
sia, which have a strong impact on the Salim Group’s strategies. Be-
cause most of the Salim Group’s businesses remain in Indonesia, it is
this institutional context that exercises the most influence on the Salim
Group strategy. The domestic institutional context can be divided into
three periods which coincide with the various Indonesian regimes.
Sukarno favoured socialist and nationalist policies in which the gov-
ernment, and particularly the army, had a strong influence on the
economy. Liem responded by establishing relations with the army. A
more favourable business environment arose under Suharto’s regime,
which encouraged domestic capitalists, particularly those who were
close to the regime. Liem responded by cherishing his contacts with
Suharto and including one of his family members in his circle of inves-
tors. He also helped implement government industrialisation policies.
A policy of cronyism and a relatively open economy arose simulta-
neously.
During the Asian Crisis, the institutional context changed completely
and the new government abolished many aspects of the crony capital-
ism environment, while a simultaneous reconstruction of the crony
system with other key players also occurred. Liem responded by with-
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drawing and handing over the leadership role to his son, who was
identified less with Suharto and who could legitimately claim he was
in favour of a more professional and less connected enterprise.
Under Sukarno, Liem found the right partners, a skill that also bene-
fited him during the Suharto regime. Liem successfully designed a re-
lationship-based strategy, which led to enormous growth. When Suhar-
to stepped down after 32 years, the group experienced a profound
shock. It needed to help former political partners while it also needed
to establish new connections with the new government, which was
quite hostile to the Salim Group. With the help of some ethnic Chinese
businessmen they were able to survive the crisis by selling off many of
their businesses while holding onto a few cash cow companies. The
crisis forced the Salim Group to abandon its relationship strategy to a
certain extent and begin focussing more on businesses with non-crony
Table 6.4 Mutual Influencing between Salim and Indonesian Institutions
Period Salim Group Actions
Government Actions
1950-1965 Liem looks for partners in unstable environment
Military officers need funding and take Liem as a partner
Liem takes care of army supplies and builds stable income
Military officers know Liem as a trustworthy partner
1966-1997 Suharto government intends to build up local industries
Liem willing to comply, but lacks funds
Government offers cheap capital and favourable conditions
Liem uses his connections to be successful in building basic industries
Government offers Liem favourable conditions in other industries
Liem is successful and incorporates partners from Suharto circle
Government increasingly trusts Liem as it reaps the benefits
Liem diversifies and builds his Salim Group, becomes crony of choice
Government now intends to build capital-intensive industries
Liem helps government by investing in new steel industry
Government gives Liem import monopoly
Salim Group quickly builds up market power
Government grants Liem various monopolies
Liem helps out Suharto's foundations when in need
Suharto family requests Liem to participate in ventures of children
Salim invests abroad and reduces dependence on Suharto
1997-2005 Government struggles with economic crisis
Anthony Salim sits on official committees to resolve debt problems
Suharto under pressure, eventually forced to resign
Salim Group does not abandon Suharto
New Government wishes to punish Salim Group
Salim Group tries building new government connections
Government pressures Salim Group to dissolve
Salim Group complies, hands over 107 companies
Salim Group decreases dependence on Indonesia
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connections. The fact that a regime change coincided with a severe eco-
nomic crisis accelerated the strategy change.
In terms of internal factors, the size of the company also forced
changes in its management and organisational structure. Its leadership
responded to these challenges in the 1990s by hiring professional
managers and reorganising its structure. But this strategy seems to
have been mostly influenced by generational changes. Anthony Salim
joined the business in the 1970s and slowly took over the leadership
role in a period of 20 years of guidance by his father. Even though his
elder brother was also active in the business, at least in the 1980s, it
was clear to the outside world that the next leader would be Anthony
Salim. The crisis put an abrupt end to the slow leadership transition
and thrust Anthony Salim into a position of power. The sudden change
cleared the way for difficult decisions that had to be made during the
Asian Crisis, which required clear and decisive, second-generation lea-
dership.
The institutional environment was highly dependent upon Suharto,
and exercised an influence on the group by providing a changing range
of opportunities and obligations, as well as a favourable patron. Being
part of Suharto’s inner circle, meant the emergence of a mutual influ-
ence situation, which provided a win-win situation for both Salim and
Suharto, and to a certain extent the Indonesian economy as well. Table
6.4 has shown some of the interactions between Indonesian institu-
tions and the Salim Group. When the Salim Group’s businesses began
to sour, the government stepped in to pick up the bill. Meanwhile, the
other side of the coin was that when Suharto’s family businesses and/
or foundations suffered, the Salim Group would step in. Although the
two parties were not equal, they certainly influenced each other on
many occasions.
Their relationship was so close that during the Asian Crisis, Indone-
sian protesters saw the Salim Group as a symbol of a corrupt Suharto
regime, an event that showed how the Salim Group had, in the eyes of
Indonesians, become itself a key part of the institutional environment.
In the face of a radical institutional and regime change, the Salim
Group, by virtue of its size and economic influence, continued to influ-
ence its environment, albeit not to the same extent as it had under Su-
harto.
Internationalisation and cut-throat competition became the focal
point after the crisis. The empire had shrunk significantly, and man-
agerial attention was divided between Indonesia and other Asian coun-
tries, which meant that the opportunities for shaping the Indonesian
institutional context became less pronounced than before. In many
ways, the effects of generational changes within the Salim Group pre-
ceded institutional context changes. Anthony Salim had the perspective
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of a new, Western-educated generation, which offered a new vision that
fit in better with a global business trend of internationalisation and
free markets, while still incorporating the value of personal connec-
tions. However, Anthony Salim attempted to implement a more mar-
ket-based strategy during a time when crony capitalism was still strong,
and the benefits of the old strategy high, and hence the process was
very gradual. The successful implementation of his strategy coincided
with a less fortunate regime change and crisis, which also firmly estab-
lished him as the leader of the group.
The Salim Group co-evolved with various Indonesian institutions be-
cause it was influenced by them, but, in turn, also had an influence on
them. The co-evolution rhythm was irregular, clearly there were peri-
ods when the Salim Group took a more passive and adaptive role,
whereas during other periods it was able to capitalise on its relation-
ships with Suharto and exercise a proactive influence on its environ-
ment, resulting in favourable policies towards the group. At the height
of its power, the Salim Group not only benefited from Suharto, it also
continued to build an independent, international professional business
group. This proactive strategy provoked a counter-reaction with the de-
mise of the Suharto regime. This happened precisely because the Sal-
im Group had been in such a position of power in the Indonesian
economy, thus the new government sought to dissolve the Salim
Group as a symbol of the old corrupt regime. The group, however,
managed to use proactive and reactive strategies to deal with the post-
crisis environment. Eventually, the Salims again began to diversify out-
side of Indonesia in other Asian countries.
6.5 Summary
Liem Sioe Liong laid the foundations for three strategic elements that
are presently observable within the Salim Group: a domestic business
model, opportunistic diversification, and a preference for teaming up
with a wide variety of partners. The close connections with Suharto en-
abled the group to influence Indonesian institutions but also meant
that they were strongly influenced by them. Anthony Salim’s vision was
to change the group and make it more international and less dependent
upon Indonesia and Suharto. He succeeded only partially and quite gra-
dually while it oscillated between relationship-oriented and market-
based strategies. Suharto’s demise, which coincided with the economic
crisis, became a turning point for the group. On the one hand, it led to
a near-collapse of the Salim Group, while, on the other hand, it cleared
away the obstacles for the more international and independent business
strategy envisioned by the second generation of leaders.
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7 Conclusions
7.1 Introduction
Whereas in the previous chapter the evolution of the Salim Group
within its context over 50 years was described, in this last chapter the
evolution of the Salim Group strategy is linked to the theoretical ap-
proaches presented in chapter one. We look at the culturalist approach,
the crony capitalism approach and the institutional theories on emer-
ging market strategy. The chapter ends with conclusions and recom-
mendations for further research.
7.2 Flexibility and Path Dependence
Some culturalist approaches suggest that ethnic Chinese firms are ex-
tremely flexible both in terms of adaptability to the environment1 and
in terms of their embedding in an international network rather than in
a national context.2 Several authors have thus spoken of ‘transnational’
or ‘footloose’ enterprises.3 Due to the extensive ethnic network, the eth-
nic Chinese firm is thought to be ‘ungrounded’ in its domestic context.
Path dependency approaches, on the other hand, suggest that history
matters, and that companies are restricted in their present strategic
choices by past decisions, which may limit their flexibility.4 In the case
of the Salim Group, one can observe three types of path dependency.
First, the group developed a domestic business model focusing on
products for a large consumer base and stuck to it, even when the gov-
ernment started providing incentives to establish export industries in-
stead of import substitution industries. Profiting initially from army
connections and the pent-up demand after the economy recovered
from the detrimental policies implemented during the Sukarno era,
this model made sense in the historical setting in which the Salim
Group emerged. In a large and fast-growing market like Indonesia, this
domestic business model offered excellent business opportunities in
many industries. When the import-substitution industrialisation phase
ended and the government started to promote exports, the Salim
Group stayed with their local-for-local model instead of adapting to
new circumstances. After all, much of their capital was fixed in their
industrial enterprises, which were doing well, so the Salim Group lea-
dership spent most of their money in their already successful busi-
nesses and in establishing similar businesses that produced for local
markets. Although the Salim Group maintained some organisational
characteristics that made it flexible and quick to act upon emerging
business opportunities, the basic domestic business model remained
the same, both in Indonesia and abroad.
Second, the Salim Group’s soul remained in their domestic busi-
nesses which were established in close connection with Suharto.
Although the Salim family pursued internationalisation strategies for
several decades, this has never changed their fundamental dependence
on Indonesia. Before the Asian crisis, after two decades of internationa-
lisation about 35% of the sales came from international operations,
showing how much the Salim Group was part of the Indonesian econ-
omy, in which the Group played a major role. When the Asian Crisis
occurred, the Salim Group decided to sell many of their international
companies to save their Indonesian enterprises, showing again how
much the group was oriented towards Indonesia. Given the political
pressure to dissolve the Salim Group during the crisis, why did they
not try to hold on to their foreign companies instead of their Indone-
sian enterprises? Apparently their investments in social capital, in fixed
assets, and their market knowledge were specific to Indonesia, and it
was not easy to leave this market behind. The Asian Crisis has shown
that the Salim Group was unable to disentangle itself from the Indone-
sian domestic context. Contrary to a company like Philips, which
closed its doors in the Netherlands during the Second World War and
continued doing business by moving its headquarters to the US, the
Salim Group was unable or unwilling to do so. It appeared that rather
than being transnational, the company was actually strongly attached
to Indonesia. Anthony Salim would now like to change this depen-
dence in a local context and he has invested heavily in other Asian
countries. But he still wants to have 50% of the business in Indonesia.
Third, a new strategy envisioned by the second-generation leader
was implemented very slowly because it ran up against past experi-
ences and the institutional context. The Suharto relationship proved to
be extremely well chosen and profitable for the Salim Group. It gave
the Salims access to resources and the ability to build management ca-
pacities to run a large corporate empire. In the years running up to the
Asian Crisis, the environment increasingly rewarded businessmen
close to Suharto. There was no immediate need to distance the Salim
businesses from Suharto while he was still in power, and yet, this sec-
ond-generation leader claims that this was his goal all along. The extra-
ordinarily long presidency of Suharto made the Salim Group the large
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multinational it is now, and allowed it to build and sustain a successful
domestic business model. But Suharto´s long term presence also hin-
dered preparations for a post-Suharto period.
The Salim Group study shows how companies develop resistance to
change over time. The national and historical context played a central
role in defining the basic business model of the Salim Group. It has al-
ways been a domestic player in large emerging market industries, dee-
ply embedded in the Indonesian context, combining business acumen
and relationship capabilities. Changing this fundamental strategic or-
ientation is a slow process. Much as a sailboat is able to change direc-
tions more quickly than a large tanker, large ethnic Chinese companies
have become increasingly unable to implement rapid changes.
7.3 The Evolution of Business Networks
Culturalist theories on ethnic Chinese firms often assume that their
leaders prefer to do business with businessmen from their own ethnic
network.5 Referring to Confucius’s influence on Chinese culture, they
assume that building trust among their fellow Chinese is much easier
than dealing with foreigners. Crony theories, on the other hand, also
focus on relationship-building, however, not with fellow Chinese immi-
grants but with politicians. The alliance, it is argued, provides a win-
win situation between the business skills of the Chinese and corrupt
Indonesian politicans.6
The Salim Group has engaged in many business ventures with one
or more partners over time. During the early years of the Salim Group,
Liem Sioe Liong benefited from contacts with other ethnic Chinese
immigrants and his own family members. But as soon as he had estab-
lished a substantial business, he laid down further contacts with a vari-
ety of partners. On the one hand, he maintained his contacts with eth-
nic Chinese partners such as the Djuhar family and the Riady family.
But soon after Sukarno assumed power he established relationships be-
yond just ethnic Chinese circles, namely with local businessmen and
family members of several Indonesian presidents. Once the Salim
Group grew into an emerging industrial firm, it initially established
contacts with the ethnic Chinese network abroad to fund its first fac-
tories. But soon thereafter, it widened its group of partners to include
foreign firms that provided knowledge, technology, and capital.
The quantitative analysis of all of the Salim Group business affairs
over the last 20 years clearly shows that the group maintained various
types of partnerships, namely with ethnic Chinese partners, political
partners, and foreign partners. Of these, the foreign partners, emerged
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as the most important for the Salim Group, more important than the
other two types put together.
This study clearly demonstrates the shortcomings of both the cultur-
alist and the crony approach in explaining ethnic Chinese networking
styles. Although this research supports both because ethnic and politi-
cal connections do matter, it also demonstrates the shortcomings, be-
cause these theories overlook the fact that the most frequent and most
important network ties were indeed with Western and Japanese compa-
nies. If one studies network ties from an evolutionary perspective, it be-
comes clear that cultural and crony theories together can explain the
nature of the Salim Group business network in its very early days, but
increasingly less so as time passes.
Using the aforementioned classification of social capital into bond-
ing capital (with one’s own social group) and bridging capital (across
social strata),7 we can conclude that the Salim Group consciously used
both bonding capital with ethnic Chinese, and bridging capital with po-
litical leaders and multinational firms. Given the sometimes hostile
context the group operated in, its success is perhaps precisely due to
the group’s ability to create social capital of various kinds.
7.4 Diversification and Social Capital
Traditional theories of diversification often utilise the term ‘economies
of scope’ to explain why it is sensible to combine diverse businesses
under one umbrella.8 The reason is that some production inputs may
be sharable and therefore beneficial to more than one line of business.
The institutional context also seems to make a difference: If certain in-
stitutions are weak there may be even more advantages to combining
different economic activities in one firm or one business group.9
While other reasons for diversification also exist, the study of the
Salim Group shows how relationships with Suharto and ethnic Chi-
nese firms stimulated the group to diversify, eventually resulting in a
web of different businesses with different partners. Government or
partner requests have often stimulated the Salim Group to pursue ven-
tures in new industries. Therefore, besides classical economies of scope
and institutional factors, one could argue that social capital can also sti-
mulate diversification. I propose that we call this economies of connected-
ness, which can be defined as advantages associated with diversification
resulting from sharable personal relationships of business owners,
such as connections with government officials or with members of
their ethnic group. ‘Economies of connectedness’ is a concept that is
both broader and more precise than corruption or cronyism. The latter
are necessarily illegal and associated with the private gains of bureau-
142 THE RHYTHM OF STRATEGY
crats, whereas diversification resulting from one’s connections is not
necessarily illegal.
The Salim Group clearly went through various phases in which both
economies of scope and economies of connectedness played a different
role. In the early stages, one’s Chinese connections allowed a poor im-
migrant to rapidly establish himself in the business world. Thereafter,
his connections with the army, and particularly with Suharto and his
family, made it possible for the Salim Group to emerge as the largest
business empire in Indonesia. Sometimes the Salim Group received
explicit government instructions to invest in a new industry, such as
the steel industry in the 1980s. The internationalisation of the group
was initially carried out with the help of ethnic connections, but later
through more traditional business contacts with foreign groups as well,
some of which were technology partners in Indonesian businesses.
From 1985 until the Asian Crisis in 1997, Salim’s diversification was
increasingly driven by a desire to achieve vertical and horizontal inte-
gration, often based on economies of scope factors such as shared hu-
man resources, capital or access to partners with technology. The weak
institutional environment may have played a role in its vertical and hor-
izontal integration. Its transactions with others, such as suppliers or
buyers, were expensive because of uncertainties, the corrupt environ-
ments, and poor law enforcement. As a consequence, it became cheap-
er to trade within the group than with external business representa-
tives. In other words, as transactions costs increased in Indonesia, it
became more sensible to have all the necessary services available with-
in the group rather having to deal with an unpredictable partner.
The influence of political and Chinese connections decreased,
although it never totally vanished. During the crisis and its immediate
aftermath, the group becomes less diversified, the political connections
decreased significantly, and the Chinese network was relevant only as a
source of potential buyers for businesses that had to be divested. In the
most recent period, the direction is not quite clear as yet, but it seems
that classical economies of scope have primacy over economies of con-
nectedness, although the latter have not disappeared.
7.5 Strategy Evolution and Generational Change
Whereas institutional theories assume that the main reason a company
changes its strategy is to adapt to changes in the business environ-
ment,10 family business literature points to the importance of genera-
tional change in explaining an the emergence of a new strategy.11 Fa-
mily businesses can be considered an extension of the psychological in-
terplay between family members.
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During the history of the group, Liem Sioe Liong and his son An-
thony Salim had different ideas about business. One was a poor immi-
grant from the hinterlands of China, without much education and
probably limited skills for operating within sophisticated international-
oriented elites. Meanwhile, the other is a well-bred international tycoon,
rooted in his country of birth even if he maintains some cultural affi-
nity with China. The father started his business career in the late 1930s
in a remote provincial town of the then Dutch Empire and climbed the
social ladder until he reached the stratosphere. The other was born into
wealth and privilege in a proud and powerful country and received an
international upbringing. Undoubtedly, the son respected his father,
which was further reinforced by the traditional Chinese veneration of
the elder, but he must have also been longing with every fibre in his
body to modernise the family business and acquire respectability and
social acceptance – if not for himself then at least for his heirs – very
much in line with the transformation of the Vanderbilts or the Rocke-
fellers from robber barons to that of great American families.
This study makes it clear that Anthony Salim initiated some changes
that slowly emerged as a new strategy. During the period when he had
just entered the business, the group began to internationalise and pro-
fessionalise its operations. However, this change was slow and incom-
plete as it ran contrary to other developments in the business context.
It was only after the Asian Crisis that this strategy was implemented
more fully. This study shows that it is not only institutional changes
that matter, but generational changes can also lead to a shift in strat-
egy, which may in turn be slowed down by institutional factors.
7.6 Strategy Oscillation
Common sense strategy approaches implicitly assume that the strategy
of a company evolves over time in a more or less gradual and linear
way. Some academics, for example, view emerging market multina-
tionals in a stage perspective. They suggest that, in weak institutional
environments, companies may resort to strong network ties, which
may be an alternative form of trust in the absence of strong rules and
legal institutions.
They consequently expect that once the institutional context moves
to a liberal market model, these companies will display less relation-
ship-based strategies and move instead to a market-based orientation
with weaker network ties.12 The story of the Salim Group supports this
view, but simultaneously shows that it is overly simplified. First, be-
cause market-based and relationship-based strategies may not be mu-
tually exclusive; second, because generational changes may interfere
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with institutional changes; and third, because institutional changes to-
wards a free market model are not always linear, manifesting instead
frequent setbacks to protectionism and cronyism in Indonesia.
Liem Sioe Liong can be considered a representative of the relation-
ship-based model, while Anthony Salim more closely represents the
market model. The second-generation leaders do not necessarily con-
tinue the same networks their parents established, and may even prefer
new types of partners. Liem built strong ethnic Chinese and political
networks, while Anthony Salim seems to prefer choosing his partners
based on business considerations. The results show that the genera-
tional change produced a new strategic vision, which was partly in-
formed by a changing global context and a Western education. The new
strategy, however, which preceded institutional changes, was imple-
mented very gradually. It is not necessarily true that corporate strategy
follows institutional context, but it can also manifest the opposite where
corporate strategy changes anticipate institutional change. As the study
has also demonstrated, the Indonesian institutions did not modernise
over time. At the end of the Suharto regime and after the crisis, crony
networks interfered with various open market approaches and provided
numerous setbacks. In Indonesia, one cannot speak of a straight road
to a liberal market economy – this road meanders continuously.
Both Liem and Anthony Salim continue to value their relationships
and continue to build strong networks. While cronyism and protection-
ism in Indonesia after the crisis has decreased, the Salim Group has si-
multaneously implemented a more market-based strategy. The new
post-crisis strategy has brought the Salim Group to new countries that
are also characterised by relationship-based environments, such as India
and China, both of which are interventionist states. It appears that the
Salim Group has simultaneously built both market and relationship-
based competencies, and it is able to operate in both contexts rather than
simply via a sequential process. The group seems to oscillate between
the two strategic orientations depending on the context. Over time, how-
ever, Salim’s trends show a propensity towards a market orientation.
The two strategic models – the relationship-orientation and the mar-
ket-based strategy – can be seen as opposite poles of a continuum, re-
presenting pure types. Individual business decisions are seldom pure
and exhibit a mixture of both modes. Indeed, the phenomenal success
of the group – at its height it was the largest group in Southeast Asia –
is undoubtedly due in large part to the ‘lucky coincidence’ of Liem
meeting an obscure army officer who eventually became the strongman
of a gigantic country for some thirty years. But without significant man-
agerial competence of the highest calibre, the group could not have
dealt with the challenges of growth and increased environmental and
technological complexity. As the Salim Group switches between the var-
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ious demands and opportunities of its network and its own perception
of the market, its managers build competences associated with the rela-
tionship-based as well as market-based models. The scale and capital
made available as a result of the relationship-based businesses has sti-
mulated the development of foreign, market-based businesses. The
shift to a more market-based model was built on accumulated resources
and relationships, showing that the two models are intertwined.
Neither the Salim Group strategy nor the institutional context in In-
donesia ever fully departed from a relationship-based way of doing
business, but its dependence on the domestic context was mitigated by
increased foreign investments. The more a company moves towards
one of the poles, the greater the pressure becomes to move in the op-
posite direction. An increased dependence on Suharto carries an in-
creased risk for the business because he may at some point be over-
thrown. Increased market-based strategies that fail to adapt to the lea-
dership’s personal and political wishes may also carry a high risk. The
ability to readily shift between these two models, so quickly that it ap-
pears to be simultaneously pursuing both, may very well be the reason
for the Salim Groups success.
This study therefore supports the notion that emerging market com-
panies may have to choose between the importance of network ties and
market-based competition, and that over time the latter will prevail.
But the ‘route’ that an emerging market company takes is not linear.
The company may shift its orientation continuously depending on the
demands of the environment and its internal capacities. The evolution
of a strategy appears to display a certain ‘rhythm’.
7.7 Strategic Choice and Institutional Environments
Several studies suggest that in a more interventionist environment, a
company is more restricted in its strategic choices than in a ‘free’ mar-
ket-based environment with many competing players.13 The Salim
Group study however, gives rise to three important observations indi-
cating that the Salim Group could achieve more freedom in this envir-
onment. First, despite a highly interventionist (or institutionalised) en-
vironment in Indonesia, characterised by patrimonial relationships and
centralised political power, companies still find room for competition,
but it was competition to gain Suharto’s favours rather than to gain
market share. In the Salim Group’s case, we see a relatively modest
firm emerge as the key domestic player, a development directly attribu-
table to the group’s good interpersonal relations with Suharto, but
surely also because of its high degree of competence relative to other
ethnic Chinese cronies. Second, the inclusion in the inner circles of
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the Suharto regime opened up strategic possibilities that would have
been extremely unlikely under market-based conditions.14 On the one
hand, the unique access to credit and the relative protection from mar-
ket forces allowed the Salim Group to become an industrial as well as
an international player and build up a strong managerial resource base.
This set it apart from other ethnic Chinese firms in the region. On the
other hand, we must also note that the strategic direction of the Salim
Group is simultaneously restricted when their crony partners directed
scarce corporate resources to the Indonesian economy and to them-
selves. A major economic player like Salim can exercise a relatively
large level of strategic choice, even to the extent that it can advance its
corporate resource base considerably and influence laws and exclusive
licenses. Third, by building a strong resource base, the profitable Su-
harto-alliance provided the financial freedom to diversify beyond the
domestic institutional environment into Hong Kong, the Philippines,
Singapore, and other markets.
Despite the continuous internationalisation of the Salim Group from
1975 onward, we can also observe that the ‘soul’ of the company re-
mains in the (semi)monopolistic Indonesian companies associated
with Suharto. This focus, which is valid even today, may indicate that
the Salim Group’s resources enabled them to take new strategic direc-
tions, but due to its past or present successes based on old strategies,
or due to outside pressure, their internationalisation remained limited.
Whereas in several respects, historic events limited the flexibility of the
Salim Group, its immersion in a variety of networks, in particular poli-
tical ones, provided the group with a high level of strategic choice.
7.8 Corporate and Institutional Alignment
Most co-evolution research and institutional research, implicitly as-
sumes a clear division between the firm and its institutional environ-
ment. Research on big business in developing states however indicates
how corporate players may be able to influence politicians by building
crony roles, thus effectively creating a grey zone between the corporate
sector and the government.15 The Salim Group case also shows that
the clear distinction between the company and institutions may not be
justified. The institutional context in Indonesia for over three decades
was characterised by a strong, long-term dictator who personally influ-
enced almost all domestic policies. Indonesia was also faced with a si-
tuation where there was no clear distinction between Suharto’s politi-
cal, economic, and business goals, a situation often termed ‘Suharto
Inc.’ in newspapers and magazines.16 Furthermore, this peculiar insti-
tutional context, which was so dependent upon a single person, we ob-
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serve an economy with one extremely large domestic business player,
with his hands in many industries, often in monopolistic positions.
The sheer size of the Salim Group, certainly by the 1990s, made it a
systemic risk to the economy; and Suharto must have realised that the
group was an economic power that could not be ignored and that was
now too large to fail.
In the Salim Group’s case, not only were the corporate and institu-
tional environments centralised and represented by two strong person-
alities (Liem and Suharto), they were also able to develop a close and
long-term relationship, as evidenced by their frequent meetings and
the favourable policies that were implemented to stimulate Salim
Group profits. The alignment between Suharto and Liem played a role
on many levels including the economic, personal and business levels.
It was characterised by a mutual understanding of give and take. The
distinction between ‘opportunity’ and ‘obligation’ therefore remains
somewhat murky. This alignment was limited by the potential for
strong criticism, and Suharto presented the alignment as beneficial to
the development of Indonesia. The Salim Group being ‘an instrument’
for national development was, considering the respective political and
economic power of both, an argument that sounded convincing. The
consequence of the alignment was that people started to perceive the
Salim Group as part of the Suharto regime. In the words of Schwarz:
‘Liem’s empire straddles the line between private enterprise and gov-
ernment like no other Indonesian organisation’.17 In the end, the Salim
Group became a symbol of the Suharto regime.
This symbolic function made it harder for the group to adapt to the
post-Suharto context. When Suharto resigned and the economy de-
clined, mobs attacked Bank Central Asia, the ultimate symbol of the
Suharto and Salim family alignment. But here too, generational
changes played a role. Liem wisely withdrew after Suharto resigned,
and let his son, who was less associated with the long-time dictator,
handle the new political and economic situation. This study suggests
the possibility that large corporate entities can successfully morph into
institutions given the right conditions of strong corporate and institu-
tional alignment.
7.9 Theoretical Implications
This study strongly suggests that the culturalist approach to ethnic Chi-
nese firms cannot adequately explain the development of the Salim
Group. The Salim Group has clearly outgrown the small one-product
family firm with its simple structure. Its history and size assumes var-
ious restrictions to flexibility and one can observe that several aspects
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of corporate strategy, such as the domestic model and the diversifica-
tion strategy remain constant, even though the environment has chan-
ged. Rather than focusing on ethnic Chinese partners it has broadened
its network with political connections and foreign partners, thus avail-
ing itself of bonding as well as bridging capital.
The crony capitalism approach is rooted in the discipline of political
economy, which in itself has little interest in corporate strategy. Yet the
notion of interdependence between corporate and political actors ap-
plies well to the Salim Group which was influenced by Indonesian in-
stitutions as well as being able to influence them. As mentioned ear-
lier, it even became a symbol of the Suharto government itself, show-
ing how intertwined the group was with Indonesian institutions.
The institutional approach applies best to the Salim Group, as it can
explain how strategy in weak institutional environments may evolve.
However, in this case, this perspective should be complemented with
insights from social capital approaches and family firm theories. It is
not only the institutional context that matters for a diversified strategy,
social capital also increased diversification.
The co-evolutionary perspective has led to important insights in this
study. Time series analysis showed how strategy was not linear but os-
cillatory, because it was influenced by both institutional and genera-
tional changes. The Salim Group became so large that it consciously
influenced the Suharto government, but in return was also heavily in-
fluenced by it, giving rise to patterns of mutual responses between the
Salim Group and Indonesian institutions. These patterns and re-
sponses can be seen as the rhythm of the Salim Group strategy.
This study shows that the Salim Group is not ‘very Chinese’ in the
strategies it implemented. It is obvious that every company develops in
its own unique way, and is shaped by its own management and envir-
onment. But having said this, there is little reason to believe that
merely ‘being Chinese’ has had a large influence on recent Salim
Group strategy, which has set it apart from other family business
groups in other emerging markets. I suspect that this is true not only
for the Salim Group, but also for other large ethnic Chinese family
business groups. However, further research is necessary to fully under-
stand whether the outcomes of this study apply only to the Salim
Group, or whether they represent strategy patterns that are common to





The following table gives an overview of the 69 annual reports of (for-
mer) Salim Group companies (i.e., companies in which the Salim fa-
mily and/or Salim investors had a substantial interest and one or more
board memberships) that were available to me and used in the writing
of this book. These companies represent the largest listed companies
within the Salim Group. The private companies are not obliged to pub-
lish annual reports. Information on these companies in the form of an-
nual reports was only available for Bank Central Asia (BCA).
Company 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Bank Central Asia X X X X X X X X
First Pacific X X X X X X X X X X
Indocement X X X X X X X X X X
Indofood X X X X X X X X X X
Indomobil* X X X X X X X
Indosiar* X X X X
QAF X X X X X X X X X X
Unggul Indah Cahaya X X X X X X X X X X
* Annual Reports were available from the year the company was listed on the stock
exchange.
Media Sources
In this study, media sources were an important type of information, in
particular newspapers. During the period 2001-2005, an archive of
news concerning the Salim Group was created and comprised thou-
sands of articles. This archive was created by means of structured
searches in databases and in the CSIS library. The table below gives
the number of articles reviewed from the largest source: the LexisNexis
database.
Lexis Nexis Search Terms Articles Retrieved











Names of unlisted firms 1760
Total 6349
Interviews
For this study, 56 interviews were carried out with a total of 40 respon-
dents. All of the interviews took place during the period 2003-2006.
Several respondents, in particular Salim managers, were interviewed
more than once in order to obtain more in-depth information. A rela-
tively large number of the interviews were done with IBRA employees,
particularly those who handled Salim Group assets after these assets
were handed over to the government. The information that became
available on the Salim Group through the handover of assets was per-
ceived to be very valuable and a unique opportunity to learn more
about the non-listed Salim companies. Several people in this category
were also interviewed more than once. For each interview, a summary
was made and interviews with Anthony Salim were recorded and tran-
scribed. The table below gives a breakdown of the number respondents
and interviews in each category.
Category Description Respondents Interviews
1 Salim Group managers 8 16
2 Academic experts 6 7
3 IBRA executives 5 9
4 Former ministers 3 4
5 Financial analysts 2 2
6 Journalists 3 4
7 Manager other conglomerate 5 5
8 Foreign partner of Salim Group 3 3
Other 5 6
Total 40 56
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While all of the sources have their advantages and disadvantages
(see table below), these can be partly compensated for by using the








Limited to Legal Obligations
for Disclosure
Limited to Public Companies
Media Sources Information from Wide
Range of Sources, Including
Specialised Media
Focus on ‘News Value’
Sources Remain Unknown
Possible Limits to Free Press
Interviews In-depth Information
Comparing Divergent Views
Respondents Want to Speak
‘Off the Record’
Potential Bias
Secondary Sources Different Perspectives
Prior Analysis Available
Comes with Interpretation of
Authors
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Annex 2 Time Series Analysis of Business Events
Strategy can be assumed to consist of a set of individual business deci-
sions that together make up the actual direction of a firm. I call those
‘business events’. A new business event was anything of importance
outside continuing existing business. Examples of business events in-
cluded the expansion of an existing business; a new venture with a
new or existing partner; a spin-off or acquisition. Each business event
was listed in a separate one-page document with a title, a description, a
date and information (plus their sources) giving more details about the
event. An example of such a new business event is given below.
Business Event: Liem Sioe Liong and Robert Kuok form sugar empire
Date: April 13, 1994
Short Description: Liem Sioe Liong and Robert Kuok merge sugar
interests in Indonesia
Context: Robert Kuok is an ethnic Chinese from Malaysia
Source 1: South China Morning Post, April 13, 1994
Indonesia’s Liem Sioe Liong and Malaysia’s Robert Kuok plan to create
one of the largest sugar empires in the world by merging their sugar inter-
ests in Indonesia. According to a Business Times Singapore report, the two
tycoons plan to set up a new holding company and invest more than US$
1 billion on seven projects in south Sumatra. Each of the projects, costing
about $ 130 million, will cover some 25,000 hectares and will have a fac-
tory capable of crushing 10,000 tons of cane a day to produce about
120,000 tons of sugar a year.
Source 2: The Financial Times, April 20, 1994
Two of south-east Asia’s wealthiest businessmen, Mr. Robert Kuok and Mr.
Liem Sioe Liong, are teaming up to develop a series of sugar plantations
and refining operations in the south of the Indonesian island of Sumatra.
Mr. Kuok, a Malaysian Chinese, controls a global business empire with in-
terests ranging from housing schemes and beach resorts to ownership of a
controlling interest in Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post newspaper
group. Mr. Liem, an Indonesian Chinese, is generally regarded as Indone-
sia’s richest businessman with interests ranging from cement manufactur-
In order to measure relationship- and market-based strategies over
time, I developed four indicators and a coding strategy that allowed the
measurement of the movement between a relationship- and market-
based strategy over time. Two indicators were related to a relationship-
based strategy and two to a market-based strategy.
Strategic Themes
T Indicators Source
T1 Ethnic Chinese Relations Theories on the CFB and diaspora approaches
T2 Political Connections Theories on Crony Capitalism
T3 Foreign Partners Institutional Approaches to Strategy in
Emerging Markets
T4 Market-Based Environment Institutional Approaches to Strategy in
Emerging Markets
Relationship-Based. According to one set of theories, ethnic Chinese
businessmen prefer to do business with other ethnic Chinese rather
than with foreigners. The first characteristic of a relationship-based
strategy is therefore that Chinese form ethnic Chinese business net-
works. Secondly, another set of theories suggests that ethnic Chinese
family firms are characterised by crony relationships with powerful of-
ficials. Together these network strategies represent the relationship-
based strategy.
Market-Based. Measuring market-based strategic models is not an easy
exercise because the literature offers few clues of what proxies we could
use. Much of the literature on strategy in emerging economies focuses
on conglomeration and diversification. The existence of weak institu-
tions encourages conglomeration whereas this strategy has become rare
in Western economies. Less diversification could therefore indicate a
more market-based strategy. I initially tried to create a measurable vari-
able by looking at how it fit into the existing portfolio of each strategic
business decision. The expected trend is that unrelated diversification
will decrease over time. However, this variable, which should indicate
the fit within the existing portfolio, was problematic. First, it is hard to
assess, when one studies a large and elaborate conglomerate, whether a
ing to noodle making. The Salim group, Mr. Liem’s main company, had
turnover of more than Dollars 9bn last year. The fortunes of both Mr.
Kuok and Mr. Liem were founded on the commodities business.
Sources: Lexis Nexis database
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new business fits into the larger portfolio. While it was clear for some
events, other events led to confusion. Also, when a conglomerate is al-
ready large, almost every new activity represents a fit somewhere with-
in the current portfolio, so this type of measurement was not consid-
ered useful. Secondly, the literature also suggests that ethnic Chinese
family firms modernise and become more market-based once they are
subject to globalisation trends. The degree of embeddedness in a global
business context outside its own domestic and ethnic partners may
therefore indicate that a company is moving towards a market model.
This can be seen in the number and importance of foreign partners
(non-Indonesian and non-Chinese). If a company does extensive busi-
ness in market-based environments, such as in the United States, one
can assume that this company reveals its capacities to operate in a mar-
ket-based manner. Therefore, the number of new business deals in
countries with ‘modern’ or market-based institutions is another indica-
tor. Together, these two proxies represent the market-based model.
The four indicators were tested on a sample of the data by a second
and a third researcher, both unfamiliar with the case material. After de-
veloping the indicators the business events were analysed using a cod-
ing procedure. Coding is an analytical strategy that allows quantitative
analysis of qualitative data. This requires a unit of coding, defined as:
‘the most basic segment, or element, of the raw data or information
that can be assessed in a meaningful way regarding the phenomenon’.1
The unit of coding of this study was a new business event. A total of
277 events were entered into the database of which 266 have been
coded. The remaining 11 events occurred prior to 1984. For the years
prior to 1984, there was often only one database event annually, which
was considered too few to attain a meaningful score. It was then
decided to consider 1984 through 2003 (20 years) as the analysis
period.
The purpose of coding raw data is to allow different data to be com-
pared and processed using quantitative techniques. In this study, the
various themes taken together establish a theoretical framework, which
is called axial coding.2 Generally speaking, the clearer the coding in-
structions, the higher the reliability of the code, which is an important
indicator for the quality of the research process. In order to maintain
the reliability of the data, I opted for a simple scale in which events
were coded based on whether several characteristics (e.g., ethnic Chi-
nese partners) were present or not. I used this presence-codification to
plot business events on the relationship-market continuum over time.
A coding technique has been applied to allow the different data to be
compared where business events displaying characteristics of the rela-
tionship-strategy were given positive scores while the presence of mar-
ket-based characteristics was rated using a negative score.
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Coding Strategy
T Themes: Rating
T1 Ethnic Chinese Relations Present (1) / Not Present (0)
T2 Political Connections Present (1) / Not Present (0)
T3 Foreign Partners Present (-1) / Not Present (0)
T4 Market-Based Environment Present (-1) / Not Present (0)
The various codes have been given a label, a description, indicators, ex-
amples, and exclusions or special conditions. These are available as a
codebook below. In order to combine the codes into a single graph, a
scaling procedure was necessary. Scaling means combining scores into
a single value. To enable a corporate strategy trend line, the values of
all of the scores were averaged per year and plotted on a chart.
Development of Codes
In order to analyse all data and integrate them, a coding system was
used based on a combination of deductive and inductive themes and
indicators. The coding protocol below is offered for each code a title,
definition, description, and examples or exclusions, which together
form the codebook for this study.
Code 1 Ethnic Chinese Relationships
Definition The presence of relationships or partnerships with ethnic
Chinese businessmen, defined as anyone of Chinese des-
cent.
Indicators Ethnic Chinese partner, business venture in China.
Examples The Salim Group set up a new joint venture with Robert
Kuok, a Malaysian ethnic Chinese. Excluded are unclear
events like when the former top Salim executive became
the CEO of another ethnic Chinese company (since it is
not clear that this is a Salim Group initiative, it could
have been a personal step taken by the in-house execu-
tive).
Rating Present (1) or Not Present (0)
Code 2 Political Connections
Definition Business ventures include a component of political rela-
tionships, either with the Suharto family or with a gov-
ernment agency, or political connections linked to the
deal are reported, either in Indonesia or in other (Asian)
countries.
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Indicators The Salim Group has received a special license or excep-
tion from the general rule; media reports bribery or spe-
cial connections; Salim Group is in business with govern-
ment-owned firms in Asia or directly with the Suharto
family.
Examples The Salim Group enters into a new business venture with
a member of the Suharto family. Indofood receives special
license to expand production, despite this being against
prevailing regulations; or Salim Group acquires half of
Jakarta water utility while the other half is awarded to a
Suharto family member in a reportedly opaque process.
Reports of connections require multiple sources to avoid
relying on rumours. Excluded are one-time rumours.
Rating Present (1) or Not Present (0)
Code 3 Foreign Partners
Definition Salim Group business event is linked to a foreign, non-
ethnic Chinese and non-Indonesian partner.
Indicators A Western partner is involved, or a Japanese firm. If a
company is simply sold or acquired, one cannot speak of
a continued partnership, and those cases are not to be
counted.
Examples Salim Group partners with a German cement company
in Indonesia or set up a chemicals firm with a large Japa-
nese multinational.
Rating Present (-1) or Not Present (0)
Code 4 Market-Based Business Environment
Definition Salim Group business event is linked to doing business
in a market-economy (which includes rule-based econo-
mies: US, Japan, Europe, Singapore, Hong Kong, and
Australia).
Indicators The event takes place in one of the above-mentioned
countries or regions. Divestments of businesses do not
count.
Examples The Salim Group buys Hagemeyer in the Netherlands.
Rating Present (-1) or Not Present (0)
The analysis of case data by means of coding procedures can suffer
from researcher biases which may unconsciously influence the actual
coding. To control for this potential bias the reliability of the coding
process is normally tested by using other people’s judgements and
comparing these with the researcher’s judgements. This research
worked with interrater reliability by measuring the percentage agree-
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ment on presence. The formula recommended for this type of pre-
sence/non-presence scoring is:3
2* (# times both coder A and coder B saw theme present)
(# times coder A saw it present + # times coder B saw it present)
With regard to the corporate strategy coding procedure, calculating re-
liability is normally done by means of double coding. An independent
coder, unfamiliar to the research has coded all of the business events
achieving interrater reliability of between 74% and 77% (scores over
70% are normally considered sufficient).
Using this coding strategy, one can visualise the data in a ‘map’
which enables one to detect trends in corporate strategy development.
In addition to the statistical analysis, the rich case data have also been
summarised and analysed using interpretative techniques. The inter-
pretative analysis is used to build a chain of evidence showing why
strategy changes occur, how strategy develops, and whether the devel-
opment of the corporate strategy can be linked to internal or external
factors. Interpretative analysis follows a similar pattern of data reduc-
tion, visualisation, and building a chain of arguments, but in a qualita-
tive manner. First, a chronological overview is made of the Salim
Group strategy in different periods in time. After this, the strategy is
interpreted in terms of ‘relationship-based’ or ‘market-based’ and ex-
pressed in a score on a scale from -5 (market-based) to +5 (relationship-
based). These scores are then plotted in a graph using time as the
x-axis. In this way, the interpretative analysis will also lead to a visuali-
sation as given in figure 1.1. If 1. the interpretative analysis and 2. the
results of the quantitative techniques both point in the same direction,
the data offer clear patterns and one can draw conclusions that are sup-
ported using different analyses. If the results of the two techniques are
opposed, strong conclusions are not possible given the mixed results.
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Annex 3 Overview of Salim Group Activities
Agribusiness
– 240,000 hectares of palm plantations in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Su-
lawesi and Riau, producing 450,000 tons of crude palm oil and
100,000 tons of palm kernel oil annually;
– 50,000 hectares of sugar plantation in Lampung province produ-
cing 700,000 tons of sugar annually;
– Pig farms on Bulan island, producing 250,000 heads annually for
export to Singapore;
– Large-scale chicken and crocodile farms on Bulan island;
– Orchid nurseries producing 2,000,000 sticks per month for export.
Automotive and shipping
– Annual turnover of 260,000 motorcycles and 75,000 four-wheel ve-
hicles;
– Joint venture with Sumitomo Rubber producing 2.5 million tires
annually;
– Leasing and financing company with Ford Credit International;
– Car rental and used-car business;
– Car dealership in California;
– Shipping fleet with capacity of 150,000 dead weight tons.
Chemicals
– 96,000 tons of caustic soda produced annually (inorganic/petro-
based);
– 90,000 tons of ethylene dichloride (EDC) annually (inorganic/pet-
robased);
– Joint Venture with Mitsui produces 82,000 tons of polyvinyl chlor-
ide (PVC) annually (inorganic/petrobased);
– Joint venture with Tosoh, production of vinylchloride monomer and
PVC targeted to start in 1997 (inorganic/petrobased);
– 150,000 tons alkylbenzene produced annually (inorganic/petro-
based); new plant in Vietnam;
– Joint venture with Dow Chemicals produces 30,000 tons of poly-
styrene annually;
– 90,000 capacity for production of organic/oleochemicals (natural
fatty-based alcohol);
– 50% holding in Albright & Wilson for production of sodium tripoly-
phosphate and surfactants;
– Joint venture to produce ethoxylate with Albright & Wilson;
– Paper-sizing chemical manufacturing with American Hercules;
– Industrial and fresh water supply joint venture with Lyonnaise des
Eaux;
– Fabrication of steel storage drums;




– Distribution and reselling of computer software and peripherals.
Construction Materials
– Cement manufacturing holding approximately 42% market share;
– Galvanised iron sheet manufacturing with capacity of 90,000 tons
annually.
Food and Consumer Products
– Noodles (including a joint venture with Myojo Food); market share
90%;
– Snack and baby food in joint venture with Pepsico Foods, market
share 60%;
– Sweetened condensed milk (45% market share) and pasteurised li-
quid milk (market share 56%);
– Bottling and distribution of Pepsi Cola and other drinks;
– Partnership with Yakult for yoghurt drinks, sales 175 million bottles
annually;
– Flour milling with 3 million tons annual capacity, market share
89%;
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– Edible oil production with a capacity of 400,000 tons annually,
market share 55%;
– Production of 100,000 tons of margarine annually;
– Joint venture with Miwon for MSG production, 65% of this is ex-
ported.
International (First Pacific Group)
– Trade and distribution of electrotechnical materials (Hagemeyer, the
Netherlands);
– Manufacturing of veterinary products, food, consumer goods and
packaging materials, investments in telecom and real estate (Metro
Pacific, Philippines);
– Manufacturing of corrugated fibreboard boxes (Steniel Manufactur-
ing, the Philippines);
– Manufacturing of consumer and technical products (Berli Jucker,
Thailand);
– Glass container production (Thai Glass Industries, Thailand);
– Distribution of computer hardware, software and related products
(Tech Pacific, Australia);
– Telecommunication Networks (Pacific Link, Hong Kong, and Smart
Communications, a Joint venture with NTT Japan);
– Banking (First Pacific Bank, Hong Kong);
– Over 50 million square feet of property in Asia (First Pacific Davies,
Hong Kong).
International (KMP Group)
– Food and retail businesses (QAF, Singapore);
– Cement (Indocement Singapore);
– Poultry (Kosmo Poultry, Singapore);
– Flour milling (Pacific Flour and Food, China);
– Guangdong Jiangmen Float Glass, joint venture with Nippon Sheet
glass and a China state-owned company;
– Equity investment in IUC managing 2.6 million square feet of of-
fice space and other property holdings;
– Real estate project in Fuzhou, China and Suzhou;
– Part of consortium in developing industrial parks/infrastructure
projects in India and Myanmar.
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Multi-industry
– Textile factories with combined annual capacity of 80,000 bales of
yarn and 130 million meters of grey fabric;
– Production capacity of 9.2 million pairs of branded sports shoes an-
nually;
– 10,000 tons production capacity of polypropylene film for packa-
ging;
– Joint venture with Rengo (Japan) for packaging;
– World largest producer of mosquito coils with capacity of 9 million
Baygon coils annually and a market share of 90%;
– Pharmaceutical products (Darya-Varia Laboratoria, Indonesia);
– Joint venture with Sumitomo in manufacturing of pre-stressed con-
crete wires, with annual capacity of 46,000 tons.
Natural Resources
– Coal mining in Kalimantan, 800,000 tons of raw coal annually;
– 25,000 hectare concession for coal mining, production of 3.5 tons
annually planned; 200,000 hectare in exploration stage;
– 4,100 hectare concession mining 3 million tons of granite;
– Storage, transport of oil and gas products, exploration and produc-
tion planned in Kalimantan;
– Participation in development of petroleum processing project on
Karimun Island;
– 500,000 hectare concession for timber, producing 300,000 cubic
meters of wood products annually, mostly for export.
Property and Leisure
– Operation of hotels with 1,600 rooms combined;
– Development of a resort in Manado;
– Resort development on Batam and Bintan islands;
– Golf courses;
– New developments include hospital and housing;
– Operates office space of 75,000 square metres in Jakarta;
– Owns and operates malls and shopping complexes;
– Three industrial estates (East Jakarta, Citeureup, Batam), two under
construction.
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Trading and Distribution
– Retail: 20 Gelael supermarkets, 129 KFCs, 64 Swensen’s ice cream
parlours and 130 Indomaret mini-marts;
– Indogrosi wholesale outlets, Super Indomaret supermarkets;
– Indonesia’s largest distribution company.
Overview of Salim Group Activities




Automotive & Shipping Automotive 370
Shipping
Banking and Financial Services Bank Central Asia (BCA 11,000
International Banking
Insurance, leasing, securities
Chemicals Inorganic/ Petrobased 1,000
Organic/Oleochemicals
Specialty Chemicals & others
Computers & Communications Computers Unknown
Communications (TV)
Construction Materials Cement 1,100
Galvanised Iron Sheets
















Property & Leisure Industry Hotels Unknown





Trading & Distribution Trading & Retailing 700
Distribution
Source: Salim Group Brochure, 1995-1996
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Annex 4 Salim Group Executives
The Salim Family
– Liem Sioe Liong (Soedono Salim): Chairman and founder of the
Salim Group. Born in Fuqing, China. Is currently retired and lives
in Singapore.
– Anthony Salim: President and CEO of the Salim Group; director of
various Salim Group companies. Son of Liem Sioe Liong. Born in
Indonesia. Received a bachelor’s degree in the UK.
– Andree Halim: In charge of the Singapore/China activities of the
Salim Group. Son of Liem Sioe Liong. Bachelor’s degree from the
UK. Holds board positions in QAF and Peaktop International Hold-
ings.
– Franciscus Welirang: Responsible for Bogasari Flour Mills; board
member of various Salim companies like Indofood and Indoce-
ment; son-in-law of Liem Sioe Liong. Bachelor’s degree in the UK.
Other Liem Investors
– Ibrahim Risjad: Born in Aceh, Indonesia. Active board member in
First Pacific, Indofood, and Indocement. Also board member of the
Risjad Salim International Bank.
– Sudwikatmono: Born in Indonesia; cousin of Suharto. Board mem-
ber of various Salim companies such as Indocement, Indofood,
First Pacific, Indomobil. Now retired from all board positions.
– Sutanto Djuhar: Born in Indonesia. Long-time partner of Liem,
from the same clan, but also has own interests, for example in
property. Active in several Salim companies such as Indocement,
Indofood and First Pacific. Father of Tedy Djuhar.
– Tedy Djuhar: Son of Sutanto Djuhar and a member of various Salim
company boards such as Indocement and First Pacific.
Professional Managers
– Eva Riyanti Hutapea: Public accountant who has also served as a di-
rector of several Indofood companies prior to the 1994 merger. Was
CEO of Indofood but resigned in December 2003.
– Manuel Pangilinan: Born in the Philippines. Became the CEO of
First Pacific and later of PLDT in the Philippines. Successfully re-
belled against the Salim family when they planned to sell PLDT.
– Tan Kong King: Group managing director of QAF in Singapore and
board member of numerous privately held companies in Singapore.
– Hartono Gunawan: Manages the chemicals division of the Salim
Group, and has been a Salim manager since 1982.
– Angky Camaro: Key figure in Indomobil, left the group and is cur-
rently CEO of Sampoerna.
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1 Taken from Chrisman et al. (2005, p. 2).
2 See, for example, La Porta et al. (1999) or Granovetter (1995).
3 Earlier works often used the term ‘Overseas Chinese’. However the term ‘ethnic Chi-
nese’ is now considered more appropriate because ‘Overseas Chinese’ is a term that
takes mainland China as a central geographical point of reference. After all, it is from
a mainland China perspective that people were considered ‘overseas’. It also suggests
that the ‘overseas’ Chinese will at some point return to China, and this is not neces-
sarily the case with Chinese migrants located in Southeast Asia. The discussion on
what terms to use partly stems from translations of Chinese characters, but it is be-
yond the scope of this study to deal with the linguistic roots and use of different Chi-
nese terms for ethnic Chinese migrants in Southeast Asia. In this study I use the
term ‘ethnic Chinese’.
4 For example, Hamilton (1991), Redding (1990), Weidenbaum (1996).
5 See Sharma et al. (1997).
6 Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) assumes that in widely held firms the
owners (shareholders) need to monitor whether managers act in the best interest of
the firm, rather than in their own self-interest. This issue is widely known as the
agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Researchers have recently argued that
in many emerging markets, businesses are not owned by dispersed shareholders, but
rather by concentrated owners, such as families (La Porta, 1999). According to Shlei-
fer and Vishny (1997) concentrated ownership leads to a different type of agency pro-
blem, namely the problem of aligning the interests of different shareholders. The
controlling family, by virtue of their position as owner and manager, may expropriate
minority owners for their own benefit.
7 See Gomez and Hsiao (2001).
8 See for example Kao (1993); Suehiro (2001) and Zheng (2002).
9 The idea that cultural values underpin capitalism can be traced back to Weber’s work
on Protestant ethics (Weber 1958) and has continued to influence studies of manage-
ment across cultures. Weber thought that people adhering to Confucian values were
incapable of producing a modern type of capitalism. Ironically enough there is now a
tendency to link Confucian values to superior capitalist behaviour. This curious aca-
demic development shows that cultural values share some of the characteristics of
horoscopes and the oracle at Delphi.
10 For example, Ahlstrom et al. (2004); Backman (1999); Chan (2000); Douw et al.
(1999); East Asia Analytical Unit (1995); Gomez and Hsiao (2001); Hodder (1996);
Kao (1993); Redding (1990); Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996); Whitley (1999) and
Yeung (2006).
11 See, for example, Davies and Ma (2003) or Weidenbaum (1996).
12 See, for example, Redding (1990); Douw, Huang and Godley (1999); Crawford
(2000); and Jomo and Folk (2003).
13 See Hofstede and Bond (1988, p. 8).
14 For example, Davies and Ma (2003). Haley et al., (1998) or Yu (2001). Attentive read-
ers may notice that some of these characteristics apply to most small family firms
around the world, and may not be so uniquely Chinese.
15 As argued by McVey (1992, p. 18).
16 See Li et al. (1997).
17 See Claessens et al. (1998); Chang (2003) and Morck and Yeung (2003). A pyramid
structure occurs when a family holds 51% of firm A, which in turn holds 51% of firm
B, which in turn holds 51% of firm C, and so on. The effect of this is, in this exam-
ple, that the family has majority control over firm C (since it owns 51% of the voting
rights) but is entitled to only 13% of the cash flow rights. Large Chinese family busi-
nesses grew quickly which made full control of their companies costly, so they
sought to limit their ownership in the firm without limiting their control through
pyramid structures. Critics argue this structure is prone to stealing from minority
shareholders, a practice known as tunneling (Friedman et al., 2003).
18 For example, Weidenbaum (1996) or Tsui-Auch (2004).
19 See Weidenbaum (1996).
20 Most of the critics of the cultural perspective point to recent changes but some histor-
ians studying colonial ethnic Chinese firms also find little use for the culturalist ap-
proach (Lian and Koh, 2004).
21 See, for example, Ahlstrom et al. (2004); Yeung (2000).
22 For example, Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996); Brown (1998).
23 The concept was invented by Bourdieu (1984) and has also been used within the dis-
cipline of management (Adler and Kwon, 2002).
24 Such as Redding (1990) and Backman (2001).
25 Comparisons have been made by Chirot and Reid (1997), Davis et al. (2001) and Kot-
kin (1992). Early researchers emphasized the middleman role many such migrants
played (Bonacich, 1973). One must note the difference between migrants and minori-
ties. Minorities are not necessarily migrants (for example the native Indian popula-
tion in the US) nor are migrants necessarily minorities (for example, the Jewish peo-
ple in Israel), but in the case of the first-generation ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia,
both terms are applicable.
26 For a more thorough discussion on ‘being Chinese’ see: Suryadinata (1997); Godley
and Lloyd (2001) or Ong and Nonini (1997).
27 The fact that ethnic Chinese are better off than the indigenous populations is a state-
ment informed by statistics and averages. Not all Chinese are rich, and not all indi-
genous are poor. Of the top 50 largest businesses in Indonesia, however, the majority
are controlled by Chinese businessmen. This is unusual given the fact that the ethnic
Chinese are a minority.
28 E.g., Mackie (1976); McVey (1992); Robison (1986); Suryadinata (1997); Thee
(2006).
29 See Robison (1986).
30 For example Yoshihara (1988). For a more elaborate review of cronyism see Khatri et
al. (2006). Crony capitalism may be seen as a special form of corruption (Luo,
2002), and both phenomena are thought to be negative for the development of a na-
tion (Vishny and Shleifer, 1993).
31 See Lim (2000).
32 For example, Kang (2002).
33 See Elson (2001).
34 See Dwipayana and Ramadhan (1989).
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35 See Karady (1997, p. 126).
36 For example Rosser (2003); Robison and Hadiz (2004).
37 See Chibber (1999).
38 See Amsden (1989); Lee (2000) or Park (2002).
39 According to Kang (2002).
40 See Schwarz (1997, p. 129).
41 See, for example, Granovetter (1992); Kotkin (1992); Lever-Tracy (2002) and Back-
man (2001).
42 See Liu (1998).
43 For example, Rauch and Trindade (2002).
44 See Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996).
45 For example, Douw et al. (1999).
46 For example, Dahles (2005); Ong and Nonini (1997) or Yeung (1997).
47 See Chen and Chen (2004) and Xin and Pearce (1996) and for the link between
Confucian values and guanxi Yeung and Tung, see (1996).
48 For example, Sunarjo and Cone (2005). Strictly speaking, guanxi does not necessarily
lead to bribes, it is very well possible, and indeed very common around the world, to
maintain completely legal reciprocal personal relationships by exchanging favours.
49 For example, Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998); Oh et al. (2004) and Uzzi (1997).
50 See, for example, Lim (2000); Liu (2001) or Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993). Blyler
and Coff (2003) note that social capital is not necessarily used to benefit the firm,
personal relations can also be used for personal gain.
51 See, for example, Putnam (2000); Adler and Kwon (2002).
52 See, for example, Hite (2005); Keister (2001) and Luo and Chung (2005).
53 See, for example, Chung (2005) and Peng (2003).
54 See, for example, Khanna and Palepu (1999).
55 Prominent scholars include Scott (1995) and North (1990).
56 See, for example, Carney (2004); Hoskisson et al. (2000); Khanna and Palepu
(2000); Kim et al. (2004); Peng (2002); Peng and Heath (1996) and Wright et al.
(2005).
57 See, for example, Granovetter (1995); Khanna and Palepu (1997 and 1999); Kock
and Guillén (2001), and Peng (2003).
58 See for, example, Khanna and Palepu (2000).
59 For example, Lincoln et al. (1998).
60 For example, Park (2002).
61 For example, Kim et al. (2004).
62 According to Scott (1995).
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64 See, for example, Butler et al. (2003); Carney (2005); Casella (1999); Hitt, et al.
(2002); Jones et al. (1997); Landa (1991); Peng et al. (2002); Rauch (2001); Xin and
Pearce (1996), and Wu and Choi (2004).
65 E.g., Claessens et al. (1999); Hoskisson and Hitt (1990), and Martin and Sayrak
(2003).
66 The concept economies of scope was developed by Panzar and Willig (1981) and
further elaborated upon by Chandler (1990) and more recently by Helfat and Eisen-
hardt (2004).
67 See for example Peng (2003); or Peng, Lee and Wang (2005).
68 See Peng and Zhou (2005).
69 Not all small ethnic Chinese firms develop into mega-conglomerates, in fact most
don’t. The approach is to develop a model of the historical development of large eth-
nic Chinese family business groups, rather than a deterministic account of how
small firms should develop.
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70 See Peng (2003).
71 I adopt this concept from Thomas, Kaminska-Labbé and McKelvey (2005), but other
authors such as Brown and Eisenhardt (1997); March (1991, 1999) and Nickerson
and Zenger (2002) also have adopted the idea that organisations continuously shift
because of certain strategic dilemmas.
72 Prominent authors in this field are Beckert (1999); Child (1997); Child and Tsai
(2005) and Oliver (1991).
73 See for example Limlingan (1986).
74 For example Hamilton (1991); Kotkin (1992); Lever-Tracy (2002); Redding (1990)
and Yu (2001).
75 See Ahlstrom et al. (2004); Bruton et al. (2003); Carney (1998); Carney and Gedajlo-
vic (2003).
76 See Garud and Karnoe (2001).
77 For example, Carney and Gedajlovic (2003); Davies and Ma (2003).
78 See Child and Tsai (2005).
79 See Limlingan (1986), Sato (1993) or Suehiro (2001).
80 See Child and Tsai (2005) and Ackoff (1974). Oliver (1991) speaks of manipulative
strategies to influence the environment.
81 See, for example, Ehrlich and Raven (1964); Nitecki (1983) or Thompson (2005).
82 Such as Thompson (2005).
83 For example, Lewin and Volberda (1999); McKelvey (1997 and 2002); Murmann et
al. (2003); Röttmer and Katzy (2005); Tan and Tan (2005); and Volberda and Lewin
(2003).
84 For example, Scott (1995).
85 The literature on strategic intent has been summarised in a recent article (Child,
1997). In addition, earlier scientists subscribing to a pragmatist view have also ex-
plored the idea of organisations as purposeful systems (Ackoff and Emery, 1972).
86 There are now several studies on institutional entrepreneurs (Dacin et al., 2002; Di-
Maggio, 1988; Garud et al., 2002; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Kondra and Hin-
ings, 1998)
87 E.g., Djelic and Ainamo (1999); Haveman and Rao (1997); Jones (2001); Lampel and
Shamsie (2003).
88 See Carney and Gedajlovic (2002).
89 There is one study of a single Brazilian firm in the telecommunication industry (Ro-
drigues and Child, 2003) but this study did not document a direct influence of the
company on Brazilian national institutions.
90 For example Redding (1990).
91 Such as Weidenbaum and Hughes (1996) or Haley (1997). There are also exceptions
to this, for example, Sato (1993) and Robison (1986), both of whom have done de-
tailed empirical research on large Indonesian Chinese business groups and their de-
velopment over time. Despite this Gomez and Hsiao (2001) have argued for more
empirical research on ethnic Chinese business groups.
92 For example, Claessens et al. (1999).
93 See, for example, Eisenhardt (1989).
94 A proponent of this view is activist/academic George Aditjondro (Business World,
1999).
95 Generally, the research design followed the procedures for case research as recom-
mended by Yin (2003).
96 See Boyatzis (1998).
97 To appreciate the completely opposite extremes represented here I note that more
than one respondent in favour of the ‘cronies’ position insisted that my research was
so dangerous that I should be worried about possibly being murdered by the Salim
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Group; while at the other end of the spectrum a board member of a European multi-
national stated that the Salim Group was their best Asian partner, and that the lea-
dership were their personal friends.
98 See Peng (2003).
99 For example, Peng (2003) and Peng and Zhou (2005).
100 In this definition, I assume corporate strategy means the actual direction a corpora-
tion. Within strategy research a distinction is sometimes made between strategy for-
mulation and strategy implementation; or between strategy process (how strategies
come about); strategy content (the product of a strategy process) and strategy context
(set of circumstances). In this research, I address corporate strategy content within
its context. For a discussion on different approaches to strategy, I refer to Meyer and
de Wit (2004).
Notes Chapter 2
1 See Sato (1993). Fuqing is sometimes spelled Futsing.
2 Although some sources mention the year 1936 (e.g., Robison, 1986), two comprehen-
sive studies of the Salim Group by Sato (1993) and Soetriyono (1989) both indicate
that Liem left China in 1938.
3 Suryadinata (1995, p. 139) reports that Liem ran a noodle shop.
4 According to Soetriyono (1989). The Dutch colonial spelling is ‘Koedoes’.
5 Although there has been Chinese migration since the third century B.C. (Wang,
2000), it is generally believed that ‘the structure of the Chinese community in Indo-
nesia today started to develop only after the advent of Dutch colonialism in the re-
gion’ (Onghokham, 1989, p. 52).
6 In fact, the use of the words peranakan and totok is more complex. Sometimes totok
is also used for people who were born in Indonesia but are less assimilated and cul-
turally closer to China. Totok, which means newcomer, has also been used for Dutch
newcomers to Indonesia, but in this book, it refers to those Chinese migrants in In-
donesia born in China. Another term used for new Chinese migrants is sinkeh.
7 See Onghokham (1989).
8 See Cheng (1986).
9 This dialect group specialisation existed until approximately 1970 (Post, 1997).
10 The hokchia dialect group is often analysed together with the xinghua group (some-
times spelled hengua), which comes from neighbouring areas in Fujian Province in
China.
11 See, for example, Post (1997).
12 See Coppel and Mackie (1976).
13 As noted by Twang (1998).
14 See Coppel and Mackie (1976).
15 See Lloyd (2001).
16 The tensions arising from the fact that a small ethnic minority holds such an impor-
tant economic position is often referred to as ‘the Chinese problem’ or in Bahasa, In-
donesia ‘masalah Cina’.
17 See Twang (1998).
18 According to Vlasblom (1993). Antons-Sutanto (2001) further notes that the totok fa-
mily is more like a traditional Chinese family with a core of family members (usually
father and sons) and a looser group of relatives around the core. The line between fa-
mily and business is usually not clear among the totok.
19 See Robison (1986).
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20 It is not completely clear when this name changed, but my interview results show
that it probably occurred in the 1960s. This is likely because in 1968, the Chinese
were pressured to integrate into Indonesian society and adopt Indonesian names (El-
son, 2001)
21 According to Soetriyono (1989).
22 See Twang (1998).
23 According to Soetriyono (1989).
24 According to Vlasblom (1993). This is not unlikely since the business environment
for Chinese was difficult during that period. Mackie (1976) notes that sporadic at-
tacks on Chinese occurred during periods where the established authorities lost con-
trol, for example, at the end of the Japanese occupation and in the period 1945-1949.
25 Interviewed in Tempo (1984). Author’s translation.
26 See Twang (1998).
27 According to Post (1997, p. 148).
28 See Soetriyono (1989).
29 According to Robison (1986). Some sources (Bresnan, 1993) also speak of smuggling
trade between Singapore, which was a widespread practice in those times. Robison
notes that one source speaks of smuggling arms, but the author was unable to either
track this source or confirm this. Soetriyono (1989) quotes Liem denying this.
30 According to Elson (2001, p. 22).
31 See CISI Rama Utama (1989).
32 See Soetriyono (1989).
33 Dutch companies were nationalised in 1957/8 followed later by British, American
and other foreign capital between 1963 and 1965.
34 An example of the difficult business environment is the confiscation of the Indone-
sian assets from the largest Chinese-Indonesian conglomerate at the time, the Oei
Tiong Ham concern, in 1961.
35 Many of the importers received a license because of their alliances with the political
power, and many ‘importers’ sold their licenses to others, often of Chinese descent.
Thus, ‘what was being consolidated was not an indigenous merchant bourgeoisie but
a group of licence brokers and political fixers’ (Robison, 1986, p. 45). An arrange-
ment where an indigenous person (‘ali’) acts as the frontman for a Chinese person
(‘baba’) to avoid or make use of certain regulations is often called the ‘ali-baba con-
struction’.
36 See Dick (2002, p. 185).
37 According to Elson (2001, p. 64).
38 Until the Great Depression of the 1930s, East and Central Java played a vital role in
the colonial economy, but Dick (2002) argues that one impact of the depression was
that Jakarta emerged as the economic center.
39 See Crouch (1978, p. 22).
40 See CISI Rama Utama (1989, p. 400).
41 Quotes stem from the author’s interviews with Anthony Salim. All further quotes
also stem from interviews unless indicated otherwise.
42 Interview with Liem Sioe Liong and Anthony Salim in Tempo (1984). Author’s trans-
lation.
43 According to the 2003 BCA Bank’s annual report, it was first established in 1955 as a
knitting company. The name changed several times, and the company started its
banking operations in 1957, the year that Liem acquired the company. The company
was renamed P.T. Bank Central Asia in 1974.
44 See Post (1997).
45 See Robison (1986, p. 297).
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46 This is confirmed in several interviews with former policymakers and researchers.
An exception being the Oei Tiong Ham concern, but this large company was nationa-
lised in 1961.
47 The power transition from Sukarno to Suharto started in 1965, when Suharto, then
commander of the Kostrad (strategic army command), emerged as the strong leader
(Dick, 2002). This happened through a coup of which the details remain somewhat
unclear until this day. On 11 March 1966, Sukarno signed a decree giving Suharto
considerable power, but Suharto didnot officially become the acting president until
1967, and officially was inaugurated as Indonesia’s second president in 1968 (Thee,
2002).
48 According to Hofman et al. (2004).
49 See Elson (2001, p. 162).
50 The company was later renamed P.T. Waringin Kencana (Sato, 1993). In the period
until the end of the 1980s, Liem’s business group was also called the Waringin Ken-
cana Group.
51 See Crouch (1978) or Robison (1986).
52 Argued by Sato (1993).
53 In fact, Sudwikatmono was almost Suharto’s step-brother as the latter had spent part
of his formative years in Sudwikatmono’s family.
54 A CISI study of business groups (1989) confirms that Sudwikatmono and Risjad
joined the group in the late 1960s as new shareholders, but claims that Djuhar
Sutanto had already joined the group earlier.
55 These activities were very substantial. For example, Pertamina, the oil company, was
under direct army control and in fact run as a profit centre for the army. Other insti-
tutions like Bulog (state logistics company) and Berdikari also provided the army
with funds from economic activities. The army’s ‘fundraising’ activities were more
centralised by the end of the 1960s by the establishment of registered companies
owned and controlled by the army. ‘Most of these military sponsored enterprises
were in fact operated by Chinese businessmen, with the military partners ensuring
that the necessary licenses and “facilities” were available and providing “protection”
when illegal activities were involved.’ (Crouch, 1978, p. 284).
56 Elson, 2001, p. 192.
57 According to Crouch (1978). Robison (1986, p. 163) writes that Bank Windu Kencana
was owned by Liem and later transferred to the ownership of the Yayasan Dharma
Putra in 1968, although reportedly still managed by Liem.
58 See Elson (2001).
59 See Crouch (1978).
60 See Robison (1986).
61 According to Bresnan (1993, p. 127).
62 See Hofman et al. (2004).
63 According to Robison (1986) and Sato (1993). The annual revenues from P.T. Mega
and P.T. Waringin Kencana grew at an annual average rate of US$ 1.2 million be-
tween 1971 and 1980 (Sato, 1993).
64 The start of operations are the years mentioned in an interview with Anthony Salim.
When confronted with the fact that other sources sometimes show different years of
establishment, the explanation by one of the Salim Group’s leading managers was
that companies were sometimes set up a few years earlier than real operations
started. According to another source that looked at the establishment of the compa-
nies (Sato, 1993) activities in flour milling started in 1969, cement in 1973, automo-
bile in 1971.
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65 Crouch (1978) reports, for example, that the flour milling activities, which were asso-
ciated with a foundation controlled by Mrs. Suharto, received credit approval from
the Bank of Indonesia only five days after application.
66 Partners in the automotive sector were Japanese companies like Hino, Mazda and
Suzuki. Nihon Cement and Taiwan Cement were partners in Indocement, and US
Steel was a partner in the Krakatau Cold Rolling Steel venture (Robison, 1986).
67 Mochtar Riady (also a hokchia) had been asked by Liem to take care of the manage-
ment of the BCA which subsequently grew rapidly under his leadership. The two Su-
harto children held a substantial number of shares in the BCA Bank. In 1998, when
the bank collapsed, they jointly had 30% of the shares. Mochtar Riady established his
own group called the Lippo Group and left BCA in 1990 (Sato, 1993). Ciputra, an In-
donesian businessman, also has his own business group called Metropolitan Group.
68 See CISI Rama Utama (1989, p. 400).
69 Quoted in Tempo (1984). Author’s translation.
70 Quoted in Tempo (1984). Author’s translation.
71 The Malari riots occurred at the occasion of the visit of Japanese Prime Minister
Tanaka in January 1974.
72 See Bresnan (1993).
73 See Sato (1994).
74 See Hofman et al. (2004).
75 According to Anthony Salim in an interview, Robison (1986) and Sato (1993).
76 See for example The Economist (1990).
77 Both quotes stem from an interview with Tempo (1984). Author’s translation.
78 According to Bresnan (1993, p. 250), ‘the import monopolies collected a commission
of US$ 20 per ton and a ‘handling fee’ of 2.5% of the value’. In 1984 and 1985, Indo-
nesia imported more than US$ 400 million in cold-rolled steel.
79 See Sato (1993, p. 413).
80 See Sato (1993, p 412-413).
81 Asswansi Java Central Asia Raya should probably be Asuransi Jiwa Central Asia Raya,
a company mentioned in other sources such as Soetriyono (1989).
82 See Tempo (1984). Author’s translation.
83 Interview with an executive of Astra, a competitor of Indomobil.
84 According to a leading newspaper, Sudwikatmono ‘confirms Salim chairman Liem
Sioe Liong helped bail out PT Bank Duta after 1990 scandal’ (Asian Wall Street Jour-
nal, 1994). This was also reported by Elson (2001, p. 252). It is likely that other such
transactions also occurred, although these were often done in a discreet manner, and
not well published. Liem also helped pay for the gambling debts of Suharto’s eldest
son, according to some unconfirmed reports.
85 See, for example, Dick (1985).
86 Sato (1994) estimates the turnover at over 1 trillion rupiah, which is the equivalent of
US$900 million at that time with an average annual rupiah rate of 1111 in 1985.
87 Soetriyono (1989) lists 192 companies in: trade, finance, construction/real estate,
automotive, metal, food, textile, chemical, forestry, cement, pharmaceutical, electro-
nics, glass, plastic, mining, surveys, holding companies, and others.
88 Elson, 2001, p. 250.
89 See Wilson and Williamson (1992, p. 2).
90 According to the South China Morning Post (1997).
91 Excerpt from Tempo (1984). Author’s translation. Liem mentioned that this motto is
what he wanted to pass on to his children.
92 The stock exchange opened in 1977, but only 24 companies were listed until 1988.
See, for an analysis of the economic policies with regard to financial markets in Indo-
nesia from 1966-1990, Cole and Slade (1992).
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93 The result of the listing was that Indocement started to make profits again.
94 According to Mackie and Sjahrir (1989, p. 23).
95 Darya-Varia is a pharmaceuticals company owned through First Pacific Company in
Hong Kong. It was listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange in 1994, and was disposed
of by First Pacific after the Asian Crisis.
96 Indomobil was listed on the stock exchange by a so-called ‘backdoor listing’. The
Salim Group merged Indomobil with its already listed P.T. Indomulti Inti Industri,
renamed it and sold the original Indomulti assets back to itself. (Jakarta Post, 1997b).
Notes Chapter 3
1 According to the Asian Development Bank Key Indicators 2004, the Indonesian
GDP growth was 7.5% in 1994; 8.2% in 1995 and 7.8% in 1996. Available at www.
adb.org/statistics, [accessed 6 January 2005].
2 See Thee (2002).
3 According to Feridhanusetyawan (1997).
4 According to Lindblad (1997). Japan also topped the list of foreign investors with
23% in the period 1967-1996.
5 See Pomerleano (1998).
6 See World Bank (1993).
7 See the First Pacific Annual Report 1996, p. 9.
8 Early influential articles were an article by Kao (1993) in Harvard Business Review and
an article by Kraar (1994) in Fortune Magazine. The East Asia Analytical Unit of the
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs published a report on the overseas Chinese
in 1995 that was well covered in the international press, and followed up by numer-
ous articles. These articles established the idea that the Chinese owned a dispropor-
tionate share of the wealth and economic power in Southeast Asia. Later books like
Weidenbaum and Murray (1996) analysed the ethnic Chinese as one regional power,
with strong links to China. Academic studies also followed.
9 Fane and Condon (1996) have surveyed the level of protection enjoyed by certain sec-
tors. Apart from the heavily protected automotive industry, other sectors like livestock
and plastics also enjoyed similar protection.
10 See Feridhanusetyawan (1997).
11 Japan launched a complaint at the WTO over the protective measures offered for the
production of the car named Timor. The national car project encountered many diffi-
culties, and was considered an embarrassment. When the problem was to find a
manufacturing location, Indomobil, a Salim company, provided a plant where the car
could be assembled. (Financial Times, 1997a).
12 See Manning and Jayasuriya (1997, p. 17).
13 According to the Australian Financial Review (1995b).
14 In 1995, large Indonesian conglomerates held a meeting about alleviating poverty,
which was described by the press as being a reaction to government plans to issue
new competition rules to limit conglomerate power. (Financial Times, 1995b). The
meeting, which was actually initiated by the government, resulted in the so-called
Bali Declaration which aimed at alleviating poverty by supporting small business
growth. The decree issued by Suharto, however, apparently went further than the
conglomerates had intended. It required all large domestic companies to donate 2%
of their earnings (Financial Times, 1996).
15 See for example Yeung (2000).
16 See Financial Times (1995a).
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17 The effect was that reliable estimates of investments of the Salim Group in China
were hard to obtain. For this reason, I had to rely on media and on interviews.
18 The Fujian Asia Bank was set up as a 50-50 joint venture with the Bank of China to
introduce overseas investment opportunities to Chinese enterprises, as well as pro-
mote foreign investments into China (Nikkei Weekly, 1993). It remained a small bank
and was later sold to Ping An Insurance and renamed Ping An Bank (Financial
Times, 2003a).
19 According to the Australian Financial Review (1995a).
20 See the Weekend Australian (1995).
21 See Sato (1993).
22 A Japanese newspaper reported: ‘The largest individual contributor to the national
coffers last year was Liem Sioe Liong, founder of the Salim Group. In fact, taxpayers
from Salim, Indonesia’s biggest conglomerate, swept the top five positions. Suharto’s
first cousin Sudwikatmono, a founding shareholder in Salim, came in seventh’ (Nik-
kei Weekly, 1994).
23 For example, Soetriyono (1989) or Lever-Tracy (2002).
24 In 1996, Liem received a doctorate honoris causa from the Wharton School, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania, according to the 1997 Indomobil Annual Report. This was ap-
parently connected to Anthony Salim’s US$1.6 million gift by to the Wharton School
for a professorship named after his father and First Pacific Company (Wharton Alum-
ni Magazine, 1996).
25 According to Sato (2004) and a Salim Group brochure. The term ‘division’ may sug-
gest that the group was established under a single umbrella or had a legal status as a
group, but this was in fact not the case. As explained previously, the Salim Group
consisted of a variety of separate legal entities under ownership of the Salim family
and partners.
26 This is a term used by the Salim Group for ‘other manufacturing activities’. It in-
cludes diverse activities such as sport shoe, textile, and galvanised iron sheet manu-
facturing.
27 To my best knowledge the brochure published in 1996 is the latest promotional ma-
terial on the Salim Group as a whole.
28 According to Sato (1993; 1994; 2003). Calculated in US$ using the historic annual
average rupiah rates.
29 The GDP in 1996 at current market prices was 532 trillion rupiah. (Asian Develop-
ment Bank) www.adb.org/statistics. [accessed 6 January 2005].
30 These turnover figures were mentioned in: Financial Times, 1994; Australian Finan-
cial Review, 1994; Australian, 1995b; Australian, 1996a; Australian, 1996b. Other
newspapers reported similar figures.
31 There is a rather large discrepancy between the 1995 figures quoted by newspapers
and those by the Salim Group (11 vs 20 billion), but a plausible explanation could be
that the figures mentioned in newspapers lag behind those published by the Salim
Group itself.
32 See Tempo (1984). Author’s translation.
33 Quoted in Tempo (1984). Author’s translation.
34 Figures for Indomobil and BCA were not available for the period, The Indomobil
Group was only listed on the Jakarta stock exchange in 1997 and BCA in 2001.
35 Although the listed companies were not heavily engaged in exporting, this does not
apply for the private companies. Some of those mainly produced for export, such as
shoes, flowers, meat, and shrimp.
36 See for example the Australian (1995a).
37 For 1996, the listed companies under the First Pacific umbrella were (company
name (country of listing) economic interest attributable to subsidiary company in %):
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Hagemeyer N.V. (Netherlands) 38.1%; Berli Jucker Company Ltd. (Thailand) 57.5%;
P.T. Darya-Varia Laboratoria (Indonesia) 51.4%; Metro Pacific Corporation (Philip-
pines) 63.7%; FPB Bank Holding Company Ltd. (Hong Kong) 51%; PDCP Develop-
ment Bank Inc. (Philippines) 21.8%.
38 After the Asian Crisis, the Salim Group handed over a large number of companies to
the Indonesian government, who subsequently sold them. Because of this sales pro-
cess, information on the structure of the various companies was published. It be-
came evident that the companies were organised in sub-groups of operating compa-
nies under the umbrella of at least one, but often more holding companies (Holdiko,
1999, 2001).
39 According to a Jakarta analyst interviewed for this study the shares in the toll road
operator were given as a payment for the delivery of cement to construct the toll-
road.
40 A Hong Kong Newspaper reported in 1994: ‘First Pacific Co subsidiary Darya-Varia
Laboratoria has agreed to buy stakes in two Indonesian companies for 8.5 billion ru-
piah (about HK$ 32 million). It has signed an agreement to buy 50 per cent of the
shares in Central Sari Medical Supplies and 49 per cent of the shares in Gelatindo
Mukti Graha.’ (South China Morning Post, 1994). Both companies were mentioned in
a list of Salim Group companies in 1989 (CISI, 1989)
41 According to the First Pacific Annual Report, 1996.
42 See Asia Pulse (1997).
43 See, for example, the Chemicals Business Newsbase (1997).
44 In this case, the related parties are not only Salim Group companies, but also compa-
nies linked to other major UIC shareholders such as the Wings Group.
45 This pyramid structure is also evident in the companies transferred to Holdiko. Vir-
tually all of the companies handed over to the Indonesian government had one or
more holding companies (Holdiko, 1999, 2001).
46 P.T. Inti Salim Corpora was established in 1983 and had registered capital of just 100
million rupiah, the owners were Anthony Salim and Andree Halim with 50% each
(Berita Negara, 1998).
47 Indonesia follows the Dutch two-tier board system consisting of a board of directors
and a supervisory board which consists of commissioners. Hong Kong and Singapore
have a one-tier board with executive and non-executive members.
Notes Chapter 4
1 Of the 214 companies listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange, 128 companies reported
a loss for the first months of 1998 and 53 companies reported negative equity
(Zhuang et al., 2001).
2 See Zhuang et al. (2001).
3 See Pomerleano (1998).
4 See IMF (2004).
5 Thee, 2003, p. 189.
6 Reported in the Financial Times (1997b).
7 See Van Dijk (2002).
8 Even before the Asian Crisis erupted, there were already high levels of Non-Perform-
ing Loans in the Indonesian banking sector (Zhuang et al., 2001; Feridhanusetya-
wan, 1997).
9 An investigation by the Supreme Audit Agency later revealed irregularities in the li-
quidity credits provided by Bank Indonesia to several banks (totalling over US$ 20
billion). BCA was one of the largest recipients of liquidity support. It was suggested
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that bank owners had used the capital injections to speculate on foreign exchange
rather than using it to increase the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) of their banks
(AFX Asia, 2004). But the Bank of Indonesia was not above criticism either. At the
end of 1997, much of the management changed after accusations of corruption (Van
Dijk, 2002, p. 84)
10 The legal lending limit for lending to affiliated companies was a maximum of 20%
but this was violated by many banks owned by Indonesian conglomerates.
11 Several interviews and also the literature (e.g., Soesastro and Basri, 1998) confirm
that conglomerates, in fact, used their banks to collect money from the public and
subsequently lend to their own group companies. However, most of those people also
say that the Salim Group (including BCA) was much better run and more profes-
sional than other banks.
12 There were many instances where Suharto reversed his decisions, which adversely af-
fected his relatives’ or friends’ business interests. One reason for doubting Suharto’s
commitment to the implementation of the IMF packages is worth noting here. The
closure of 16 banks also included Bank Andromeda, a bank 25% owned by Bambang
Trihatmodjo, Suharto’s son, who was furious and at first threatened to sue the min-
ister of finance. Within a short period however, Bambang was able to buy another
bank, Bank Alfa (Wall Street Journal, 1997). This bank was bought from Albert Halim
(Liem Sioe Liong’s son) after an asset swap took place. Bank Alfa’s assets and liabil-
ities were transferred to the Bank Risjad Salim International (also under the Salim
Group) and the assets and Bank Andromeda liabilities were inserted (Van Dijk 2002,
p. 89). Apparently the Salim Group was again helping out old friends.
13 See, for example, Soesastro and Basri (1998) and Van Dijk (2002).
14 See, for example, Associated Press (1998a).
15 Rumours circulated that the riots had been organised, particularly those in the vici-
nity of Liem Sioe Liong’s house (Van Dijk, 2002).
16 South China Morning Post, 1999c. The most likely reason why the range of estimated
capital flight is so broad is that there were no statistics. The source also mentioned
that the figure was more likely to be closer to US$10 billion.
17 These KKN scandals were numerous. The Bank Bali scandal led to the detention of
the governor of the central bank. The case of Texmaco, another conglomerate, re-
vealed that Suharto intervened directly to enable this conglomerate to obtain loans,
although this was against the prevailing regulations. The Bulog (state logistics
agency) scandal provided another case of KKN.
18 McLeod, 2000, p. 5.
19 See Thee (2002, p. 186).
20 Newspapers reported rumours of the Salim Group planning to buy a controlling
stake of San Miguel for US$1.6 billion (Australian, 1997), Manuel Pangilinan, CEO
of First Pacific, reported that ‘we bought 2% of the company in 1997 for approxi-
mately US$ 70 million as a toehold to possibly acquiring a major equity position’.
(Annual Report First Pacific, 1997). Negotiations with other shareholders, including
the Philippine government, did not succeed, and therefore the acquired shares were
subsequently sold. The transaction with Bank Danamon involved US$84 million (Ja-
karta Post, 1997c) and also involved CSFB as a partner, but was cancelled on 6 April
1998 because of ‘recent developments’ i.e., the unfolding crisis (Jakarta Post, 1998a).
21 The turnover of QAF in 1997 was only US$224 million, whereas Indofood reported
a turnover of US$1.7 billion in the same year according to annual reports of both
companies.
22 See, for example, Jakarta Post (1997a).
23 E.g., Bisnis Indonesia (1997); Sinar (1997); Forum (1997).
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24 It is possible that the sudden moves to influence the composition of the board of
Jurong Cement Limited (a Singapore listed cement maker in which the Salim Group
held a 20% stake) were connected with these plans (Business Times, 1997).
25 See Business Week (1998).
26 New York Times, 1999.
27 Because of the long queues for withdrawing money BCA became known as Bank Ca-
pek Antre (Tired of Queuing Bank) (Van Dijk, 2002, p. 194).
28 Jakarta Post, 1998b.
29 According to a Salim manager, the Salim family handed over the bank on 20 May
1998.
30 Associated Press, 1998b.
31 According to Finance Minister Bambang Subianto (Asia Pulse, 1998b).
32 The drinking water contracts for Jakarta were divided between the Salim Group (part-
nering with Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux) and Suharto’s son Sigit (with Thames Water).
Because the contracts were awarded in a non-transparent way, crony capitalism was
assumed, and they came under pressure. (Australian, 1998). Suez Lyonnaise des
Eaux cancelled its joint venture with the Salim Group and took 100% ownership of
the company managing the west Jakarta water supply.
33 Jakarta Post, 1998c.
34 According to the 1997 First Pacific Company’s annual report.
35 This acquisition aroused some criticism, since a Salim-controlled company was pay-
ing so much while still owing billions of dollars to the Indonesian government. Rizal
Ramli, who later became minister of economic affairs, commented that this showed
that the Salim Group had money to pay the government (Jakarta Post, 1998c)
36 The deal first included Nissin, but was blocked by creditor after which Nissin pulled
out. First Pacific went ahead and tried to achieve a controlling stake in Indofood
alone. The stake was sold by the Salim family for a big discount (Financial Times,
1999). Minority shareholders of First Pacific approved acquiring a 40% stake of In-
dofood for US$ 600 million. In subsequent years they built a majority stake in the
company which was achieved in 2002.
37 The Indonesian name was Badan Penyehatan Perbankan Nasional (BPPN).
38 To illustrate IBRA’s importance: in May 2000 it managed assets valued at US$53 bil-
lion (IBRA monthly newsletter, June 2000) while Indonesian GDP was around US
$150 billion in 2000. Of course this made the institution an interesting target for all
kinds of people inside and outside the organisation trying to get a piece of the pie.
IBRA complained that the government interfered with their task. Several irregulari-
ties were revealed at IBRA (Van Dijk, 2002).
39 See IBRA (1999).
40 See, for example, Asia Pulse (1998a).
41 See, for example, New York Times (1998).
42 The total obligations of the Salim Group to IBRA were over 50 trillion rupiah (ap-
proximately US$5 billion) but the sales value of the surrendered assets was only 20
billion (Financial Times, 2000b). The reason for this lower value could have been due
to the value of assets falling in value over time; and/or due to the value of the assets
having been inflated at the time of surrender in 1999.
43 According to statements by Temenggung, then head of IBRA, at a press conference
on 11 July 2002 (AFX Asia, 2002).
44 The figures given in the Holdiko report do not add up to 100%, but it is not clear to
the author why.
45 IBRA 2000a; 2000b.
46 According to the Financial Times (2000a). This lack of interest spurred Business Week
(2000) to publish an article under the title ‘Crony bank, anyone?’
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47 Belgian retailing group Delhaize bought 49% of Shop ‘n Save (previously under
QAF) for approx. US$ 14.5 million (South China Morning Post, 1999a).
48 See, for example, South China Morning Post (1999a).
49 The end-of-year rupiah rate for 1999 stood at 7085 while the 2000 rate was 9595, so
there is a substantial difference. Because the exact sales date of the assets was not al-
ways clear, I’ve used the 2000 rate for all transactions.
50 See AFX Asia (2001).
51 MSAA means Master Settlement and Acquisition Agreement, which regulated the
transfer of assets from ailing conglomerates that had their banks recapitalized by the
government to IBRA. BPPN is the Indonesian acronym for the Indonesian Bank Re-
structuring Agency (IBRA).
Notes Chapter 5
1 According to the ADB key economic indicators for Indonesia the GDP growth rates
were 3.5%; 3.7% and 4.1% respectively in 2001, 2002 and 2003. Available at www.
adb.org/statistics [accessed 6 January 2005].
2 See IMF (2004).
3 See Athukorala (2002).
4 See, for example, Dick (2001).
5 Indofood had plans to spin off Bogasari since 1999. One of the reasons for the spin
off mentioned by analysts was the new anti-monopoly law implemented after the cri-
sis, another reason was to raise money to pay of debts. Citing low price, Indofood
has so far deferred its plans to spin off Bogasari.
6 During its 5 years of existence IBRA had seven different chairmen, namely: Bambang
Subianto, Radius Prawiro, Glenn Yusuf, Cacuk Sudarijanto, Edwin Gerungan, I Putu
Gede Ary Suta, and Syafruddin Temenggung.
7 See Pangestu and Goeltom (2001); Siregar (2001).
8 See Business Week (2003).
9 See for example United Press International (2002). In order to dispose of its shares in
Indosiar, IBRA initiated an IPO. On 22 March 2001 the company was listed at the Ja-
karta Stock Exchange. On 28 November 2001, IBRA and Holdiko announced they
had sold 49% of the shares to TDM Aset Manajemen, a newly formed company. The
sale of 72.63% ownership in Indomobil was announced on 5 December 2001. The
buyer was a consortium led by Trimegah Securities. People close to Anthony Salim
have confirmed there rumours.
10 The transaction to sell the Holdiko ownership of Indocement shares to Heidelberger
Cement was finalised on 18 April 2001.
11 The Monthly IBRA Newsletters in this period were reviewed. (IBRA, 2001a, 2001b,
2001c, 2001d, 2001e, 2001f, 2001g, 2001h, 2001i, 2001j, 2001k, 2001l, 2002a,
2002b, 2002c, 2002d, 2002e, 2002f, 2002g, 2002h, 2002i, 2002j, 2002k, 2002l,
2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2003d, 2003e, 2003f, 2003g, 2003h, 2003i, 2003j, 2003k,
2003l). Calculated into US dollars, using the end-of-year rupiah rate for 2003. The
list of asset sales does not appear to be complete if compared with the companies
that were handed over by the Salim Group.
12 See for example Asia Pulse (2002).
13 Reported in Business Week (2003). Based on table 4.3 and table 5.1, I arrive at a total
of US$2.4 billion, which would be a recovery rate of 48%, but the difference can ea-
sily be caused by applying different currency rates. The average recovery rate for all
Indonesian debtors stood at 28.5%. This is comparable with Malaysian results (29%)
but lower than Thailand (35.34%) and Korea (39%) as reported by Tempo (2004).
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14 See, for example, Jakarta Post (2004a).
15 See, for example, Jakarta Post (2004b).
16 According to Futuris’s annual report in 2002.
17 According to a report by Jones Lang LaSalle (2002, p. 12).
18 It is rather strange that Andree Halim, being the son of Soedono Salim, has a differ-
ent family name – but it could be the result of a simple mistake in the name registra-
tion. Although usually the name Andree Halim is used in official documentation,
IBRA here uses the Salim family name. Anthony Salim is sometimes spelled Antho-
ni Salim.
19 It is possible that the Salim family had shares in First Pacific and in Indofood di-
rectly, but the First Pacific and Indofood annual reports of 2002 did not disclose this
aside from mentioning that Anthony Salim had a 0.01% share in First Pacific.
20 According to the Peaktop corporate website, Andree Halim was appointed co-vice
chairman in October 2003. The company is mainly active in garden and home dec-
orations and production is in Fuqing, China. It started producing in 1992 in Fuqing
and was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 1998 (www.peaktop.com [ac-
cessed 29 May 2005]).
21 See Financial Times (2003b).
22 Anthony Salim already discussed the sale of PLDT with a potential buyer, an ethnic
Chinese businessman from the Philippines. However, Manuel Pangilinan was vehe-
mently opposed to the deal. Two directors resigned. First Pacific finally held on its
shareholding in PLDT and the prospective buyer pulled out. Instead First Pacific sold
its majority share in Bonifacio Land in the Philippines to another Filipino group for
US$ 102.2 million (Financial Times, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c).
Notes Chapter 6
1 The straight line in this Figure is the line that best represents the trend in the data
based on the R-squared value. The same linear trendline technique was used in Fig-
ures 6.2, 6.3; 6.4 and 6.6. In Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.6 the trendline appears in the
legend as ‘linear’ followed by the name of data series between brackets.
2 The idea that politically well connected business groups engaging in rent seeking
should be dissolved has also been voiced by some researchers (Morck and Yeung,
2004, p. 405). The reason is that rent-seeking is believed to have a negative impact
on economic growth (Murphy et al., 1993).
3 See Post (2006).
Notes Chapter 7
1 See, for example, Redding (1995) or Limlingan (1986).
2 See, for example, Lever-Tracy (2001) and Backman (1999)
3 For example, Ong and Nonini (1997).
4 See for the concept of path dependency Garud and Karnoe (2001) and for path de-
pendency in ethnic Chinese firms Carney and Gedajlovic (2002, 2003) and Ahlstrom
et al. (2004).
5 See, for example, Backman (1999).
6 See for example Robison (1986) or Yoshihara (1989).
7 Developed by Putnam (2000) and Adler and Kwon (2002).
8 See Panzar and Willig (1981).
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9 See Khanna and Palepu (1997, 1999).
10 See, for example, Peng (2003).
11 See, for example, Chrisman et al. (2005).
12 For example, Peng (2003).
13 See, for example, Oliver (1991).
14 The Salim Group study supports propositions developed by Rodrigues and Child
(2003) who argued that an emerging market player can increase its level of choice by
immersing itself in political networks.
15 See, for example, Kang (2002); Lee (2000) and Park (2002).
16 For example, in the South China Morning Post (1998).
17 See Schwarz (2004, p. 112).
Notes Annex 2
1 See Boyatzis (1998, p. 63).
2 Strauss and Corbin (1998).
3 According to Boyatzis (1998).
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Glossary
Ali-Baba Alliance between Chinese (Baba) and Indonesian (Ali)
Bang Dialect group
Benteng Fortress
Cendana Jakarta street in which the Indonesian Presidential Pa-
lace is located
Chaebol South Korean business group
Cukong Indonesian businessman linking up with an official
Danbangke Trader with a bicycle
Guanxi Connections
Hengua Fujian language group (sometimes spelled Xinghua)
Hokchia Fujian language group
Hoki Luck
Kretek Clove cigarette
Masalah Cina Chinese problem
Om Uncle
Peranakan Assimilated Indonesian-Chinese person
Qiaoxiang Ties with one’s birthplace
Sinkeh New Chinese migrant in Indonesia
Totok Newly arrived Chinese in Indonesia
Xinghua Fujian language group (sometimes spelled Hengua)
Abbreviations
ADB Asian Development Bank
BCA Bank Central Asia
BPPN Badan Penyahatan Perbankan Nasional (See IBRA)
CAR Capital Adequacy Ratio
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CPO Crude Palm Oil
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IBRA Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency
IMF International Monetary Fund
IPO Initial Public Offering
KKN Korupsi, Kolusi, Nepotisme
MSAA Master of Settlement and Acquisition Agreement
NPL Non-Performing Loans
PLDT Philippine Long Distance Telephone
UIC Unggul Indah Cahaya
US$ US Dollar
WTO World Trade Organisation
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